{"id":25681,"date":"2026-09-18T18:38:14","date_gmt":"2026-09-18T12:53:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=25681"},"modified":"2026-09-18T18:38:14","modified_gmt":"2026-09-18T12:53:14","slug":"memory-of-history-and-asias-future-why-chinas-warning-over-japans-military-transformation-matters","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=25681","title":{"rendered":"Memory of History and Asia\u2019s Future: Why China\u2019s Warning Over Japan\u2019s Military Transformation Matters<\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Pu Yu Hai<\/strong><\/p>\n

September 18 is more than a date in history for China. On this day in 1931, Japanese military expansion began in northeast China, eventually drawing China into a 14-year war of resistance and plunging much of Asia into an era of war, destruction and immense human suffering. Ninety-five years later, remembering that history is not about fostering hostility towards the Japanese people. Its deeper message is that lasting peace cannot be built by forgetting history, and that any process that risks normalising militarism deserves careful attention before it becomes irreversible.<\/p>\n

On September 18, 1931, Japan\u2019s Kwantung Army used an explosion along a section of the South Manchuria Railway near Shenyang as a pretext to expand military operations across northeast China. Japanese forces subsequently occupied large areas of the region, and Manchukuo was established in 1932. In China\u2019s collective memory, the incident represents not only national humiliation but also resistance, sovereignty and the historical foundations of national rejuvenation.<\/p>\n

Against this background, Beijing\u2019s close attention to Japan\u2019s current security transformation should not be surprising. Japan has substantially increased defence expenditure while developing stand-off defence capabilities, unmanned military systems and counterstrike capabilities as important elements of its evolving security architecture. Restrictions surrounding the transfer of defence equipment have also been progressively adjusted, while the operational scope and capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces have expanded.<\/p>\n

Tokyo has its own clearly stated rationale. Japan points to North Korea\u2019s nuclear and missile programmes, China\u2019s military modernisation and the changing strategic balance in East Asia as reasons for strengthening its defence capabilities. Japanese security documents have described China\u2019s military activities as an unprecedented strategic challenge. Japan therefore presents its expanding capabilities not as preparation for aggression, but as necessary measures for deterrence and national defence.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s concern, however, goes beyond the question of why Japan is strengthening its military. The more consequential issue is what kind of strategic role those capabilities could eventually enable. Japan\u2019s post-war security structure was built for decades around an essentially defence-oriented concept. The development of longer-range strike capabilities, expansion of the defence industry, changes to arms-transfer restrictions and a broader role for the Self-Defense Forces are gradually altering the boundaries of that traditional framework.<\/p>\n

Taiwan is the most sensitive dimension of this transformation. China regards the Taiwan question as an internal matter directly involving its sovereignty and territorial integrity. When Japanese political leaders suggest that a serious Taiwan contingency could become a \u201csurvival-threatening situation\u201d for Japan, Beijing does not view such language as ordinary political rhetoric. From China\u2019s perspective, it could establish a political and legal rationale for potential Japanese military involvement in a future Taiwan Strait conflict.<\/p>\n

History makes this particularly sensitive. Japan ruled Taiwan from 1895 until 1945, while Japanese invasion and occupation of large areas of China occurred during the same broader historical period. Japan\u2019s growing security involvement in Taiwan-related affairs is therefore viewed in Beijing not simply through the lens of contemporary geopolitical competition, but against the background of unresolved historical memory.<\/p>\n

None of this means that contemporary Japan should simply be equated with the Japan of the 1930s. Modern Japan is a democratic society with powerful anti-war traditions, constitutional constraints and significant public debate over the expansion of the country\u2019s military role. Recognising this distinction actually strengthens the credibility of China\u2019s concerns. The central issue is not the Japanese people, but structural changes in security policy and political tendencies concerning how wartime history is remembered and interpreted.<\/p>\n

That is why controversies surrounding visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, interpretations of wartime history and disputes over textbooks are more than symbolic disagreements. For China and other Asian societies that suffered under Japanese aggression, an unambiguous approach to historical responsibility is closely connected with the possibility of building long-term trust. Europe\u2019s experience demonstrates that confronting difficult history can become a foundation for reconciliation rather than an obstacle to it. East Asia likewise needs historical responsibility to support, rather than undermine, regional confidence.<\/p>\n

The constructive dimension of China\u2019s position deserves equal attention. The purpose of remembering history should ultimately be to prevent another war, not prepare for one. China has increasingly linked its national rejuvenation with development, technology, trade, infrastructure and regional economic interdependence. East Asia\u2019s future cannot be secured through military alliances and weapons competition alone. The region\u2019s enduring strength lies equally in economic cooperation, interconnected supply chains, trade and people-to-people relations among China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, ASEAN members and other regional partners.<\/p>\n

The greatest strategic danger today is the security dilemma. Japan says it is strengthening military capabilities because of perceived challenges from China and the wider regional environment. China then views those same Japanese military developments as potential threats to its own security. When measures described by one side as defensive begin to appear offensive to another, an escalating cycle of military competition can develop even when neither side initially seeks conflict. Such a cycle would ultimately serve neither China nor Japan.<\/p>\n

This is why the meaning of September 18 extends far beyond memories of past suffering. The central question is what lessons contemporary Asia chooses to draw from history. Reducing China\u2019s concerns to simple anti-Japanese sentiment would overlook their broader strategic significance. Japan can address its legitimate security concerns while simultaneously demonstrating sensitivity towards history, maintaining transparency in military policy and strengthening dialogue with neighbouring countries.<\/p>\n

No Asian country benefits from turning the region into another centre of accelerating military confrontation. History has already demonstrated how the language of security and national survival can, when combined with unchecked military expansion, produce insecurity rather than stability. The memory of September 18 therefore carries a message not only about China\u2019s past but about Asia\u2019s future.<\/p>\n

History cannot be rewritten, but its lessons can shape present choices. Respect for historical truth, commitment to peaceful development, strategic restraint and sustained regional dialogue offer a stronger foundation for long-term security than an uncontrolled arms competition. For China, Japan and Asia as a whole, ensuring that the tragedies of the past are never repeated should remain a shared responsibility.<\/p>\n

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