{"id":21539,"date":"2026-08-03T11:04:22","date_gmt":"2026-08-03T05:19:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=21539"},"modified":"2026-08-03T11:04:22","modified_gmt":"2026-08-03T05:19:22","slug":"why-has-civil-society-in-nepal-been-brought-to-its-knees-from-donor-dependence-to-a-crisis-of-legitimacy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=21539","title":{"rendered":"Why Has Civil Society in Nepal Been Brought to Its Knees? From Donor Dependence to a Crisis of Legitimacy<\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

# Muna Chand<\/strong><\/p>\n

The weakening of civil society in Nepal is often discussed as though society itself has lost the awareness to question authority, the courage to resist injustice and the capacity to intervene in matters of public concern. The reality, however, is somewhat different. What has weakened is not civic consciousness, but the formal structure of civil society that depended for decades on donor grants, externally funded projects and agendas shaped from outside the country.<\/p>\n

Non-governmental organisations, rights-based groups, research institutions, campaigners and public intellectuals once identified with civil society now appear to have lost much of their influence. This decline cannot be attributed to a single event or individual. Changes in global politics, shrinking donor assistance, prolonged wars, the reduced role of transnational actors, growing public awareness in Nepal, the expansion of communications technology, the commercialisation of politics and a crisis of legitimacy within civil society itself are among the principal causes.<\/p>\n

The present crisis of civil society in Nepal is therefore not merely financial. It is structural, political, ethical and representational.<\/p>\n

From Movement-Oriented Activism to Project-Oriented Structures<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The history of civil society in Nepal did not begin with non-governmental organisations. Social campaigns against the Rana regime, democratic struggles, the defence of human rights, resistance to the Panchayat system, the 1990 People\u2019s Movement, peace initiatives during the armed conflict and the 2006 People\u2019s Movement all demonstrated the importance of civic mobilisation.<\/p>\n

At that time, the strength of civil society did not come from project proposals, donor budgets or seminars in luxury hotels. Its strength came from moral credibility, direct connections with the public, ideological clarity and the willingness to take risks.<\/p>\n

Following political change, however, civil society gradually became increasingly non-governmentalised. Public concerns were transformed into projects. Issues such as rights, inclusion, democracy, good governance, environmental protection, gender equality, peace and social justice were no longer treated solely as public needs; they also became programme areas through which donor funding could be obtained.<\/p>\n

As a result, a significant section of civil society became more project-oriented than movement-oriented, more office-centred than community-centred and more accountable to donors than to the public.<\/p>\n

The subjects on which organisations spoke, the timing and intensity of their interventions and even the language they used increasingly came to be determined by project priorities, available budgets and donor strategies rather than by the needs of society. This process expanded the size of civil society, but weakened its autonomy and moral foundations.<\/p>\n

The Trump Era and the Restructuring of Donor Assistance<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The rise of Donald Trump in American politics brought significant changes to the United States\u2019 approach to foreign assistance, democracy promotion, human rights, climate change, diversity and international institutions. The \u201cAmerica First\u201d policy strengthened the view that foreign aid should be directly linked to national strategic interests.<\/p>\n

This shift affected donor agencies, international non-governmental organisations and their local partners around the world. Reviews of assistance programmes, budget reductions, changing priorities and institutional restructuring had direct consequences for donor-dependent civil society organisations in countries such as Nepal.<\/p>\n

Funding that had once been relatively accessible under the banners of democracy, citizen participation, rights, electoral education, good governance and social inclusion began to shrink. Donor agencies started assessing the measurable impact, political relevance and strategic value of programmes more strictly.<\/p>\n

This change revealed an uncomfortable reality: many civil society organisations in Nepal were sustained not by local membership, public contributions or domestic resources, but by external grants. When the funding stopped, their voices also became quieter. When projects ended, campaigns ended with them. Once donors withdrew, offices, staff, reports and public activism all contracted.<\/p>\n

This has raised a serious question: were these activities driven by social commitment or by financial opportunity?<\/p>\n

Prolonged Wars and Shifting Aid Priorities<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The war in Ukraine, instability in West Asia, the Gaza crisis, tensions involving Iran, conflict in Sudan and broader global security challenges have altered the priorities of international assistance.<\/p>\n

A considerable share of funding once allocated to development, democracy and civil society has been redirected towards humanitarian relief, refugee management, military security, food shortages, reconstruction and emergency response.<\/p>\n

As economic pressure has increased within donor countries themselves, political willingness to finance long-term social-change projects abroad has also weakened. When voters are facing unemployment, inflation, healthcare shortages, housing problems and security concerns at home, they increasingly ask why grants should be provided to non-governmental organisations in other countries.<\/p>\n

This changed environment has had a major impact on project-driven civil society organisations in Nepal. The problem is not only the decline in international assistance. Competition for funding has intensified, pressure to demonstrate results has increased and political sensitivity surrounding assistance has grown.<\/p>\n

The Shrinking Role of Transnational Actors<\/strong><\/h3>\n

In the post-Cold War world, transnational actors\u2014including international non-governmental organisations, human-rights networks, democracy-promotion institutions, international media, research centres and multinational advocacy campaigns\u2014became highly influential.<\/p>\n

They operated across state boundaries and shaped policy, public opinion and social movements. In Nepal, such actors had a notable presence during the peace process, human-rights advocacy, debates over inclusion and federalism, transitional justice and constitution-making.<\/p>\n

Global politics, however, is now shifting back towards the centrality of nation-states, sovereignty, national security and geopolitical competition. Governments have begun to subject foreign-funded institutions and campaigns to closer scrutiny. Questions are being raised about political influence exercised in the name of civil society, ideological intervention and external pressure on domestic policy.<\/p>\n

Consequently, the autonomous influence of transnational actors has diminished. Local societies no longer automatically regard them as credible merely because they are international.<\/p>\n

In Nepal, ordinary citizens increasingly ask why a particular campaign is being funded from abroad, what its real purpose is, whose interests it serves and how it seeks to influence national policy.<\/p>\n

Growing Public Awareness and Suspicion of the \u201cFunded Voice\u201d<\/strong><\/h3>\n

In the past, statements made by civil society leaders were often assumed to be morally sound and politically neutral. They were viewed as independent, public-oriented actors standing apart from the state and political parties.<\/p>\n

Over time, however, the same individuals began to appear alternately as rights activists, advisers to donor-funded projects, supporters of political parties, aspirants for public appointments and representatives of international organisations.<\/p>\n

This raised questions about their impartiality.<\/p>\n

Citizens now ask not only who is speaking, but why they are speaking, who is funding them, whose agenda they are advancing and why they remain silent in comparable situations.<\/p>\n

The tendency to react forcefully to one incident while ignoring another similar case has exposed the selective morality of sections of civil society. Principles such as human rights, freedom of expression and the rule of law should apply equally to all. When responses vary according to political proximity or donor priorities, credibility inevitably declines.<\/p>\n

The crisis of civil society is therefore not only about a reduction in funding. It is also a crisis in which citizens have begun to withdraw the moral authority they once granted to civil society leaders.<\/p>\n

Communication Technology and the End of a Monopoly over Representation<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The development of social media, online journalism, live broadcasting, mobile reporting and digital archives has transformed the structure of public debate.<\/p>\n

In the past, a limited circle of civil society figures, major media outlets and political commentators largely controlled public discourse. They decided which issues would become national debates and which would be ignored.<\/p>\n

That monopoly has now been broken.<\/p>\n

Ordinary citizens can publish videos directly from the scene of an event. They can retrieve old statements and expose contradictions. They can reveal financial links, institutional affiliations and political relationships. The gap between a person\u2019s public statements and actual behaviour can be exposed within hours.<\/p>\n

This has made civil society leaders more accountable, but it has also reduced their traditional influence.<\/p>\n

No organisation or individual now holds a monopoly over speaking on behalf of citizens. Victimised communities, local youth, independent researchers, Nepalis abroad, subject specialists and digital campaigners can speak for themselves.<\/p>\n

Formal civil society may therefore appear weaker, but civic expression itself has not weakened. Rather, the power of expression has become decentralised.<\/p>\n

The Commercialisation of Politics and the Co-option of Civil Society<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Politics in Nepal is increasingly viewed not as a means of public service or ideological commitment, but as a route to power, appointments, contracts and economic opportunity. This commercialisation has also affected civil society.<\/p>\n

Many civil society leaders have eventually entered political parties, accepted government appointments or publicly defended particular parties and leaders. Political parties, in turn, have cultivated their own affiliated organisations, intellectuals, professional groups and campaigners.<\/p>\n

This has erased the necessary distance between the state, political parties and civil society.<\/p>\n

The role of civil society is to ask uncomfortable questions of those in power. But when a civic leader is hoping for a future appointment, political access, donor funding or personal prestige, that person\u2019s critical capacity is weakened.<\/p>\n

This condition can be described as the co-option of civil society\u2014the process through which power structures absorb critical voices not through direct repression, but through positions, access, recognition and opportunity.<\/p>\n

This is one of the main reasons civil society has been brought to its knees in Nepal. Many of its leaders now have to consider their political relationships, prospects for appointment and economic interests before questioning the state.<\/p>\n

The Difference Between Institutional Civil Society and Genuine Civic Consciousness<\/strong><\/h3>\n

It would be wrong to conclude that civil society has disappeared from Nepal. What has primarily weakened is the donor-funded, Kathmandu-centred and elite-led formal structure.<\/p>\n

At the local level, community forest groups, mothers\u2019 groups, cooperatives, youth clubs, religious and cultural organisations, volunteer networks active during disasters, public-school reform campaigns and local rights movements remain active.<\/p>\n

During floods, earthquakes, fires and social crises, citizens continue to mobilise assistance spontaneously. People raise their voices against corruption, injustice and local mismanagement through social media and community-based action. This shows that civic energy remains alive.<\/p>\n

That energy, however, is no longer being expressed primarily through traditional civil society institutions.<\/p>\n

The current crisis should therefore be understood not as the death of civil society, but as a restructuring of representation. Older institutions are weakening while new, informal and digital civic networks are emerging.<\/p>\n

The Need to Rebuild Legitimacy<\/strong><\/h3>\n

To restore its role, civil society must first establish financial transparency. Organisations should openly disclose where their funding comes from, how much they receive, how the money is spent and whether such funding influences their public positions.<\/p>\n

Second, institutions must reduce their exclusive dependence on donors and build sustainable financial foundations through membership fees, local contributions, public support and domestic research services.<\/p>\n

Third, the real needs of society must take precedence over the language of projects. The practice of remaining silent until a donor identifies an issue, and ending a campaign once the budget is exhausted, must come to an end.<\/p>\n

Fourth, civil society must apply the same ethical standards to all sides. Trust cannot be rebuilt when organisations remain silent about the wrongdoing of their political allies while magnifying minor mistakes by their opponents.<\/p>\n

Fifth, civil society must establish genuine connections with communities beyond Kathmandu\u2019s intellectual circles\u2014with workers, farmers, women, young people and citizens living in remote areas.<\/p>\n

Sixth, civil society must abandon the mistaken belief that independence means automatically opposing the state or government. Supporting sound policy, opposing harmful decisions and cooperating responsibly on matters of national interest are all equally legitimate civic roles.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Civil society in Nepal has not been weakened merely because donor money has declined. Excessive dependence on donors, the influence of external agendas, political co-option, selective morality, financial opacity, weak social foundations and increased public scrutiny in the digital age are the deeper causes.<\/p>\n

The rise of Trump, the restructuring of foreign assistance, prolonged wars and the shrinking role of transnational actors have accelerated this crisis. But its roots already existed within the structure of Nepali civil society.<\/p>\n

When a voice disappears as soon as a donor withdraws, it reveals institutional weakness. When an advocacy campaign ends because political access is lost, it reflects moral failure. When organisations become uncomfortable because ordinary citizens begin to question them, it exposes a crisis of representation.<\/p>\n

What Nepal now needs is not the revival of the same old project-driven civil society, but the creation of a new civic structure that is accountable, domestically rooted, financially transparent, politically independent and connected with communities.<\/p>\n

Civic consciousness in Nepal is not dead. On the contrary, citizens have become increasingly capable of understanding who is speaking in their name, why they are speaking and whose interests they may be serving.<\/p>\n

What has been brought to its knees, therefore, is not civil society itself, but the donor-dependent elite structure that long claimed to represent citizens.<\/p>\n

The civil society of the new era will be one that does not merely claim to speak for the people, but openly demonstrates its sources of funding, political relationships, ideological foundations and accountability to the public.<\/p>\n

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