{"id":21717,"date":"2026-08-06T08:03:06","date_gmt":"2026-08-06T02:18:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=21717"},"modified":"2026-08-06T08:03:06","modified_gmt":"2026-08-06T02:18:06","slug":"xizang-sensitivities-and-kathmandus-decision","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=21717","title":{"rendered":"Xizang Sensitivities and Kathmandu\u2019s Decision <\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

# Prem Sagar Poudel<\/strong><\/p>\n

The postponement, at the request of the Nepal government, of the 17th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, scheduled to be held in Kathmandu from August 23 to 29, 2026, is not merely an administrative matter. It simultaneously tests Nepal\u2019s sovereign decision-making capacity, its commitment to the One China principle, its protection of academic freedom, its ability to respect the legitimate security concerns of a neighbouring country and its institutional competence to preserve its own Buddhist civilisational identity.<\/p>\n

The seminar was to be jointly hosted by the Himalayan Centre for Asian Studies under Kathmandu University and Rangjung Yeshe Institute, part of Kathmandu University\u2019s Centre for Buddhist Studies. According to the organisers, the participation of around 720 scholars and representatives from 39 countries had already been confirmed.<\/p>\n

Preparations involving research papers, travel, accommodation, registration and logistical arrangements had reached an advanced stage. On August 5, 2026, however, it was announced that the seminar would not proceed after the government expressed concerns relating to diplomatic sensitivities.<\/p>\n

The debate generated by the postponement of what would have been the first such seminar held in Nepal should not be reduced to simplistic claims of \u201cChinese pressure\u201d or \u201cNepal\u2019s surrender.\u201d It would be equally misleading to assume that every study of the history, language, religion and culture of Xizang and the wider Tibetan cultural region is inherently anti-China.<\/p>\n

The real issue lies in the complex diplomatic, scholarly and institutional space between these two extreme interpretations.<\/p>\n

The International Association for Tibetan Studies was formally established at the University of Oxford in 1979 as an international scholarly body. Its stated objective is to advance Tibetan studies through history, religion, linguistics, philosophy, art, literature, medicine and related disciplines. It also provides established and emerging scholars with a platform to present original research.<\/p>\n

The association describes itself as an academic institution unaffiliated with any government or political campaign.<\/p>\n

The seminar therefore cannot reasonably be classified as separatist or anti-China without concrete evidence. Studying the language, Buddhist philosophy, history, archaeology, art, literature or social development of Xizang and the broader Tibetan cultural sphere does not in itself constitute an attack on the sovereignty of any country.<\/p>\n

China itself maintains an extensive network of institutions devoted to research on Xizang\u2019s history, culture, religion, archaeology and modern development.<\/p>\n

For China, however, Xizang is not an ordinary foreign-policy matter. It is a core national interest directly connected to national unity, sovereignty and state security.<\/p>\n

Beijing\u2019s concern that exiled political structures, separatist organisations or external powers could use an academic platform for political mobilisation against China\u2019s national integrity is therefore understandable.<\/p>\n

A clear distinction must consequently be made between the participation of independent researchers, university professors, linguists and historians and the formal representation of an exiled political structure.<\/p>\n

An individual attending as a scholar or researcher is not equivalent to that person appearing as the representative of a political administration or separatist campaign.<\/p>\n

Public accounts indicate that Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Zhang Maoming raised concerns about the seminar with Nepali officials. The Chinese side was reportedly particularly sensitive to the possibility that political representatives associated with the Dalai Lama or members of exiled Tibetan structures might use the seminar as a platform for political messaging.<\/p>\n

Early reports citing Foreign Ministry sources suggested that the ambassador had raised concerns about the event\u2019s possible political character and consequences rather than delivering a formal written demand for its cancellation.<\/p>\n

This distinction is critically important.<\/p>\n

A friendly country expressing diplomatic concern about an issue linked to its core national interests is not the same as that country ordering another sovereign state to take a particular decision.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s communication of its security and sovereignty concerns to Nepal falls within normal diplomatic practice. The final responsibility for assessing those concerns and deciding whether to permit the seminar, impose conditions, verify the status of participants or postpone the event rested with the Nepal government.<\/p>\n

Nepal\u2019s commitment to the One China principle is not a situational policy. Nepal has consistently recognised the People\u2019s Republic of China as the sole lawful government representing the whole of China.<\/p>\n

It has also repeatedly affirmed that matters relating to Xizang are China\u2019s internal affairs and that Nepali territory will not be used for separatist activities against China.<\/p>\n

Preventing formal political activities directed against China\u2019s national unity and territorial integrity from taking place on Nepali soil should therefore not be interpreted as submission to external pressure.<\/p>\n

It is consistent with Nepal\u2019s declared foreign policy, the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and the strategic partnership between Nepal and China.<\/p>\n

Adherence to the One China principle, however, does not require restricting legitimate research into Xizang\u2019s history, language, religion, philosophy, art or culture.<\/p>\n

An inability to distinguish between political separatism and credible scholarship would represent institutional weakness rather than policy firmness.<\/p>\n

The seminar had reached the implementation stage after more than four years of preparation. Hundreds of scholars had arranged research papers, registration, travel and accommodation.<\/p>\n

Its postponement at the final stage was therefore not a routine administrative adjustment. It could raise questions about Nepal\u2019s reliability as a venue for major international academic events, the predictability of government policy and the research autonomy of its universities.<\/p>\n

The Nepal government had both the authority and the responsibility to intervene if it possessed credible information that the event could facilitate political mobilisation, create a security risk or violate the country\u2019s foreign-policy commitments.<\/p>\n

Such a decision, however, should have been made through a timely, transparent and institutional process.<\/p>\n

The government should have clarified which proposed activities were considered inconsistent with national policy, what conditions were offered to the organisers, how the official status of participants was assessed and why alternatives to complete postponement were found inadequate.<\/p>\n

\u201cDiplomatic sensitivity\u201d is an extremely broad expression.<\/p>\n

Unless the concern is connected to an identifiable individual, institution, session or proposed activity, it cannot become a sufficient basis for halting every research or cultural programme relating to a sensitive subject.<\/p>\n

A state\u2019s decision becomes stronger when its basis is written, transparent, defensible and capable of being applied consistently to similar cases in the future.<\/p>\n

Nepal may have had the option of allowing the seminar to proceed under clear conditions and effective supervision.<\/p>\n

The organisers could have been required to submit a detailed programme, institutional profiles of speakers, political affiliations, session themes and sources of funding.<\/p>\n

Formal representation by exiled political structures, separatist symbols, political appeals against China\u2019s sovereignty and activities unrelated to the declared scholarly programme could have been explicitly prohibited.<\/p>\n

Independent scholars, historians, linguists and university professors could have participated in their individual and research capacities while formal political representation was kept separate.<\/p>\n

Meaningful participation by scholars from Chinese universities and research institutions could also have prevented the seminar from becoming a one-sided forum.<\/p>\n

Complete absence from international discussions concerning one\u2019s own country does not always protect the national interest. At times, absence leaves space for others to construct the narrative unilaterally.<\/p>\n

In modern public diplomacy, presenting one\u2019s position through participation, research, historical documentation and evidence-based argument can be more effective than prohibition.<\/p>\n

Had the organisers refused to comply with Nepal\u2019s foreign-policy commitments, security conditions and restrictions on political activity, postponing the seminar would have been a clear and defensible decision.<\/p>\n

Because no such formal process has been publicly demonstrated, the question remains whether regulation was genuinely impossible or whether the state lacked the necessary preparation and institutional confidence.<\/p>\n

Another serious dimension of the episode concerns Nepal\u2019s Buddhist civilisational identity.<\/p>\n

Nepal is not only the birthplace of Gautama Buddha. It is also a historic meeting ground of Himalayan and South Asian Buddhist philosophy, Sanskrit, Pali, Newar and Tibetan Buddhist traditions.<\/p>\n

If programmes relating to Buddhist studies, philosophy, culture and history are repeatedly placed under diplomatic or security suspicion, Nepal\u2019s own civilisational space could gradually contract.<\/p>\n

Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Buddhist and all other religious communities must receive equal freedom, respect and protection under Nepal\u2019s Constitution and laws.<\/p>\n

It would be socially irresponsible to portray the expansion of one religion as the decline of another.<\/p>\n

However, if other religious and cultural institutions are able to organise academic events, institutional programmes, international exchanges and outreach activities freely, while Buddhist studies and cultural programmes are repeatedly obstructed because of political suspicion, legitimate questions arise concerning equal treatment, cultural justice and institutional neutrality.<\/p>\n

The problem does not lie in the freedom enjoyed by Christian, Muslim or other religious communities. Their rights must be fully protected.<\/p>\n

The concern arises when Buddhist religion, philosophy and culture do not receive the same institutional protection, public space and open research environment.<\/p>\n

The freedom of one religion should not be restricted in an attempt to prevent the growth of another. At the same time, unequal conduct by the state should not force a historically rooted civilisational tradition to retreat.<\/p>\n

Nepal\u2019s secularism does not require the country to detach itself from its own history and civilisation.<\/p>\n

It means guaranteeing equal rights to all religious communities while protecting the country\u2019s historic Buddhist and Hindu heritage, languages, philosophies and cultural traditions.<\/p>\n

Nepal cannot fully utilise its civilisational capital if it is unable to host world-class studies and discussions relating to Lumbini, Kapilavastu, Swayambhu, Boudhanath, Namo Buddha and the Himalayan Buddhist traditions.<\/p>\n

If every international programme relating to Buddhism is viewed solely through the lens of political risk, Nepal may lose its own historic distinctiveness.<\/p>\n

Conversely, it would also be unacceptable to allow Buddhist scholarship to serve as a cover for political campaigns against the sovereignty of a friendly country.<\/p>\n

Establishing a clear, lawful and intelligent boundary between these two situations is the real responsibility of the state.<\/p>\n

Had the seminar proceeded, Nepal would have had an opportunity to present itself as an international centre for Himalayan civilisation, Buddhist studies, Sanskrit, Pali, Tibetan language, archaeology and Asian studies.<\/p>\n

The presence of hundreds of scholars could have encouraged university partnerships, joint research projects, academic publications, cultural tourism and wider international recognition of Nepal\u2019s Buddhist heritage.<\/p>\n

Nepal is a historic, cultural and geographical point of connection among China, Xizang and South Asia.<\/p>\n

It possesses a unique historical foundation for credible research into the Buddhist, commercial and civilisational relations linking these regions.<\/p>\n

The seminar should therefore have been considered not only a potential security concern, but also a strategic cultural opportunity requiring careful management.<\/p>\n

Nepal should now formulate a clear national framework for sensitive international academic events and programmes.<\/p>\n

It should establish timely coordination among the foreign, home, education and culture ministries, relevant universities and security agencies.<\/p>\n

The nature of participants, subject matter, links to political institutions, sources of funding and security requirements should be assessed before an event is publicly announced.<\/p>\n

Such a framework must clearly distinguish academic study, cultural programming and human-rights discussion from political campaigning and separatist activity.<\/p>\n

The formal participation of foreign political organisations, exiled administrations or groups active against the territorial integrity of another country should be reviewed at the earliest stage.<\/p>\n

University professors, independent scholars and researchers should not be excluded merely because of their nationality or personal views.<\/p>\n

At the same time, academic cover should not be used to provide formal representation to political organisations or facilitate activities contrary to Nepal\u2019s established foreign policy.<\/p>\n

Decisions of this nature should not be made through verbal requests, last-minute telephone calls or ambiguous administrative instructions.<\/p>\n

They should rest on written legal grounds and predetermined standards.<\/p>\n

Foreign embassies may legitimately communicate their concerns through diplomatic channels. Nepal, however, must make the final decision according to its own Constitution, laws, declared foreign policy and long-term national interests.<\/p>\n

Sovereignty does not mean rejecting every concern raised by a neighbouring country.<\/p>\n

Nor does it mean abandoning institutional judgement and procedure whenever a friendly state expresses sensitivity.<\/p>\n

Genuine sovereignty is the capacity to understand the legitimate concerns of others while taking decisions according to one\u2019s own rules, national interests and long-term credibility.<\/p>\n

Presenting the postponement of the Kathmandu seminar as either a Chinese victory or a Nepali defeat would misrepresent both the complexity of the episode and the broader Nepal\u2013China relationship.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s concern regarding a core national interest was understandable. Nepal\u2019s commitment not to allow its territory to be used for separatist activities against China is equally clear.<\/p>\n

The weakness lay in Nepal\u2019s failure to manage that commitment, research freedom and its own Buddhist civilisational interests through a single transparent and credible process.<\/p>\n

Nepal must firmly uphold the One China principle.<\/p>\n

Recognising matters relating to Xizang as China\u2019s internal affairs and preventing anti-China separatist activities on Nepali territory are consistent with Nepal\u2019s national interest, mutual respect and the Nepal\u2013China strategic partnership.<\/p>\n

At the same time, legitimate study of the language, history, religion, philosophy and culture of Xizang and the broader Tibetan cultural sphere must not be treated as synonymous with separatism.<\/p>\n

Protecting research, scholarly exchange and Buddhist cultural activity while preventing political misuse is the hallmark of a capable, confident and civilisationally conscious state.<\/p>\n

Nepal should not be forced to choose between respecting the sensitivities of a neighbour, protecting academic freedom and preserving its own Buddhist civilisational space.<\/p>\n

A strategically mature nation manages all three responsibilities in balance.<\/p>\n

The postponement may have reduced an immediate diplomatic risk. Nepal\u2019s real strategic success, however, will lie in building the capacity to manage future sensitivities not by cancelling academic events, but through clear rules, equal religious and cultural treatment, transparent procedures and confident diplomacy.<\/p>\n

About the Author: Prem Sagar Poudel is a senior journalist and international relations analyst from Nepal. He has conducted in-depth studies on Nepal-China relations, the geopolitics of the Himalayan region, and Asian security issues.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

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