{"id":21929,"date":"2026-08-08T08:56:08","date_gmt":"2026-08-08T03:11:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=21929"},"modified":"2026-08-08T09:00:13","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T03:15:13","slug":"the-emerging-strategic-divide-within-the-west-and-south-asia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=21929","title":{"rendered":"The Emerging Strategic Divide Within the West and South Asia<\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

# Elias Grant
\nPolitical and Foreign Affairs Analyst<\/strong><\/p>\n

Global politics is no longer being shaped solely by US\u2013China competition, Russia\u2013West confrontation, or the traditional North\u2013South divide. Within the Western world itself, a deeper reassessment is underway over foreign policy, national sovereignty, democracy, social values, trade, security, and the purpose of development assistance.<\/p>\n

For Nepal and South Asia, the implications are particularly sensitive. The United States, European countries, and their associated development agencies, diplomatic mechanisms, non-governmental sectors, and multilateral institutions have maintained a significant presence in the region for decades. It is therefore natural that major policy shifts within the West eventually influence South Asia\u2019s political environment.<\/p>\n

The extent of external influence over the formation of Nepal\u2019s current political structure remains a subject of debate in political and diplomatic circles. There may not be sufficient publicly verifiable evidence to present such claims as established fact. Yet one point is becoming increasingly apparent: Western powers and institutions engaged with Nepal do not necessarily operate from a single strategic outlook. The differences emerging among them are not merely local disagreements originating in Kathmandu; their roots lie in a broader political and ideological restructuring taking place in Washington, Brussels, and other major European capitals.<\/p>\n

For that reason, some political disagreements in Nepal, differences in policy priorities, approaches toward civil society, security cooperation, social issues, and relations with China and India cannot always be understood solely as domestic political competition. Some of these developments may reflect differing strategic currents evolving within the West itself. At the same time, reducing them to a simplistic narrative of a hidden conspiracy would be equally misleading. The reality is far more complex.<\/p>\n

The Rise of Two Influential Strategic Currents<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Two broad strategic tendencies can currently be identified within Western policymaking. The first is a nation-centered realist current that prioritizes sovereignty, direct national interest, balance of power, economic security, borders, industrial capacity, and transactional diplomacy. The second is a liberal-institutionalist internationalist current that considers democracy, human rights, multilateral institutions, civil society, inclusion, international rules, and broadly shared global norms to be important foundations of foreign policy.<\/p>\n

These two currents should not be understood as a simple geographical division between the United States and Europe. Supporters of both approaches exist within the United States and within Europe. However, recent political changes in the United States have strengthened a more nation-centered and results-oriented approach to foreign policy. Within the institutional structures of the European Union, the liberal-institutionalist outlook remains influential, although Europe itself is moving toward greater emphasis on security, industry, and strategic autonomy. The effects of this transformation are increasingly reaching South Asia.<\/p>\n

Sovereignty or Universal Norms?<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The first fundamental disagreement between these two currents concerns sovereignty itself. For nation-centered realists, the sovereign state remains the primary unit of global politics, and the political, social, and cultural structure of a country should primarily be determined by its own citizens. This approach holds that the purpose of foreign policy is not to transform another society, but to defend national interests.<\/p>\n

The liberal-institutionalist approach accepts national sovereignty but argues that human rights, democracy, freedom of expression, minority protection, gender equality, and international law cannot always be treated as purely internal matters. The distinction between these two approaches is particularly important in South Asia, where social structures, religions, ethnic identities, national experiences, state formation, and political development have evolved differently from those of Western societies.<\/p>\n

Democracy: Sovereign Choice or Exportable Model?<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The liberal Western tradition has long regarded democracy promotion as a legitimate component of foreign policy. Support for elections, civil society, independent media, women\u2019s and minority participation, human rights, and governance forms part of this approach. Its positive aspects are significant: weak democratic institutions may receive capacity-building support, civil rights can be strengthened, state accountability may improve, and marginalized communities may gain greater access to political participation.<\/p>\n

The difficulty begins when the boundary between assistance and political influence becomes unclear. If foreign funding gradually starts shaping local political priorities, social debates, electoral environments, or the direction of state policy, legitimate questions of sovereignty arise. The nation-centered current is more skeptical at precisely this point. Its argument is that democracy may be supported, but outsiders should not determine what another society ought to become. For Nepal, this is a particularly important debate.<\/p>\n

Foreign Assistance: Development or Influence?<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Foreign assistance is not purely charitable, but neither is every form of foreign assistance a conspiracy. Both extremes are misleading. Foreign assistance is one instrument of foreign policy, and when a donor country spends taxpayers\u2019 money abroad, it is natural that the expenditure serves some combination of strategic, diplomatic, humanitarian, developmental, or economic objectives. Nepal does not need to reject such assistance, but it should accept it with a clear understanding of its purpose and consequences.<\/p>\n

Five fundamental questions should be asked about every major foreign-funded initiative: Who is providing the money? Who is receiving it? For what purpose? What change in policy, behavior, or institutional practice is expected? And what permanent capacity will remain in Nepal once the project ends? These questions should apply not only to development assistance, but also to non-governmental organizations, research institutions, media initiatives, election assistance, social campaigns, and policy programs. Transparency remains the most effective safeguard.<\/p>\n

Possible Reflections of Western Differences in Nepal<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The long-standing assumption that all Western actors in Nepal operate from a single strategic worldview is increasingly inadequate. The priorities of different Western governments, embassies, development agencies, international organizations, foundations, and policy networks active in Nepal are not identical. Some emphasize social inclusion, civil society, rights, governance, and democratic institutions, while others place greater weight on energy, trade, security, strategic competition with China, supply chains, technology, and infrastructure.<\/p>\n

In many cases, these objectives complement each other; in others, they may come into tension. It would therefore be analytically unsound to interpret every political development in Nepal as evidence that \u201cone foreign camp defeated another.\u201d At the same time, it would be equally shortsighted to dismiss the possibility that policy divisions within the West may affect their local partners, priorities, funding relationships, and institutional networks. Understanding this distinction is essential.<\/p>\n

India: One of the Most Skilled Practitioners of the New Order<\/strong><\/h3>\n

India appears to have understood this transformation earlier than many other countries. It has not chosen exclusively between the United States and Europe. It continues to deepen cooperation with the United States in defense, maritime security, critical technologies, artificial intelligence, and strategic sectors; expands relations with Europe in trade, technology, green energy, industrial production, and security; maintains longstanding energy, defense, and strategic ties with Russia; and, despite border disputes and strategic competition with China, has not completely abandoned trade and diplomatic dialogue.<\/p>\n

This can no longer be described adequately as simple non-alignment. It is active multi-alignment. India\u2019s objective is not to demonstrate permanent ideological loyalty to any one bloc, but to expand its bargaining power. That is an important lesson for the rest of South Asia.<\/p>\n

China: The Common Question That Reconnects the West<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Despite disagreements between the United States and Europe on many issues, economic and strategic concern about China continues to bring them closer in several areas. The United States views China as a major competitor in technology, industrial capacity, military power, critical minerals, maritime access, and global influence. Europe does not generally seek complete economic separation from China, but it does seek to reduce excessive strategic dependence.<\/p>\n

American \u201cstrategic competition\u201d and European \u201cde-risking\u201d are therefore not identical, but they share one broad objective: reducing strategic vulnerability. This has direct implications for South Asia. India\u2019s strategic importance rises, while infrastructure, energy systems, digital networks, telecommunications, and mineral-related decisions in countries such as Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka may increasingly be viewed through a strategic lens by external powers.<\/p>\n

Nepal\u2019s challenge lies precisely here. Becoming a frontline state in another power\u2019s anti-China strategy would carry significant risks. Creating unnecessary distance from the United States or Europe because of Nepal\u2019s relations with China would be equally unwise.<\/p>\n

Europe Is No Longer the Europe of the Past<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The era of viewing Europe primarily as a source of human-rights advocacy, non-governmental support, environmental programs, and development assistance is coming to an end. Europe is increasingly focused on security, defense industry, technology, critical minerals, energy, economic security, and strategic autonomy. Uncertainty in transatlantic relations has placed greater pressure on Europe to develop more independent strategic capabilities.<\/p>\n

Its future role in South Asia will therefore be increasingly multidimensional. Europe will not only be a development partner; it will also be an investor, a technology partner, a potential defense and security partner, and a regulatory power. Where necessary, it may also seek to operate as a strategic pole capable of making decisions distinct from both Washington and Beijing.<\/p>\n

Technology: The Most Sensitive Arena of the Future<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The most consequential competition of the coming decade may become more visible in technology than in political declarations. Whose artificial intelligence systems will be used? Whose cloud infrastructure? Where will national data be stored? Who will build 5G and future telecommunications networks? Who will control smart-city data? Who will design digital identity systems? On whose software will national electricity systems depend? These are increasingly becoming questions of national security.<\/p>\n

The United States seeks technological leadership and market access. Europe seeks to preserve influence over regulation and data rights. China continues to expand technological infrastructure and systems, while India is building its own digital capabilities. Nepal should not become a passive consumer of any single external technological ecosystem; it must develop its own digital sovereignty.<\/p>\n

Energy: Opportunity Within Competition<\/strong><\/h3>\n

For Nepal, energy may represent the greatest strategic opportunity. The United States increasingly links energy security with economic and strategic power. Europe gives greater emphasis to renewable energy, climate objectives, and regional electricity connectivity. India requires large quantities of clean energy, Bangladesh needs additional electricity, and Nepal can cooperate with China in energy infrastructure and technology.<\/p>\n

Under such circumstances, Nepal does not need to choose only one partner. It can pursue separate forms of cooperation with multiple countries according to its national interest. Nepal\u2019s hydropower should not become an instrument of someone else\u2019s geopolitical project; it is a strategic national asset.<\/p>\n

Social Policy: The Most Sensitive Field<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The ideological divide within the West becomes particularly visible in social policy. The liberal approach presents minority rights, gender equality, diversity, and inclusion as universal norms, while the nation-centered approach argues that questions involving family, religion, culture, national identity, and local social structures should primarily be decided by the society concerned.<\/p>\n

Both contain arguments worth considering. But Nepal requires a clear principle: its social policy should not be determined from abroad. Nepal should protect human dignity, equal citizenship, and constitutional rights, while changes in social and cultural structures should emerge through Nepali society, Parliament, the judiciary, and democratic processes.<\/p>\n

What the Russia\u2013Ukraine War Reveals<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The Russia\u2013Ukraine war provides another important context for understanding Western strategic differences. Many European countries view the conflict fundamentally as a direct European security crisis. Within the United States, however, different views have developed regarding the cost of the war, its duration, burden-sharing, and the prospects for a political settlement.<\/p>\n

An even more instructive case is India. India has maintained its relationship with Russia while simultaneously expanding relations with both the United States and Europe. This reveals an increasingly important reality in global politics: complete ideological alignment is no longer a prerequisite for strategic partnership. Cooperation can continue where interests converge, while disagreements are managed where interests differ. Nepal should develop the same diplomatic capacity.<\/p>\n

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Two Approaches<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The strength of nation-centered realism lies in its insistence on clarity of national interest. It emphasizes sovereignty, encourages caution toward foreign interference, and prioritizes trade, infrastructure, industry, and measurable outcomes. Its risks, however, are equally real. When power becomes more important than rules, smaller countries can become vulnerable. If international norms weaken, asymmetries of power can become decisive, while human rights and democratic principles may be subordinated to strategic interests.<\/p>\n

The strength of liberal institutional internationalism lies in its emphasis on rules, institutions, human rights, and accountability. It can provide smaller states with legal and institutional protection against stronger powers and can strengthen civil society and democratic institutions. But it also carries risks. Universal norms can sometimes be applied without sufficient sensitivity to local culture and social structures; institutions dependent on foreign grants may gradually become more responsive to donor priorities than to local communities; and when international rules are applied selectively, their moral credibility declines.<\/p>\n

What Should Nepal Do?<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Nepal should not wait to see which current ultimately dominates the West. It must define its own policy.<\/p>\n

First, foreign assistance should be fully transparent. Funding received by governments, non-governmental organizations, research institutions, policy centers, or organizations capable of influencing public debate should be accompanied by clear disclosure of purpose.<\/p>\n

Second, strategic infrastructure requires special protection. Energy systems, telecommunications, data, airports, border infrastructure, water resources, and digital networks should not be treated merely as ordinary commercial projects.<\/p>\n

Third, no external power or ideology should be allowed to transform Nepal\u2019s domestic political competition into a proxy struggle.<\/p>\n

Fourth, Nepal should cooperate with India, China, the United States, Europe, Russia, Japan, and other partners in different sectors according to national priorities.<\/p>\n

Fifth, the true measure of foreign cooperation should not be the amount of money received, but the amount of national capacity created. Which project leaves Nepal more capable five years later, and which leaves it more dependent? That is the decisive question.<\/p>\n

Sixth, Nepal needs stronger indigenous policy-research capacity. A situation in which foreign think tanks continuously analyze Nepal while Nepal lacks the institutional capacity to independently analyze itself and external powers is strategically unhealthy.<\/p>\n

Seventh, Nepal\u2019s foreign policy must move one step beyond the language of \u201cbalance.\u201d It should become active multi-alignment.<\/p>\n

The Central Misconception<\/strong><\/h3>\n

It is increasingly inaccurate to view the West as a single political organism. The interests of Washington, Brussels, London, Paris, and Berlin are not always identical. But it would also be wrong to assume that they are permanently opposed to one another. There remains significant convergence on China, technology, supply chains, and selected security issues, while substantial differences persist over climate, social policy, trade, multilateralism, defense spending, foreign assistance, and interpretations of national sovereignty.<\/p>\n

Western relations should therefore be studied issue by issue, rather than through a simplistic binary of \u201cunity\u201d or \u201cdivision.\u201d Likewise, the behavior of one embassy, institution, or development program in Nepal should not automatically be treated as the policy of the entire \u201cWest.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Central Message for Asian Leaders<\/strong><\/h3>\n

In the emerging global order, national capacity is becoming more valuable than ideological loyalty. A country that possesses a market, energy, technology, strategic geography, credible state institutions, and clearly defined national priorities will increasingly be courted by competing powers. A country that fails to formulate its own national strategy, by contrast, risks becoming an arena for the strategies of others.<\/p>\n

This principle is particularly relevant to Nepal. Nepal lies between China and India, both major global economic and strategic powers. The United States remains active across the Indo-Pacific, Europe is expanding its role in Asia, and Russia is increasingly redirecting strategic attention toward the continent. Despite this geography, Nepal should not remain a country that merely reacts to the strategies of others. It must be capable of presenting its own strategic proposition to the world.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The current strategic disagreement within the West is better understood as a restructuring of the Western order than as its collapse. One current is returning to the language of the nation, sovereignty, borders, power, industry, and direct national interest, while the other seeks to preserve democracy, international rules, human rights, civil society, and multilateral institutions. Both contain strengths, and both contain weaknesses.<\/p>\n

Nepal and other Asian countries do not need to adopt either approach uncritically. From nation-centered realism, they can learn the importance of clearly defined national interests and sovereignty. From liberal institutionalism, they can learn the importance of law, institutions, accountability, and human dignity. But the final model must be their own.<\/p>\n

Nepal, in particular, should recognize one further reality: some of the political and policy disagreements becoming visible inside the country may not be adequately explained solely as struggles originating in Kathmandu. Strategic restructuring at higher levels of Western policymaking can influence local partnerships, priorities, and networks. Yet attributing every domestic political event to external direction would be equally unsupported and analytically unsound.<\/p>\n

The appropriate response is therefore neither blind trust nor automatic suspicion. It is information, transparency, independent analysis, and national interest.<\/p>\n

Nepal\u2019s future should not depend on which current ultimately prevails within the West. It should depend on how clearly Nepal defines its national interests, how effectively it strengthens state capacity, how transparently it manages external influence, and how skillfully it uses competition among global powers to advance its own prosperity.<\/p>\n

In the emerging world order, the greatest security available to a small or medium-sized state is not permanent loyalty to a major power.<\/p>\n

It is the national capacity to make its own decisions.<\/p>\n

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