{"id":20322,"date":"2026-07-16T14:03:58","date_gmt":"2026-07-16T08:18:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=20322"},"modified":"2026-07-16T14:03:58","modified_gmt":"2026-07-16T08:18:58","slug":"the-iran-war-and-the-test-of-american-democracy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=20322","title":{"rendered":"The Iran War and the Test of American Democracy <\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

# Prem Sagar Poudel<\/strong><\/p>\n

The political confrontation unfolding in the United States Congress over the 2026 war with Iran should not be understood merely as another partisan dispute between President Donald Trump and the Democratic Party. Senate Democrats\u2019 decision to block the immediate advancement of the $1.15 trillion National Defense Authorization Act, combined with a separate $95 billion budget framework introduced by House Republicans covering defence, intelligence, agricultural assistance and voter-identification provisions, has exposed a deeper and long-developing crisis within the American system of government.<\/p>\n

That crisis is not confined to Iran. The fundamental question is who has the authority to take the United States to war: the president acting alone, Congress exercising its constitutional responsibility, or a president who begins military operations first and later seeks indirect legitimacy through congressional funding?<\/p>\n

The United States and Israel launched military operations against Iran on February 28, 2026. The Trump administration said the campaign was intended to destroy Iran\u2019s ballistic-missile stockpiles and production capacity, weaken its naval forces, disrupt support for regional armed groups and prevent Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.<\/p>\n

A ceasefire was announced on April 7, followed by a period of diplomatic engagement and another understanding reached on June 17. According to the US administration, however, hostilities resumed on July 7 after Iran violated that arrangement. President Trump formally informed Congress on July 13 through a letter dated July 10.<\/p>\n

On July 15, the US military began a new phase of attacks against Iranian coastal defences, missile and drone facilities and command structures. Washington also reinstated a maritime blockade affecting Iranian ports, while Iran retaliated against US military targets in the Gulf region.<\/p>\n

The conflict was therefore no longer developing merely as a limited exercise in military pressure. It was moving toward a wider regional confrontation with potentially significant strategic and economic consequences.<\/p>\n

Against this background, the Senate held a procedural vote on July 14 to begin consideration of the National Defense Authorization Act. The motion received 50 votes in favour and 46 against but failed because it required 60 votes to advance.<\/p>\n

This did not constitute the final rejection of the defence bill. Republican Senate leader John Thune voted against the motion in order to preserve his procedural right to seek reconsideration, meaning the legislation could return for another vote.<\/p>\n

Yet the fact that the annual defence-policy bill, traditionally passed with broad bipartisan support, was halted because of disagreements over the Iran war represented an extraordinary political development.<\/p>\n

Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer accused Trump of expanding the conflict without prior congressional approval, a clearly defined strategy or a credible plan for ending the war. Democrats argued that advancing the $1.15 trillion defence bill under such circumstances could amount to granting indirect political and financial support to a war launched without sufficient congressional involvement.<\/p>\n

That criticism carries weight. It would nevertheless be misleading to portray Democratic opposition as a flawless defence of constitutional principle.<\/p>\n

For decades, Congress has permitted both Democratic and Republican presidents to conduct prolonged military operations abroad without formal declarations of war. Legislators often fail to exercise their constitutional role before hostilities begin. Only after a conflict becomes costly, unpopular or politically damaging do they attempt to impose restraints through budgets, resolutions or public hearings.<\/p>\n

The current crisis is therefore not solely the responsibility of the Trump administration. It is also the result of a long-term institutional failure in which Congress has gradually surrendered much of its constitutional authority over war to the executive branch.<\/p>\n

The US Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war, finance the armed forces and establish rules governing military operations. The president serves as commander in chief.<\/p>\n

A president requires a degree of flexibility when responding to an immediate attack or urgent security threat. But a conflict lasting for months, involving expanding objectives and generating consequences throughout the global economy cannot indefinitely be justified as an emergency exercise of presidential self-defence powers.<\/p>\n

The War Powers Resolution of 1973 requires the president to notify Congress within 48 hours of introducing US forces into hostilities and generally requires military operations to end within 60 days unless Congress grants approval.<\/p>\n

Modern US presidents from both parties, however, have repeatedly argued that parts of the law improperly restrict the constitutional powers of the commander in chief.<\/p>\n

Congress took an unusual step during the Iran conflict. On June 3, 2026, the House of Representatives voted 215\u2013208 to approve a war-powers resolution directing that US forces should not remain involved in hostilities against Iran without congressional approval. Four Republican representatives joined Democrats in supporting the measure.<\/p>\n

The Senate approved the same resolution on June 23 by 50 votes to 48. It was the first time since the enactment of the War Powers Resolution that both chambers had supported a measure intended to halt active military involvement of this kind.<\/p>\n

But the measure was a concurrent resolution rather than legislation presented to the president for signature. Its political message was powerful, but its binding legal effect remained weak and contested.<\/p>\n

A 1983 Supreme Court decision raised constitutional doubts about mechanisms through which Congress attempts to reverse executive action without presidential participation in the legislative process. Consequently, even when both chambers vote to restrain a war, the president may still disregard the resolution unless Congress passes binding legislation or directly restricts funding.<\/p>\n

This is where the central contradiction in American democracy becomes visible.<\/p>\n

Congress has a constitutional responsibility to decide questions of war and peace, yet the mechanisms it uses may fail to restrain the executive branch. Courts may decline to intervene, describing war and foreign policy as political questions. The military remains under presidential command.<\/p>\n

In practice, Congress\u2019s most effective remaining instrument is often its control over public money.<\/p>\n

Senate Democrats are now attempting to use that financial power. But the $1.15 trillion National Defense Authorization Act should not be understood as an appropriation exclusively for the Iran war.<\/p>\n

The legislation establishes policy and authorisation levels covering military salaries, aircraft, ships, missile systems, nuclear forces, cybersecurity, space programmes, defence cooperation with allies and the broader structure of US military policy.<\/p>\n

It is also not, by itself, a final appropriations law. It authorises policies, programmes and maximum spending levels, while the actual release of money requires separate appropriations legislation.<\/p>\n

By blocking its advancement, Democrats are applying pressure not only to the Trump administration but also to the wider US defence establishment.<\/p>\n

Republicans can reasonably argue that the salaries of service members, military readiness, long-term planning and equipment procurement should not be held hostage to a partisan dispute over one conflict.<\/p>\n

That argument is not entirely without merit.<\/p>\n

But the opposite question is more serious. If Congress cannot demand clear answers about the legal basis, objectives, costs, duration and exit strategy of an active war while considering more than one trillion dollars in defence authorisations, when exactly is it expected to exercise its constitutional responsibility?<\/p>\n

Treating the annual defence bill as legislation that must always pass reduces congressional oversight to a formality. The administration begins a war. The defence industry receives additional contracts. Legislators support the bill in the name of troop pay and employment in their own constituencies. Strategic accountability is postponed until some undefined future date.<\/p>\n

From this perspective, the Democratic obstruction is political, but it is not inherently illegitimate.<\/p>\n

Their moral credibility, however, will depend on whether they are prepared to apply the same standard to a future Democratic president who launches military operations without congressional approval.<\/p>\n

House Republicans\u2019 separate $95 billion proposal, unveiled on July 15, is even more complicated.<\/p>\n

It is not a final law authorising immediate expenditure. It is a 47-page preliminary framework designed to permit later legislation through the budget-reconciliation process.<\/p>\n

The proposal allocates budgetary room for $60 billion in defence programmes, $13 billion in intelligence spending, $12 billion in agricultural assistance and $10 billion in incentives for states to implement elements of Trump\u2019s voter-identification and proof-of-citizenship policies.<\/p>\n

Republican leaders are seeking to use reconciliation because such legislation may pass the Senate by a simple majority, thereby bypassing the 60-vote threshold that has enabled Democrats to block other measures.<\/p>\n

Providing assistance to farmers affected by rising fuel and fertiliser prices resulting from the Iran war and Gulf instability is not inherently unreasonable. The economic effects of war do not remain confined to military accounts. They spread into agricultural production, transportation and consumer prices.<\/p>\n

But combining defence, intelligence, farm relief and voter-identification measures in one legislative package reflects political bargaining rather than disciplined budgeting.<\/p>\n

Whether stricter voter-identification and citizenship requirements are desirable should be debated on their own merits. Linking them to funding for the Iran war and assistance for farmers is not an example of legislative integrity.<\/p>\n

It creates a political trap for opposition lawmakers.<\/p>\n

Those who vote against the package may be accused of opposing national security, the military and farmers. Those who support it may be portrayed as endorsing a controversial election policy.<\/p>\n

Such legislation denies representatives the opportunity to judge each policy according to its individual merits. It risks transforming Congress from a deliberative institution into a marketplace in which unrelated political interests are exchanged and bundled together.<\/p>\n

There is no complete agreement even within the Republican Party.<\/p>\n

Some Republican senators have warned that linking voter-identification rules to war and defence funding could make the package more difficult to pass. The combined $73 billion proposed for defence and intelligence is also far below the additional $350 billion in military spending requested by Trump.<\/p>\n

There is therefore no unified long-term financial strategy shared by the House, the Senate and the White House.<\/p>\n

The administration\u2019s willingness to use military force is clear. Its legislative, fiscal and political structure for sustaining the conflict is not.<\/p>\n

The White House has repeatedly stated that its objectives are to destroy Iran\u2019s missile and naval capabilities, end its support for regional armed organisations and prevent the development of nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n

These security concerns are not imaginary. Iran\u2019s nuclear activities, missile programme, influence over armed regional networks and ability to disrupt Gulf shipping have generated genuine concern in the United States, Israel, Gulf states and much of the international community.<\/p>\n

But a list of objectives is not the same as a strategy for ending a war.<\/p>\n

At what point will Iran\u2019s missile-production capacity be considered sufficiently degraded? How weak must its naval forces become before the blockade is lifted? Can air strikes permanently end Tehran\u2019s relationships with regional armed groups? Which independent inspection system will verify that its nuclear programme has been brought under control? How long will the United States continue fighting if these objectives remain unfulfilled?<\/p>\n

The Trump administration has not publicly provided measurable answers to these questions.<\/p>\n

Washington claimed in April that major military objectives had been achieved and a ceasefire had taken effect. By July, military operations had resumed, the maritime blockade had returned and further escalation was under consideration.<\/p>\n

This illustrates the difference between destroying physical infrastructure and achieving a durable political outcome.<\/p>\n

Air power can destroy bases, ships and missile facilities. It cannot automatically eliminate a state\u2019s strategic will, political system or long-term security doctrine.<\/p>\n

Trump\u2019s supporters can reasonably argue that previous diplomacy and sanctions failed to alter Iran\u2019s behaviour and that diplomacy without credible military pressure is often ineffective.<\/p>\n

That argument should not be dismissed merely because of partisan hostility toward the president. Diplomatic negotiations may indeed require the support of credible coercive power.<\/p>\n

The decisive question, however, is whether force remains a limited instrument for achieving a diplomatic objective or whether diplomacy becomes merely a temporary pause between successive military campaigns.<\/p>\n

When each ceasefire is followed by renewed fighting and each new phase of war expands the original objectives, \u201cpeace through strength\u201d risks becoming permanent uncertainty through force.<\/p>\n

Democrats have highlighted the administration\u2019s strategic ambiguity. But they also have a responsibility to offer an alternative.<\/p>\n

How would they restrain Iran\u2019s nuclear programme? How would they protect navigation through the Strait of Hormuz? How would they address the security concerns of Israel and Gulf states? What structure of sanctions, inspections, regional dialogue and diplomatic pressure would replace military operations?<\/p>\n

It is not enough to say that Trump lacks a strategy. The opposition must also demonstrate that it possesses a credible and workable alternative to war.<\/p>\n

American public opinion does not fully support Washington\u2019s military confidence.<\/p>\n

A Reuters\/Ipsos survey of 1,019 adults conducted from July 10 to 12 found that 79 percent expected the war to last for an extended period, up from 65 percent in March. Only 18 percent believed the conflict would end quickly, while 37 percent supported the US military attacks. The survey had a margin of error of approximately four percentage points.<\/p>\n

Sixty percent expected the war to increase petrol prices, while roughly half believed that the conflict was not justified by its economic cost.<\/p>\n

These findings do not prove that Americans dismiss the security risks associated with Iran. They demonstrate that recognising a threat is not the same as supporting an open-ended war whose duration and end state remain undefined.<\/p>\n

The consequences extend far beyond the United States.<\/p>\n

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world\u2019s most sensitive energy corridors. Military attacks, blockades and risks to commercial shipping affect oil prices, maritime insurance, transportation costs, food prices and global inflation.<\/p>\n

By July 16, tensions in the Gulf had already reduced shipping activity and increased volatility in energy markets.<\/p>\n

Developing countries dependent on imported energy have no vote in the formulation of US war policy, yet they bear part of its cost through higher petroleum prices, pressure on foreign-currency reserves, food inflation and rising freight expenses.<\/p>\n

Bombs may fall on limited military targets, but their economic shockwaves travel across the world.<\/p>\n

The reliability of the decision-making process is also important to US allies.<\/p>\n

They may value American military capability and security guarantees. But shifting objectives, renewed attacks after ceasefires and unresolved disputes between the president and Congress create long-term uncertainty for alliances.<\/p>\n

Military partnerships do not depend only on weapons and force. They also depend on predictability, political stability and confidence in the decision-making process.<\/p>\n

The most serious question facing President Trump is whether he is expanding a prolonged military campaign without prior congressional authorisation and without presenting a measurable exit strategy.<\/p>\n

The central question facing Democrats is whether they are defending a permanent constitutional principle or using it selectively as an immediate political weapon.<\/p>\n

The main criticism of Republican congressional leaders is that they are combining war funding with agricultural assistance and unrelated election rules, turning national security into a vehicle for partisan bargaining.<\/p>\n

All three criticisms can be valid at the same time.<\/p>\n

Complete impartiality does not require declaring all sides equally guilty. It requires examining each actor according to the same rigorous standard of authority, responsibility, claims and conduct.<\/p>\n

The president is commander in chief, but he is not a substitute for Congress.<\/p>\n

Congress controls war authorisations and public funding, but it cannot escape responsibility for decades of inaction by expressing outrage only after a conflict has begun.<\/p>\n

Iran, for its part, cannot dismiss international concerns over its nuclear programme, missile forces and regional activities merely by invoking sovereignty.<\/p>\n

Ultimately, however, the greatest test of American democracy is not being imposed by Iran. It is being imposed by the United States upon itself.<\/p>\n

The central issue is not whether America possesses the military power to attack Iran. That capability is not seriously in doubt.<\/p>\n

The real question is whether the use of such power remains governed by law, coherent strategy, public accountability and political restraint.<\/p>\n

Congress must now move beyond symbolic opposition and procedural obstruction.<\/p>\n

It should pass a separate and clearly defined authorisation for the use of military force specifying the objectives, geographical limits, duration and permissible means of the Iran campaign.<\/p>\n

That authorisation should contain an automatic expiry clause. A bipartisan special investigative committee should examine the decision-making process, intelligence assessments and civilian impact of the war.<\/p>\n

Defence expenditures should be subjected to independent and public auditing, and any major expansion of the conflict should require a new congressional vote.<\/p>\n

If the Trump administration cannot define its objectives and exit strategy, if Congress cannot elevate war powers above electoral budget bargaining, and if both parties continue to use national security as campaign material for the midterm elections, the long-term damage from the Iran war will not be confined to the Middle East.<\/p>\n

It will also be visible in the institutional credibility of American democracy.<\/p>\n

War may reduce some of Iran\u2019s military capabilities. But war conducted without effective constitutional control may also weaken America\u2019s own democratic capacity.<\/p>\n

That is the deeper meaning of the political struggle now unfolding in Washington.<\/p>\n

About the Author: Prem Sagar Poudel is a senior journalist and international relations analyst from Nepal. He has conducted in-depth studies on Nepal-China relations, the geopolitics of the Himalayan region, and Asian security issues.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

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