{"id":19569,"date":"2026-07-02T17:54:13","date_gmt":"2026-07-02T12:09:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=19569"},"modified":"2026-07-02T17:54:13","modified_gmt":"2026-07-02T12:09:13","slug":"ukraine-the-european-union-and-nato-membership-deterrence-and-europes-new-security-dilemma","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=19569","title":{"rendered":"Ukraine, the European Union and NATO: Membership, Deterrence and Europe\u2019s New Security Dilemma<\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

# Pravdist (\u041f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0434\u0438\u0441\u0442)
\nInternational Security and Strategic Affairs Analyst<\/strong><\/p>\n

When Ireland assumed the six-month presidency of the Council of the European Union on July 1, 2026, the opening ceremony in Dublin carried significance far beyond the routine institutional calendar. The presence of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, European Council President Ant\u00f3nio Costa and Irish Prime Minister Miche\u00e1l Martin brought three interconnected questions facing contemporary Europe onto a single platform: how to fulfil the promise of integrating wartime Ukraine into the European Union, what form Europe\u2019s long-term security relationship with Russia should take, and how much greater responsibility a Europe still dependent on American military capabilities is prepared to assume for its own defence.<\/p>\n

Ireland will hold the presidency of the Council of the European Union until December 31, 2026, under the theme \u201cStrength Through Unity.\u201d Competitiveness, values and security are among its principal priorities. The country holding the rotating presidency does not determine overall EU policy on its own. It chairs ministerial meetings, advances the common agenda, seeks compromise among member states and helps build legislative agreement between the Council and the European Parliament. Ireland therefore has no unilateral authority to grant Ukraine membership, but it possesses meaningful institutional influence to accelerate negotiations, build consensus and keep the issue high on the European political agenda.<\/p>\n

Zelenskyy\u2019s appeal is neither a new nor an undefined political demand. Ukraine applied for EU membership on February 28, 2022. It received candidate status in June 2022. Accession negotiations were formally launched on June 25, 2024, and the bilateral screening of Ukrainian legislation was completed in September 2025. On June 15, 2026, with the agreement of all EU member states, the first negotiating cluster, known as the Fundamentals Cluster, was opened.<\/p>\n

This first cluster is not merely a technical chapter. It covers the judiciary, fundamental rights, justice and security, public procurement, statistics and financial control. It is opened first and remains under scrutiny until the final stages of the accession process. Progress in the rule of law, democratic institutions, public administration reform and anti-corruption measures determines the pace of the entire negotiation. Ukraine\u2019s membership therefore cannot be guaranteed by geopolitical solidarity alone. Even under wartime conditions, it must meet the EU\u2019s institutional, economic and legal standards.<\/p>\n

During his visit to Dublin on July 1, Zelenskyy urged the European Union to open the remaining negotiating clusters quickly and translate its political commitment to Ukraine\u2019s eventual membership into practical action. According to the Ukrainian position, further progress would strengthen public morale, accelerate domestic reforms and demonstrate that the EU intends to honour its promises. Ukraine\u2019s accession process, continued support and pressure on Russia were also among the central issues discussed during the high-level meetings in Dublin.<\/p>\n

For the Ukrainian leadership, EU membership is not merely a matter of economic or commercial integration. It is a strategic instrument for making the country\u2019s postwar orientation irreversible, giving external institutional support to domestic reforms, attracting reconstruction investment and limiting the possibility of Ukraine returning to a Russian sphere of influence. Kyiv has increasingly treated its European orientation as part of the state\u2019s long-term political and security architecture.<\/p>\n

A fundamental distinction must nevertheless be understood. Membership of the European Union and membership of NATO are not the same. Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union obliges member states to assist a fellow member that becomes the victim of armed aggression on its territory. Yet this mechanism is not supported by the kind of integrated military command, joint operational planning and collective defence structure that exists under NATO. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty establishes the political and security commitment that an armed attack against one member shall be considered an attack against all.<\/p>\n

Ukraine\u2019s entry into the European Union could therefore anchor its political, legal and economic future in Europe, but it would not automatically provide the collective military guarantees associated with NATO membership. Advancing Ukraine toward EU membership while postponing immediate NATO accession may emerge as a middle path for European powers. Such an arrangement could preserve Ukraine\u2019s Western institutional direction while somewhat reducing the danger of a direct military confrontation between NATO and Russia.<\/p>\n

Zelenskyy\u2019s message in Dublin and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte\u2019s statements in Berlin should be understood within this broader context. One concerns Ukraine\u2019s political and institutional integration. The other concerns military deterrence, defence production and NATO\u2019s strategy of maintaining long-term pressure on Russia.<\/p>\n

During a press conference in Berlin on July 1, 2026, with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, Rutte said Germany was expanding defence spending, military production and assistance to Ukraine. According to NATO, Germany is moving toward spending 3.5 percent of gross domestic product on core defence by 2029. This forms part of the alliance\u2019s broader objective of raising combined defence and security-related expenditure to five percent by 2035.<\/p>\n

Rutte argued that deterrence is built not only in military bases and armed forces, but also in factories, production lines and supply chains. NATO has urged defence industries to increase output, open new production facilities and deliver equipment more rapidly to member states. He portrayed Germany as one of Ukraine\u2019s leading European supporters and insisted that pressure on Russia must be maintained. NATO\u2019s leadership increasingly regards Russia as a long-term challenge to Euro-Atlantic security even after the present war ends.<\/p>\n

This language reflects a profound transformation in NATO strategy. During the initial phase of the conflict, the central priority was the immediate provision of weapons, financial assistance and training to Ukraine. The alliance is now investing in a longer-term military posture involving permanent deployments in Eastern Europe, air defence, ammunition stockpiles, military mobility, defence production and the protection of critical civilian infrastructure.<\/p>\n

Germany has moved to the centre of this restructuring. For much of the post-Second World War period, German security policy rested on military restraint, American protection and economic interdependence. The Ukraine crisis has rapidly altered that model. Germany has expanded its role in Baltic security, developed a permanent military presence in Lithuania and assumed a central role in NATO structures coordinating security assistance and training for Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Increasing defence expenditure, however, is not merely a technical military or budgetary decision. Every additional billion euros devoted to defence competes with social security, healthcare, education, housing, energy transition and public infrastructure. Immediate security fears may provide political legitimacy for larger defence budgets, but maintaining such levels for decades will require sustained public consent.<\/p>\n

Europe\u2019s challenge is not limited to raising money. Building industrial capacity, training skilled personnel, securing electronic components and raw materials, producing ammunition, drones and air-defence systems, and coordinating the military structures of different states may take years. Allocating more money and creating genuine combat-ready capability are two different processes. If Europe fails to translate budgetary announcements into production and operational strength, the political cost of defence spending will rise without producing the expected level of deterrence.<\/p>\n

It would also be premature to describe these developments as the full emergence of European strategic autonomy. In Berlin, Rutte made clear that the United States remains indispensable to Ukraine\u2019s defence. American capabilities remain decisive in advanced air defence, intelligence, strategic transport, military command and high-end technology. Europe and Canada may assume a larger share of the financial and conventional military burden, but the creation of a security system fully independent of the United States remains unlikely in the near future.<\/p>\n

The present trend is therefore less about constructing an autonomous European military pole outside the United States than about redistributing responsibilities within NATO. Europe is expected to bear a larger share of conventional defence, production and financial costs, while the United States remains at the centre of advanced technology, strategic deterrence, intelligence and nuclear security.<\/p>\n

Ireland\u2019s position is especially significant in this context. It is not a NATO member and continues to uphold a policy of military neutrality. Yet neutrality does not remove it from the European security debate. Modern security is no longer limited to tanks, troops and territory. Undersea communications cables, energy infrastructure, ports, cyber systems, elections, the information environment, supply chains and financial networks have all become components of national security. A neutral state cannot remain isolated from these risks without developing the capacity to protect critical infrastructure and national sovereignty.<\/p>\n

While institutional integration, European rearmament and NATO deterrence are advancing on the Western side, Moscow views these developments not as ordinary defensive adjustments but as the continuation of an unbalanced European security order constructed after the Cold War. From the Russian perspective, an analysis of the Ukraine conflict that begins only in February 2022 obscures the historical, political and military causes of the crisis.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s central argument is that the end of the Cold War created an opportunity to build a common, equal and indivisible security system in Europe. Instead of using that opportunity to create an inclusive structure, NATO was gradually expanded eastward. For the Russian leadership, this was not simply the geographical enlargement of an alliance. It became evidence that the West interpreted the end of the Cold War not as a common victory, but as its own strategic triumph and Russia\u2019s defeat.<\/p>\n

Public records from the negotiations over German reunification in 1990 and 1991 contain various statements by Western officials concerning Soviet security interests and the non-extension of NATO\u2019s military jurisdiction eastward. Whether those statements applied only to the territory of the former East Germany or also implied a broader commitment concerning Central and Eastern Europe remains disputed. No legally binding treaty prohibiting NATO enlargement was concluded. Diplomatic trust, however, is not built solely through written clauses. Russia\u2019s argument that the political signals of that period created broader expectations in Moscow cannot simply be dismissed as a myth.<\/p>\n

NATO enlargement therefore became more than a matter of military calculation in Russian political consciousness. It came to represent the erosion of mutual trust, the perception that Russia had not been accepted as an equal security partner and the belief that Western institutions had established a monopoly over the European security order. Central and Eastern European countries, by contrast, interpreted NATO membership as an expression of sovereign choice and a response to security fears rooted in their historical experience. The unresolved question was how to reconcile one state\u2019s right to choose its alliances with the security consequences that choice could impose on another.<\/p>\n

This is where Russia\u2019s concept of \u201cequal and indivisible security\u201d becomes important. Documents adopted within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, including the 1999 Istanbul Document and the 2010 Astana Commemorative Declaration, affirm the right of each state to choose its security arrangements and alliances. The same documents also refer to common and indivisible security, a security space without dividing lines and the interrelationship between the security of all participating states. The Russian criticism is that the West emphasised the right to choose alliances while treating the consequences for the security of other states as secondary.<\/p>\n

NATO\u2019s official position is that no external power may exercise a veto over the membership choices of independent states. The alliance has repeatedly affirmed its open-door policy and the right of each nation to choose its own security path. Although NATO expressed willingness to discuss missile control, military transparency, risk reduction and communication mechanisms with Russia, it rejected Russian demands to halt enlargement and restrict military deployments in Eastern member states.<\/p>\n

From Moscow\u2019s perspective, this response continued a pattern in which only one side of Europe\u2019s interconnected security principles was recognised. Russia does not formally deny the sovereign right of states to make security choices. It argues, however, that the extension of a major military alliance\u2019s infrastructure, missile systems, intelligence capabilities and possible long-term deployments to its borders cannot be treated as an ordinary political decision without strategic consequences.<\/p>\n

In an article published on June 19, 2026, on Ukraine, Europe and global security, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov linked the Ukraine crisis to this post-Cold War security imbalance. In his analysis, the enlargement of the European Union and the Eastern Partnership initiative ceased to be purely economic or cooperative projects and gradually became geopolitical instruments for separating the post-Soviet region from Russia politically, economically and strategically. From Moscow\u2019s standpoint, the European integration of Ukraine and Moldova forms part of this broader process.<\/p>\n

Russia also places the political change in Ukraine in 2014 within this historical sequence. Moscow\u2019s official interpretation is that a change of power outside constitutional procedures occurred with open Western political support and that the government formed afterward did not represent a consensus among all Ukrainian regions and linguistic communities. Western governments and the Ukrainian authorities, however, describe the fall of then-President Viktor Yanukovych as the result of mass protest, state repression, political crisis and the president\u2019s eventual flight from the country.<\/p>\n

Presenting the events of 2014 as an entirely domestic and spontaneous democratic transformation overlooks the active political involvement of Western officials, their contacts with opposition leaders and their rapid support for the new authorities. Yet reducing the entire crisis to an externally organised operation would also ignore genuine public discontent, anti-corruption sentiment and deep political divisions inside Ukraine. The central analytical point is that the combination of external geopolitical competition and internal political dissatisfaction pushed Ukraine toward confrontation rather than national reconciliation.<\/p>\n

The Minsk agreements later offered an opportunity to seek a political resolution to the conflict in Donbas. They envisaged a framework involving a ceasefire, constitutional reform and a special political arrangement within Ukraine. Implementation failed because of continuing disagreements over the sequencing of security and political measures, ceasefire violations, border control and the status of the affected regions.<\/p>\n

Russia has argued that Kyiv and its Western supporters used the Minsk process to gain time and strengthen Ukraine\u2019s military capabilities. The Western side maintains that political provisions could not advance because of the security situation and the actions of Russia-backed forces. Whatever interpretation is accepted, the failure of the Minsk process demonstrated the absence of a credible mechanism capable of enforcing an agreement already endorsed by the major parties. In Russian strategic thinking, this deepened distrust toward future arrangements with the West.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s legally binding security proposals presented to the United States and NATO in December 2021 emerged from this background. They sought an end to further NATO enlargement, particularly the exclusion of Ukrainian membership, limits on military deployments and exercises in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet region, and mutual restrictions on ground-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. From Moscow\u2019s standpoint, these proposals were an attempt to restructure a deteriorating security balance through diplomacy.<\/p>\n

The United States and NATO indicated that arms control, transparency and risk reduction could be discussed. They nevertheless refused to change the alliance\u2019s open-door policy or grant Russia authority over the strategic choices of other states. From the Western perspective, the Russian proposals risked dividing sovereign countries into spheres of influence and limiting the defence rights of Eastern NATO members. From the Russian perspective, the Western response avoided the central causes of the security crisis and offered dialogue only on secondary matters.<\/p>\n

The negotiations held in Istanbul in 2022 subsequently became another major diplomatic turning point. Available draft documents and accounts from people familiar with the talks indicate that serious discussions took place over Ukrainian neutrality, non-membership in NATO, non-nuclear status, international security guarantees and the possibility of EU membership. Significant disagreements nevertheless remained over territory, the size of Ukraine\u2019s armed forces, the responsibilities of guarantor states and the mechanism for implementing security commitments. The talks were real and had reached an advanced stage, but it would be inaccurate to claim that a complete and signature-ready peace treaty had already been finalised.<\/p>\n

According to the Russian leadership, the negotiations were approaching meaningful agreement and Kyiv changed course under external influence. President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly referred to the Istanbul draft as a possible basis for a settlement. Moscow argues that the political calculations of the Ukrainian leadership shifted after then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson visited Kyiv.<\/p>\n

This claim is not an uncontested fact. Ukraine\u2019s improved battlefield position, the events made public in Bucha, unresolved territorial disputes, uncertain security guarantees and expectations of continuing Western support all affected the course of the negotiations. Yet the opposite assertion, that Istanbul never represented a real opportunity for peace, is also inconsistent with the available evidence. A genuine framework involving neutrality and security guarantees existed. The parties ultimately failed to turn it into a final agreement.<\/p>\n

From the Russian perspective, this experience produced a serious conclusion: the West\u2019s principal objective was not the rapid conclusion of peace, but the use of Ukraine to weaken Russia\u2019s military, economic and political power. Western leaders describe their policy as the defence of Ukrainian sovereignty, self-defence and the rules-based international order. These opposing narratives have severely weakened the foundation of trust necessary for any peace process.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s security concerns are therefore not merely abstract fears. They are connected to concrete strategic calculations involving the movement of NATO infrastructure, missile defence systems, military exercises, intelligence capabilities and possible long-term deployments toward Russian borders. Recognising Ukraine\u2019s sovereign rights does not eliminate this military-geographical reality.<\/p>\n

At the same time, none of this negates Ukraine\u2019s sovereignty, the security of its citizens or its right to self-defence. Ukrainian society has endured the direct destruction of war, and no durable settlement should leave the country insecure, unstable or permanently exposed to military pressure. But peace will not endure if Ukrainian security and Russian security are treated as mutually exclusive, zero-sum concepts.<\/p>\n

The full meaning of the OSCE principle of indivisible security must therefore be restored. Ukraine has the right to choose its political future. That right, however, should not be converted into a military arrangement that entirely disregards the security of a neighbouring nuclear power. Russia has legitimate security concerns, but those concerns cannot become a justification for eliminating Ukrainian statehood or the security of its population. A durable settlement must place both sides within binding limits, reciprocal commitments and verifiable security arrangements.<\/p>\n

Seen from a Russian strategic perspective, Europe\u2019s central question is not how Russia can be defeated, but whether a European security order that includes Russia is still possible. The assumption that peace can be created by permanently isolating, weakening or encircling Russia is inconsistent with Europe\u2019s geography, military balance and history. Russia is not a temporary problem that can be removed from the European security system. It is a permanent power with vast territory, nuclear capabilities, energy resources and historical influence.<\/p>\n

The Western policy of maintaining pressure on Russia nevertheless has its own strong strategic logic. Ukraine and its supporters argue that without sufficient military, economic and political pressure, Moscow would have little incentive to halt the war or enter serious negotiations. Strong Ukrainian resistance may improve the balance of power at the negotiating table and deter further military operations.<\/p>\n

Pressure, however, is not in itself a peace strategy. It must be linked to clear political objectives, a viable diplomatic path and a defined end state. If the goal is merely to weaken Russia indefinitely, exclude it from Europe or impose strategic defeat, the result will be an incentive for long-term military resistance rather than compromise.<\/p>\n

Ukraine\u2019s EU accession process could either reduce Europe\u2019s division or deepen it. If accession is linked to transparent reform, economic reconstruction, good governance and legal stability, it could provide the basis for a durable postwar Ukrainian state. If it is presented solely as a geopolitical victory over Russia, Moscow will interpret it as another stage in a zero-sum strategic conflict.<\/p>\n

The credibility of the EU accession process also matters. If standards are weakened because of wartime sympathy, its institutional character will be damaged. But if the process is delayed indefinitely until every reform is completed and perfect peace is achieved, the political promise made to Ukraine may become meaningless. What is required is a phased, rigorous and predictable process.<\/p>\n

The real test of Ireland\u2019s presidency will lie here. It must advance Ukraine\u2019s accession while preserving the EU\u2019s legal standards. It may support pressure on Russia, but it should not permanently close the door to future diplomatic engagement. It must advance the debate on security while ensuring that military expenditure does not undermine social and economic stability.<\/p>\n

Three broad scenarios may emerge in the coming years. First, Ukraine\u2019s EU accession negotiations could advance rapidly while final membership remains linked to the postwar political and legal situation. Second, Ukraine could receive long-term military assistance and bilateral security commitments while immediate NATO membership remains deferred. Third, no comprehensive settlement may be reached, leading both Europe and Russia into prolonged remilitarisation.<\/p>\n

A combination of the first and second paths could provide Ukraine with political direction and practical security while limiting the risk of a direct NATO-Russia confrontation. The third would be the most costly for Europe as a whole. It would place decades of pressure on defence budgets, energy, trade, social spending and political cohesion.<\/p>\n

For small and medium-sized states around the world, this is not merely a regional European conflict. The European security crisis affects energy prices, food markets, trade routes, sanctions regimes, development assistance and international polarisation. A country such as Nepal, which depends heavily on imported fuel and industrial goods, may bear indirect but serious costs through higher energy prices, transport expenses, inflation and changes in development partnerships. A stable European security order is therefore connected to the economic and diplomatic interests of countries far beyond the battlefield.<\/p>\n

Ultimately, Europe\u2019s new security architecture can endure only through a balance between two principles. The first holds that peace cannot be preserved without sufficient deterrence, military capability and clear institutional commitments. The second holds that a permanent European security order cannot be constructed by excluding Russia entirely. A realistic settlement may require both: sufficient deterrence to prevent renewed conflict and sufficient diplomatic inclusion to stop war from recurring.<\/p>\n

Ireland\u2019s presidency, Zelenskyy\u2019s appeal for membership and Rutte\u2019s message in Berlin are all signs of the same historical transition. Europe cannot return to the security environment that existed before the war. Yet it remains uncertain whether the new order will be based solely on military competition or on a balance between power, law, institutional integration and reciprocal security dialogue.<\/p>\n

If Europe can connect pressure with diplomatic objectives, defence spending with social stability and Ukraine\u2019s integration with a wider continental security arrangement, the present crisis may be prevented from becoming the permanent foundation of a new Cold War. If it fails, the end of the war in Ukraine will not end Europe\u2019s security crisis. The crisis will merely enter a new and more enduring phase.<\/p>\n

What Europe now requires is a policy more ambitious than the declaration of victory. It needs the diplomatic courage to guarantee Ukraine\u2019s security, address Russia\u2019s genuine security concerns within a rules-based framework, distinguish NATO deterrence from uncontrolled military expansion and create verifiable security guarantees for the entire continent. European peace cannot be built upon the complete security of one side and the permanent insecurity of the other.<\/p>\n

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