{"id":20813,"date":"2026-07-24T07:47:54","date_gmt":"2026-07-24T02:02:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=20813"},"modified":"2026-07-24T07:49:01","modified_gmt":"2026-07-24T02:04:01","slug":"nepal-and-indias-strategic-ambiguity-and-chinas-legitimate-exercise-of-sovereignty","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=20813","title":{"rendered":"Nepal and India\u2019s Strategic Ambiguity and China\u2019s Legitimate Exercise of Sovereignty<\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

# Prem Sagar Poudel<\/strong><\/p>\n

Wang Huning, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People\u2019s Political Consultative Conference, completed a four-day inspection tour of the Xizang Autonomous Region from July 19 to 22.<\/p>\n

Wang, generally regarded as fourth in China\u2019s leadership hierarchy, visited not only Lhasa but also the strategically important Ngari Prefecture, which borders both Nepal and India. His visit was more than a routine administrative inspection. It demonstrated China\u2019s high-level political sensitivity regarding stability in its border regions, national unity, ethnic solidarity, religious governance and external interference.<\/p>\n

During the visit, Wang called for social stability to remain a priority in the governance of Xizang, the full implementation of the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which came into effect on July 1, and the healthy and orderly development of Tibetan Buddhism.<\/p>\n

He also emphasised the protection of historical archives and cultural heritage, the consolidation of poverty-alleviation achievements, the expansion of infrastructure and improvements in local living standards.<\/p>\n

This indicates that China\u2019s Xizang policy is not limited to security or religious administration. It is a comprehensive policy combining national integration, economic development, cultural preservation, public services and stability in strategically important border regions.<\/p>\n

The new law seeks to establish an institutional foundation for equality, interaction, integration and common prosperity among China\u2019s 56 ethnic groups. It prohibits discrimination and oppression against any ethnic group while defining the state\u2019s responsibilities for infrastructure, industry, public services and environmental protection in less-developed ethnic regions.<\/p>\n

It also provides a legal framework for action against violent terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism.<\/p>\n

Prevailing Western political narratives often highlight only the law\u2019s security provisions while pushing its development, equality, public-service and legal-protection components into the background. Such selective interpretations frequently appear to be guided more by predetermined political conclusions than by a serious effort to understand China\u2019s actual governance system.<\/p>\n

The One-China Principle and the Tibet Question<\/strong><\/h3>\n

For diplomatic accuracy, the relationship between the One-China principle and the Tibet question must be clearly understood.<\/p>\n

The direct focus of the One-China principle is Taiwan. It holds that there is only one China in the world, that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and that the government of the People\u2019s Republic of China is the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China.<\/p>\n

The Tibet question, meanwhile, concerns China\u2019s sovereignty, territorial integrity and the principle of non-interference in its internal affairs. However, the formal understandings Nepal and India have reached with China place their commitments regarding Taiwan and Tibet within the same broader political framework.<\/p>\n

In South Asian diplomacy, therefore, adherence to the One-China policy means not only refusing to recognise Taiwan as a separate state but also recognising Tibet as part of China and preventing national territory from being used for activities directed against China.<\/p>\n

This is not simply a matter of diplomatic courtesy. It is a political and diplomatic obligation requiring states that maintain relations with China to respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity in practice.<\/p>\n

Governments that are highly sensitive about their own borders, national unity and constitutional order but refuse to apply the same standard to China display a clear policy inconsistency.<\/p>\n

The Gap Between Nepal\u2019s Declared Commitment and Implementation<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Nepal has repeatedly expressed firm support for the One-China policy in joint statements with China. It has recognised matters relating to Tibet and Taiwan as China\u2019s internal affairs and has repeatedly pledged not to allow any anti-China activity on Nepali territory.<\/p>\n

In April 2026, Foreign Minister Shishir Khanal assured Chinese Ambassador Zhang Maoming that Nepal would remain committed to the One-China principle and would not allow its territory to be used against China or any other friendly country.<\/p>\n

Nepal\u2019s problem is not the absence of formal commitments. It is the continuing distance between official statements and practical implementation.<\/p>\n

Successive governments repeat Nepal\u2019s One-China commitment to Beijing, but the country has not developed a permanent institutional mechanism capable of assessing sensitive Tibet-related programmes, foreign funding, political contacts, refugee activities and the character of international conferences.<\/p>\n

When controversy emerges, the government often attempts to distance itself from responsibility by invoking academic freedom, humanitarian considerations or a lack of prior information.<\/p>\n

This weakens Nepal\u2019s diplomatic credibility.<\/p>\n

The Chinese ambassador has raised concerns with Foreign Secretary Amrit Bahadur Rai regarding the 17th conference of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, scheduled to be held in Kathmandu from August 23 to 29.<\/p>\n

Hundreds of scholars from 39 countries are expected to attend, while institutions affiliated with Kathmandu University are reportedly involved in organising the event.<\/p>\n

The organisers have described it as a purely academic conference and have said that Chinese scholars will also participate. China has not formally demanded its cancellation, but it has cautioned that groups supporting the exiled Dalai Lama or separatist forces could attempt to turn the gathering into a political platform directed against China.<\/p>\n

Holding an academic conference is not in itself a violation of the One-China policy.<\/p>\n

There is neither a need nor a justification for preventing the study of Tibetan history, language, philosophy, medicine, art and Buddhism. China itself invests in Tibetan historical research, cultural heritage preservation and Buddhist studies.<\/p>\n

However, academic freedom and separatist political mobilisation are not the same thing.<\/p>\n

The responsibility of the Government of Nepal is not to close the conference but to preserve its academic character.<\/p>\n

A clear distinction must be maintained between academic organisers, speakers and research presentations on the one hand, and political declarations, separatist flags and symbols, formal representation of exiled political organisations and possible anti-China campaigns launched from Nepali territory on the other.<\/p>\n

If the conference remains within academic boundaries, it should be allowed to proceed without obstruction. But if academic cover is used for political activities questioning China\u2019s territorial integrity, Nepal cannot evade responsibility by claiming that it was unaware of what was happening.<\/p>\n

Nepal must abandon the tendency to respond immediately to the security concerns of Western countries, mobilise its administration whenever India raises sensitive issues, but address China\u2019s core national interests only through formal statements.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s sovereignty is not less important than the priorities of foreign donors, non-governmental organisations or politically connected academic networks.<\/p>\n

India\u2019s Strategic Ambiguity<\/strong><\/h3>\n

India\u2019s policy is different from Nepal\u2019s and considerably more complex.<\/p>\n

During then-prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee\u2019s visit to China in 2003, India formally recognised the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the territory of the People\u2019s Republic of China.<\/p>\n

India also pledged not to allow Tibetans to conduct anti-China political activities on Indian territory and stated that its One-China policy remained unchanged.<\/p>\n

The same position was reiterated in bilateral documents issued in 2005 and 2006. In practice, however, India has for decades provided refuge to the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan administration-in-exile and associated political structures in Dharamshala.<\/p>\n

India has not formally recognised the exiled institution as a government. Nevertheless, it has provided the geographical and institutional space necessary for organisational expansion, international engagement, political campaigning and leadership development.<\/p>\n

In 2025, Indian Parliamentary and Minority Affairs Minister Kiren Rijiju attended celebrations marking the Dalai Lama\u2019s 90th birthday. He stated that the authority to determine the Dalai Lama\u2019s reincarnation and successor rested only with the Dalai Lama and his religious institution.<\/p>\n

India\u2019s Ministry of External Affairs later clarified that the government had no official position on matters of religious belief.<\/p>\n

However, the pattern in which a senior government minister attends a highly sensitive event and makes a statement with significant political implications, while the foreign ministry subsequently characterises it as a matter of personal religious belief, illustrates India\u2019s strategic ambiguity.<\/p>\n

Since 2010, India appears to have weakened the practice of explicitly reiterating the One-China policy in high-level joint statements.<\/p>\n

Within Indian strategic circles, an argument has developed that India should not restate the One-China policy unless China adequately respects Indian sensitivities concerning Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh.<\/p>\n

This suggests that sovereignty is being treated not as a universal principle but as a diplomatic instrument to be used in political bargaining.<\/p>\n

India\u2019s rejection of external commentary on its borders, Arunachal Pradesh, Ladakh and Kashmir is understandable. But a policy inconsistency emerges when the same state preserves Tibet-related exiled political structures as a potential strategic instrument of pressure against China.<\/p>\n

A policy that treats one\u2019s own territorial integrity as non-negotiable while keeping another country\u2019s territorial integrity available as leverage is not diplomacy grounded in consistent principles.<\/p>\n

Such an approach is also not in the long-term interests of Tibetans. It shifts Tibetan religion and culture away from their spiritual and civilisational foundations and connects them to geopolitical competition against China. The Dharamshala-based structure may serve as an instrument of pressure on China, but it does not build long-term trust between India and China. Instead, it risks keeping the Himalayan region trapped in a permanent geography of tension.<\/p>\n

Why China\u2019s Security Concerns Are Legitimate<\/strong><\/p>\n

No sovereign state treats separatist campaigns operated from across its borders as ordinary civilian activity.<\/p>\n

India does not accept foreign political campaigns concerning Kashmir. Nepal would similarly regard foreign-supported activities seeking to undermine the state in the name of ethnic autonomy or political change as a national-security issue.<\/p>\n

The United States, France, the United Kingdom and other states also do not remain indifferent to foreign campaigns intended to dismantle their constitutional order.<\/p>\n

Therefore, automatically describing China\u2019s security concerns about separatist activities relating to Tibet or Taiwan as repression reflects a failure to apply a consistent international standard.<\/p>\n

China has the same right as any other state to protect its national unity, constitutional order, border security and social stability.<\/p>\n

Wang Huning\u2019s visit to Ngari is particularly significant in this context.<\/p>\n

Ngari is not merely a remote Himalayan administrative region. It is a meeting point of the borders with Nepal and India, Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar, ancient civilisations, religious heritage, cross-border trade, environmental concerns and regional security.<\/p>\n

Stability there is linked not only to China\u2019s interests but also to peace in Nepal, India and the wider Himalayan region.<\/p>\n

Assessing Xizang solely through external political allegations while ignoring China\u2019s investments in roads, railways, airports, communications, education, health, energy, poverty reduction and cultural preservation produces an incomplete picture.<\/p>\n

Preserving Tibetan culture does not require weakening China\u2019s sovereignty. Religious freedom does not mean allowing religious institutions to become platforms for foreign political interference or separatist campaigns.<\/p>\n

What Nepal Should Do<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Nepal must transform the One-China policy from a diplomatic phrase repeated at ceremonies into a clear institutional state policy.<\/p>\n

It should establish transparent legal and administrative standards for programmes relating to Tibet and Taiwan.<\/p>\n

Academic study, cultural programmes and religious practices should be protected. At the same time, separatist propaganda, parallel political representation, foreign-directed campaigns and the use of Nepali territory against a friendly country must be prevented.<\/p>\n

It would be wrong to restrict a conference simply because its subject is Tibet.<\/p>\n

It would be equally inappropriate to allow the academic identity of a conference to be used to reject China\u2019s territorial integrity, present an exiled political structure as a legitimate national representative or issue declarations contradicting Nepal\u2019s formally stated foreign policy.<\/p>\n

Freedom and responsibility must operate together.<\/p>\n

Nepal must end the practice of reassuring China diplomatically while remaining passive in administrative implementation.<\/p>\n

If Nepal\u2019s One-China commitment is genuine, its practical effect must be visible. Otherwise, Kathmandu\u2019s repeated assurances risk gradually becoming diplomatic formalities without credibility.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Wang Huning\u2019s tour of Xizang and Ngari demonstrated that China will maintain a clear position on national unity, border stability, ethnic solidarity, religious governance and development.<\/p>\n

Enforcing national laws within its territory, preventing separatism, requiring religious institutions to operate within the national legal framework and developing border regions are legitimate exercises of China\u2019s sovereign rights.<\/p>\n

The central problem is not China\u2019s position but the inconsistencies between the commitments and conduct of Nepal and India.<\/p>\n

Nepal accepts the One-China policy but has yet to establish the institutional capacity necessary to prevent the political misuse of sensitive issues. India recognises Tibet as part of China but continues to preserve exiled political structures that can be used as instruments of strategic influence.<\/p>\n

Both approaches raise questions about diplomatic credibility.<\/p>\n

If Kathmandu and New Delhi expect China to respect their sovereignty and national interests, they must demonstrate equal and unconditional respect for China\u2019s sovereignty.<\/p>\n

Sovereignty is not a principle to be selectively applied according to changing interests and circumstances.<\/p>\n

The One-China policy is not merely a formal slogan of friendship. It is a test of state credibility, diplomatic integrity and responsibility towards a neighbouring country.<\/p>\n

For Nepal, its responsible implementation would strengthen mutual trust with China while contributing to peace and stability across the Himalayas and protecting the long-term interests of Nepal-China friendship.<\/p>\n

About the Author: Prem Sagar Poudel is a senior journalist and international relations analyst from Nepal. He has conducted in-depth studies on Nepal-China relations, the geopolitics of the Himalayan region, and Asian security issues.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

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