{"id":24461,"date":"2026-09-04T07:53:58","date_gmt":"2026-09-04T02:08:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=24461"},"modified":"2026-09-04T07:53:58","modified_gmt":"2026-09-04T02:08:58","slug":"dalai-lama-succession-in-the-context-of-religious-tradition-and-national-law","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=24461","title":{"rendered":"Dalai Lama Succession: In the Context of Religious Tradition and National Law<\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Prem Sagar Poudel<\/strong><\/p>\n

Rather than viewing the Dalai Lama’s succession merely as a question of religious freedom, it is essential to understand its historical, legal, and sovereign dimensions. This issue is not only linked to the belief in reincarnation but also raises a serious question: who determines the succession, legitimacy, and political influence of a religious institution that exists within China’s sovereign territory?<\/p>\n

Buddhism’s doctrine of “Anatta” (non-self) rejects the existence of a permanent, independent soul. Reincarnation is understood not as a soul transmigrating from one body to another, but as the continuity of karma, consciousness, and causality. The Buddha did not appoint any personal successor after his passing; instead, he instructed that the Dharma and Vinaya should serve as guides. The Tulku (reincarnation) system, which later developed in Tibet, is a means of maintaining institutional continuity, but from its very inception, this system was intertwined with political and administrative structures.<\/p>\n

The Dalai Lama institution was established in the 16th century, and during the time of the Fifth Dalai Lama (after 1642), religious and secular authority were unified. Therefore, it would be historically inaccurate to regard the Dalai Lama institution solely as a purely spiritual entity. Tibetan Buddhism is divided into multiple traditions, including Nyingma, Kagyu, Sakya, and Gelug, among which the Dalai Lama belongs to the Gelug tradition. Thus, the Dalai Lama is not the supreme spiritual leader of the entire Buddhist world, but a prominent religious figure.<\/p>\n

In 1793, the Qing dynasty promulgated the “29-Article Ordinance for the Administration of Tibet,” which institutionalized the Golden Urn system for the identification of high reincarnated lamas, with the primary aim of preventing external interference in the selection process. This formalized the role of the central government. In 2007, China further codified this process by enacting the “Regulations on the Management of Reincarnation of Living Buddhas,” which require government approval alongside religious searches, and matters concerning high-impact reincarnations are subject to the final decision of central state authorities.<\/p>\n

Even in the recognition of the 14th Dalai Lama in 1940, the then central government of the Republic of China provided the final approval, although the Golden Urn procedure was not used on that occasion. This was a special exemption, but it does not undermine the sovereign authority of the central government.<\/p>\n

In 2025, the Dalai Lama announced that the sole authority for identifying his future reincarnation lies with the Gaden Phodrang Trust. However, this Trust is not a religious body within China’s legal framework; rather, it is a private entity registered under Indian law in Dharamshala, India. In China’s view, it holds no legal authority, and any declaration made in disregard of China’s sovereignty is illegal and invalid.<\/p>\n

The history of the Golden Urn system demonstrates that since the late 18th century, the central state authority has played an indispensable role in high-level Tibetan religious succession. Although exemptions were granted in certain exceptional cases, these do not fragment the long-standing tradition and legal framework. China’s current claim of authority over the Dalai Lama succession is a continuation of this historical tradition.<\/p>\n

The Dalai Lama has been living in exile in India since 1959, and structures such as the Gaden Phodrang Trust and the Central Tibetan Administration remain active in Dharamshala. India faces the challenge of balancing its strategic relations with China against its sensitivities toward the Tibetan community residing on its soil. China’s position is clear: no foreign power should interfere in Tibet’s internal affairs, and the Dalai Lama’s succession is strictly China’s internal matter.<\/p>\n

If a parallel Dalai Lama were to be recognized outside China’s legal framework, it could create division within the Tibetan Buddhist community. Monasteries, senior lamas of various Buddhist traditions, and Buddhist communities in Mongolia, Bhutan, Nepal, and elsewhere may have differing views. However, from China’s perspective, sovereignty and legal legitimacy are the ultimate foundations\u2014religious acceptability and state recognition must converge on a single individual.<\/p>\n

Nepal has already committed to the One-China principle and considers all matters related to Tibet as China’s internal affairs. Although Nepal’s constitution guarantees religious freedom, it is necessary to keep such freedom separate from political mobilization. Nepal’s appropriate course is to protect religious worship, pilgrimage, and Buddhist exchanges while ensuring that these activities are not transformed into anti-China separatist movements.<\/p>\n

A solution is not possible through a “China versus exile camp” zero-sum competition. An acceptable process must proceed within China’s legal sovereignty, involving participation from eminent scholars and senior lamas from various Tibetan Buddhist traditions, historical records, and transparent search procedures. Ultimately, however, legitimacy can only come from the common ground of China’s law, historical tradition, and sovereign authority.<\/p>\n

The succession of the Dalai Lama is not merely an abstract religious belief in reincarnation; it is an integral part of China’s sovereignty, legal structure, and historical tradition. China’s central government possesses the ultimate historical, religious, and legal authority in this process. No external force, institution, or individual can make a unilateral decision on this matter. Ultimately, religious recognition and state legitimacy are only possible within China’s legal framework, and this is the foundation for long-term stability and unity.<\/p>\n

About the Author: Prem Sagar Poudel is a senior journalist and international relations analyst from Nepal. He has conducted in-depth studies on Nepal-China relations, the geopolitics of the Himalayan region, and Asian security issues.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

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