{"id":25657,"date":"2026-09-18T17:16:22","date_gmt":"2026-09-18T11:31:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=25657"},"modified":"2026-09-18T17:16:22","modified_gmt":"2026-09-18T11:31:22","slug":"brics-after-new-delhi-a-new-strategic-foundation-for-china-russia-india-cooperation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=25657","title":{"rendered":"BRICS After New Delhi: A New Strategic Foundation for China\u2013Russia\u2013India Cooperation<\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Pravdist (\u041f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0434\u0438\u0441\u0442)
\nInternational Security and Strategic Affairs Analyst<\/strong><\/p>\n

The significance of the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi extends beyond its declaration and bilateral meetings. Its broader strategic message is that China, Russia and India, despite differing security concerns and national priorities, can expand cooperation in areas of shared interest. The New Delhi Declaration placed multipolarity, stronger representation for the Global South, economic and financial cooperation, peaceful management of disputes and reform of international institutions at the center of this common ground.<\/p>\n

The meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was among the summit\u2019s most important political developments. Both leaders emphasized the need to approach bilateral relations from a long-term and strategic perspective, prevent differences from becoming disputes and maintain peace in the border areas. China stressed that the two countries should see each other as partners in development rather than rivals, while India emphasized mutual respect, sensitivity to each other\u2019s concerns and mutual interests as essential foundations of the relationship.<\/p>\n

This does not mean that the China\u2013India boundary question has been resolved. The border issue, trade imbalance, market access and security sensitivities remain subjects for negotiation. The important shift lies instead in the political willingness to manage these differences while simultaneously advancing economic cooperation, trade, connectivity and people-to-people relations. If this approach continues, improved China\u2013India relations could contribute to stability across the Himalayan region and the wider Asian strategic environment.<\/p>\n

Russia occupies a distinctive position in this equation. Moscow maintains important strategic relationships with both Beijing and New Delhi. President Vladimir Putin\u2019s participation in the summit and his talks with Modi highlighted the continuity of Russia\u2013India cooperation in energy, trade, defence, technology, infrastructure and industry. Reports have also emerged about discussions concerning possible defence cooperation, including the Su-57 fighter aircraft, but no final agreement on procurement or joint production has been officially confirmed. Russia\u2013India relations therefore should not be reduced to a single prospective defence project; their economic and strategic dimensions are considerably broader.<\/p>\n

China, meanwhile, has sought to expand the BRICS agenda into artificial intelligence, new industrialization, manufacturing and supply-chain cooperation. India has emphasized digital infrastructure, startups, agricultural technology, health and stronger representation for developing countries, while Russia has focused on energy, technology, investment and financial cooperation. China\u2019s manufacturing capacity, India\u2019s vast market and digital capabilities, and Russia\u2019s strengths in energy, minerals, science and technology suggest that the three countries possess substantial economic complementarities alongside their areas of competition.<\/p>\n

The economic dimension of the New Delhi Declaration is therefore particularly significant. BRICS has neither established a common currency nor created a fully operational alternative to SWIFT. It is, however, exploring greater use of local currencies, more efficient and secure cross-border payment arrangements and an expanded role for the New Development Bank. The practical objective appears less about immediately replacing the US dollar than about widening financial options and strengthening economic autonomy for participating countries.<\/p>\n

Reform of global governance provides another area of convergence. BRICS has continued to advocate stronger representation for developing countries in institutions such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and World Bank. In this context, describing BRICS simply as an anti-Western structure would overlook its broader institutional agenda. Its stated direction is oriented more toward making the existing international system more representative and multipolar than dismantling it altogether.<\/p>\n

There is no formal China\u2013Russia\u2013India political or military triangle, nor is there sufficient evidence to characterize their cooperation in those terms. The potential strength of their relationship lies instead in maintaining strategic autonomy while cooperating where interests converge. Cooperation where interests align, dialogue where differences persist and mechanisms to prevent competition from becoming confrontation could provide a more sustainable foundation for this emerging relationship.<\/p>\n

For Nepal, these developments have direct strategic relevance. Greater stability between China and India, continuity in India\u2013Russia relations, and expanding BRICS opportunities in infrastructure, energy, technology and development finance could create a more favorable regional environment for developing countries. Nepal\u2019s long-term interests are better served by regional stability, stronger economic connectivity and wider multilateral development opportunities than by intensified rivalry among major powers.<\/p>\n

The real test for BRICS after New Delhi will therefore be implementation. As China assumes the chairmanship in 2027, attention will turn to whether local-currency and payment cooperation becomes more practical, whether the New Development Bank expands its role, whether technological and industrial cooperation becomes institutionalized, and whether China and India can continue managing their differences effectively. New Delhi has nevertheless established an important foundation: China, Russia and India do not need identical positions on every issue to cooperate. Their ability to prevent differences from becoming confrontation while converting shared interests into practical cooperation could become an important source of both BRICS influence and regional stability.<\/p>\n

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