{"id":22073,"date":"2026-08-09T09:06:01","date_gmt":"2026-08-09T03:21:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=22073"},"modified":"2026-08-09T09:06:12","modified_gmt":"2026-08-09T03:21:12","slug":"seeing-china-through-nepali-eyes-a-time-to-learn-from-the-discipline-of-development-not-to-imitate","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=22073","title":{"rendered":"Seeing China Through Nepali Eyes: A Time to Learn from the Discipline of Development, Not to Imitate<\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

# Muna Chand <\/strong><\/p>\n

When China\u2019s development is viewed from the outside, the first thing that stands out is the scale of its physical transformation. High speed rail, modern cities, industrial zones, new energy vehicles, digital public services, vast energy infrastructure, and rapid technological expansion immediately capture attention. Yet if China\u2019s achievements are understood only through these visible structures, the most important dimension of its development journey is missed. China\u2019s real strength does not lie merely in the number of roads, railways, buildings, or factories it has constructed. It lies in the capacity of the state to define long term goals, maintain continuity in national priorities, and align infrastructure, industry, technology, markets, and public administration toward a common developmental direction. From a Nepali perspective, this is perhaps the most important lesson China offers. Nepal cannot replicate China\u2019s scale, population, industrial capacity, or political system, nor is such an attempt necessary. But there is no reason Nepal cannot learn from the experience of how a country turns national objectives into sustained implementation.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s high speed rail network is one of the clearest examples of this development philosophy. During the 14th Five Year Plan period, the total length of China\u2019s high speed railway network in operation increased from 37,900 kilometres to 50,400 kilometres, representing growth of roughly 33 percent. In 2025 alone, 2,862 kilometres of new high speed railway entered operation. China now operates the largest high speed rail network in the world. These figures should not be interpreted merely as a demonstration of construction capacity. High speed rail in China does more than reduce travel time between cities. It also affects labour mobility, industrial production, tourism, consumption, regional development, and the integration of the domestic economy. The more important point is that transport infrastructure has been conceived not as an isolated physical project, but as part of a broader economic network.<\/p>\n

This is precisely where Nepal can reconsider its own development practice. Nepal\u2019s geography, economy, and population do not require a Chinese scale high speed rail system. Learning from China therefore does not mean attempting to build high speed railways across Nepal. The real lesson lies in the purpose behind infrastructure. In Nepal, roads, airports, industrial zones, and energy projects are often treated as achievements in themselves, while their relationship with production, trade, tourism, employment, and local economic transformation receives secondary attention. A road should not be regarded as successful simply because it has been built. From the beginning, planners should ask what products it will bring to market, which towns it can turn into economic centres, which industries it will make more competitive, and what new economic activity can emerge along its route. Unless infrastructure is connected to economic transformation in this way, even large investments may fail to generate the expected national return.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s development experience demonstrates the discipline of linking infrastructure to outcomes. Railways, highways, ports, energy systems, industrial zones, and urban development are often designed as interconnected elements rather than unrelated projects. Questions such as where production will take place, where energy will come from, how raw materials and finished goods will move, where labour will be sourced, and how products will reach markets are considered within the same economic structure. This approach allows infrastructure to raise productivity. For Nepal, such thinking is even more important because the country does not possess unlimited resources. A nation with limited resources must be even more disciplined in setting priorities. Rather than attempting to bring every type of project to every district, Nepal needs greater national clarity about which regions should be developed for which economic functions.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s expansion in new energy vehicles reflects the same systemic approach. In 2025, China sold 16.49 million new energy vehicles. An important distinction is necessary here. In Chinese statistics, new energy vehicles do not refer only to fully battery powered electric vehicles. The category also includes plug in hybrid vehicles and fuel cell vehicles. At the same time, China did not merely expand vehicle production. It also built the infrastructure necessary to support large scale adoption. By the end of February 2026, China had 21.01 million electric vehicle charging facilities, including approximately 4.834 million public and 16.176 million private charging points.<\/p>\n

Taken together, these figures reveal an important sequence in China\u2019s development approach. It is not enough to simply encourage citizens to adopt a new technology. The environment required to use that technology must be created either beforehand or in parallel. A person purchasing a new energy vehicle needs confidence that charging will be available, technical service and spare parts will exist, electricity supply will be reliable, and long distance travel will remain practical. One reason for China\u2019s success has been its ability to advance production, infrastructure, supply chains, technological research, and market expansion as mutually connected processes. This illustrates a broader principle of development. Markets cannot be created by increasing production alone. Technological transition cannot be achieved through subsidies alone. And citizens cannot be persuaded into adopting a new system merely through government encouragement. A complete ecosystem is required to generate confidence.<\/p>\n

This experience is particularly relevant to Nepal\u2019s transition toward electric mobility. Nepal\u2019s focus should not remain limited to changing the composition of vehicle imports. More important questions include how domestic electricity can be linked to the transport sector over the long term, how public transport can be electrified, how a reliable charging network can be built nationwide, how technical skills can be developed, how batteries can be reused and managed responsibly, and what domestic economic activities can emerge around electric mobility. The lesson from China is not to imitate a particular vehicle manufacturer or technology. It is to understand how energy, transport, industry, and consumers can be connected within a single policy framework.<\/p>\n

The Suzhou Industrial Park offers another important example of China\u2019s industrial development. Here, factual precision matters. The 834.59 billion yuan in imports and exports recorded in 2025 refers not to the whole city of Suzhou, but specifically to the Suzhou Industrial Park. Developed as a major government cooperation project between China and Singapore, the park covers 278 square kilometres and has a population of around 1.37 million. In 2025, its total import and export volume rose by 20.8 percent to 834.59 billion yuan. The scale of economic activity generated within such a limited geographical area demonstrates that industrial policy is about far more than allocating land for factories. Industrial clusters emerge when manufacturing, research, technology, finance, transport, international trade, and skilled labour are brought together within a connected economic environment.<\/p>\n

Nepal should evaluate its own industrial estates and special economic zones using the same logic. The amount of land allocated or the number of firms registered is not enough. What matters is whether industries have reliable electricity, efficient roads and customs procedures, access to skilled workers, adequate financing, links with research institutions or universities, and identifiable markets for their products. Nepal cannot reproduce China\u2019s industrial scale, but it can create areas of specialisation. Hydropower, agricultural processing, medicinal herbs, information technology, tourism, the Himalayan economy, clean energy, and selected manufacturing activities could allow Nepal to become a useful part of regional value chains. This requires the discipline to assign distinct economic roles to particular regions rather than attempting to make every place serve every purpose.<\/p>\n

Another important dimension of China\u2019s experience is the digital transformation of public administration and citizen services. China\u2019s State Council has defined the 12345 government service hotline as an important mechanism for receiving the concerns of citizens and businesses, resolving practical problems, improving government service efficiency, and supporting better governance. In 2025, policies were introduced to further standardise the system, expand its digital capabilities, and improve coordination across government agencies. Its significance lies not in the telephone number itself, but in the process of receiving citizens\u2019 problems, transferring them to responsible agencies, tracking their resolution, collecting feedback, and using accumulated information to identify weaknesses in governance.<\/p>\n

Beijing\u2019s experience demonstrates the scale such a system can achieve. In 2025, the city\u2019s 12345 service handled more than 25.8 million requests and complaints from citizens and businesses. Official data reported a resolution rate of 97.3 percent and a satisfaction rate of 97.7 percent. Such figures should not be treated as a complete measure of the quality of an entire governance system, but they do reveal an important administrative lesson. Citizen complaints can be viewed not merely as obstacles, but as information that can be used to improve governance. Artificial intelligence, large scale data systems, and digital platforms can likewise be deployed not to distance the state from citizens, but to strengthen responsiveness and improve public service delivery.<\/p>\n

This point is especially relevant to Nepal\u2019s digital governance ambitions. Digital transformation is not complete simply because a ministry develops a new application, an office converts paper documents into electronic files, or a government service receives a website. The real questions are how many offices citizens must visit to complete a task, whether they can track the status of an application, whether they can see where a complaint has reached, whether the same information must repeatedly be submitted to different government agencies, and whether service providers can be held accountable for results. Technology acquires value in governance only when it makes citizens\u2019 lives easier. In this sense, China\u2019s experience offers a lesson in administrative restructuring rather than technological display.<\/p>\n

Another notable feature of China\u2019s development journey is policy continuity. Five Year Plans cover defined periods, but many objectives in infrastructure, industrialisation, technology, energy, and regional development evolve from one planning cycle into the next. In the case of high speed rail, the network that reached 50,400 kilometres by the end of the 14th Five Year Plan is expected to expand to around 60,000 kilometres by 2030. Such continuity gives development projects an economic time horizon longer than the immediate political popularity of a government. When national direction remains relatively consistent, administrators, industries, investors, and local governments gain greater clarity about future priorities.<\/p>\n

Nepal\u2019s structural challenge is often the opposite. Changes in government frequently bring changes in priorities. New ministers may hesitate to claim ownership of projects launched by predecessors, while even projects of national importance can become trapped in disputes over political ownership. Democracy necessarily involves policy debate, and some shifts in priorities when governments change are entirely natural. But there should still be minimum national continuity in areas such as energy, major transport infrastructure, digital public systems, education, health, industrial capacity, and long term trade connectivity. Political debate should focus less on whether such national goals should exist at all and more on the most effective, transparent, and accountable means of achieving them.<\/p>\n

It is therefore important to understand correctly what learning from China should mean. Recognising China\u2019s achievements does not imply that all Chinese policies are suitable for Nepal. Nepal has its own Constitution, democratic system, social structure, geography, economic scale, and public priorities. Copying the model of another country is not a development strategy. But studying institutional practices that have successfully addressed problems elsewhere is not intellectual dependence either. Genuine confidence lies in the ability to improve one\u2019s own system by learning from external experience. Nepal does not need a copy of the Chinese model. It needs the intellectual confidence to use China\u2019s experience as one reference point for reassessing its own weaknesses and possibilities.<\/p>\n

Nepal\u2019s geographical proximity to China makes this question even more practical. As China has become one of the world\u2019s major centres of production, trade, technology, and clean energy, Nepal can no longer view its northern neighbour primarily as a source of grants, infrastructure projects, or tourists. The more important question is where and how Nepal can connect with China\u2019s vast economic structure. Which categories of Nepali products could find a market in China? What technical skills should Nepali young people develop? Which productive activities could be built around Nepal\u2019s clean electricity? How can border towns become genuine centres of trade and tourism? In which sectors can Nepal cooperate with China\u2019s green and digital economy? Such questions are more important to the future of bilateral relations than the sheer number of projects announced.<\/p>\n

For this to happen, Nepal must do its own homework. China will not design Nepal\u2019s development strategy on Nepal\u2019s behalf. The capacity of any neighbouring country becomes useful only when Nepal itself has clear priorities, sound project selection, realistic financing, environmental assessment, market strategy, and implementation capacity. A poorly prepared state can fail to benefit even from large opportunities. A capable state, by contrast, can use even modest projects to create long term economic capacity. Nepal China economic relations therefore need to move gradually from a project centred approach toward a capacity centred approach.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s development should neither be treated with uncritical admiration nor viewed solely through a predetermined lens of suspicion. Every large development process contains challenges, costs, uneven outcomes, and areas requiring further reform. But these realities do not justify dismissing verified achievements. The scale of infrastructure, productive capacity, new energy industries, digital services, and trade networks China has created within a few decades is an empirical reality worthy of serious study. Even more important for Nepal is understanding how goal setting, planning, implementation, experimentation, expansion, and continuity have been connected in producing those outcomes.<\/p>\n

Ultimately, China\u2019s most important lesson is not a particular railway, factory, new energy vehicle, or digital hotline. The deeper lesson is the seriousness with which development is approached. Money alone is not enough. There must be clarity about where and why it is invested. Infrastructure alone is not enough. It must be linked to production. Technology alone is not enough. It must solve real problems for citizens. Plans alone are not enough. Their implementation must be measured. A successful project alone is not enough. It must contribute to institutional capacity. And one active leader alone is not enough. Institutions must preserve continuity when leadership changes.<\/p>\n

Nepal has no reason to try to become China. It must build its own development path based on its history, geography, democratic system, social structure, and economic capacity. But permanently explaining national weaknesses through geography, limited resources, or political complexity is not a solution either. Just across the Himalayas, there is a large scale experience of economic transformation built through the relationship between long term goals, infrastructure, industry, technology, public services, and implementation. Studying that experience, selecting what is useful, and adapting it to Nepal\u2019s own institutional context is an exercise in practical intelligence.<\/p>\n

The most positive message China\u2019s development offers Nepal is that development is not an accident. Transformation does not emerge from aspiration, slogans, or a single successful project. It requires clear goals, discipline in setting priorities, institutional continuity, implementation capacity, and accountability for results. Nepal\u2019s development debate should therefore move beyond repeatedly asking what the country lacks. It should increasingly focus on how Nepal can transform the resources, geography, human capacity, and strategic proximity to two major neighbours that it already possesses into tangible outcomes. That may be the most valuable lesson Nepal can draw from China\u2019s experience.<\/p>\n

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