{"id":28018,"date":"2026-10-26T10:20:34","date_gmt":"2026-10-26T04:35:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=28018"},"modified":"2026-10-26T10:20:34","modified_gmt":"2026-10-26T04:35:34","slug":"washington-dharamshala-thimphu-kathmandu-a-link-in-the-encirclement-against-china-not-a-routine-itinerary","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/eng.dragonmedia.com.np\/?p=28018","title":{"rendered":"Washington\u2013Dharamshala\u2013Thimphu\u2013Kathmandu: A Link in the Encirclement Against China, Not a “Routine Itinerary”<\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Prem Sagar Poudel<\/strong><\/p>\n

In diplomacy, a message is sometimes seen not in statements but on the map of a journey. A meeting with the Dalai Lama in Dharamshala, talks with Bhutan’s prime minister, and then arrival in Kathmandu. This sequence by the U.S. delegation cannot be dismissed as mere travel convenience. Nepal and the United States have had diplomatic relations since 1947, development cooperation has been under way since 1951, and military contacts are also decades old. Washington does not need any intermediary to speak with Kathmandu. The central question, therefore, is not the absence of a relationship. What message is the United States seeking to send to China and the international community by placing Nepal as the final destination of a Himalayan journey linking Dharamshala, Delhi and Bhutan?<\/p>\n

First, the facts must be distinguished. The delegation led by U.S. Representative Jason Smith met India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in Mumbai on October 20. The following day, it met the Dalai Lama in Dharamshala. Public reports say that it then met Bhutanese Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay before arriving in Nepal. Thus, the delegations that visited Dharamshala and Bhutan were not two separate groups; the same U.S. delegation visited both places. Separately, a five-member delegation that included U.S. Senator Todd Young also reportedly arrived in Nepal via Thailand. The U.S. Embassy said Young’s visit focused on cooperation with Nepal to disrupt cross-border criminal networks. These delegations and their purposes should not be conflated.<\/p>\n

The main question is not which route the aircraft took. Nepal and the United States have direct diplomatic relations; there is no need to establish that relationship through Dharamshala. The question is: within what regional itinerary was the visit to Nepal placed, and why were meetings with the Tibetan separatist leadership and Bhutan linked to the same journey before the delegation came to Nepal? The argument that it is not unusual for a U.S. delegation to meet several countries and parties during one trip may sound reasonable, but the sequence of the visit adds political meaning, particularly when it includes the Tibetan issue, which is sensitive for China, and the Himalayan country of Bhutan.<\/p>\n

The meeting in Dharamshala cannot be normalized as “the U.S. lawmakers’ political interest in Tibet.” Dharamshala is not merely a place for meetings. It is a political base for separatist forces conspiring against China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The U.S. lawmakers’ visit there to meet the Dalai Lama constitutes open interference in China’s internal affairs. The language in which they raise Tibetan culture, religious freedom and rights in their political dialogue is the language Washington uses to justify its intervention. That meeting is an open signal to China: the Tibetan issue has not disappeared from American political debate. The shield that “political support and formal diplomatic recognition are different things” is also an old one. Officially, Washington continues to wear the mask of One China, while through Congress and its members it continuously encourages separatists and meets with them. This is a two-handed policy. One hand signs, while the other holds a knife. It gives separatist forces an international platform and works to diminish China’s standing.<\/p>\n

The meeting with Bhutan, too, cannot be normalized as “the expansion of American political contacts in the Himalayan region.” Public reports say that the Bhutanese prime minister met the delegation led by Jason Smith, but the details of their talks have not been disclosed. Therefore, it cannot be said that a security agreement was reached there, but in diplomacy the meaning of every step is not confined to open agreements. The U.S. lawmakers’ meeting with Bhutan’s prime minister is itself a message. That message is an effort to keep Bhutan away from China’s influence and bring it into contact with Washington. Bhutan is a country working to settle its border dispute with China. At such a time, calling the U.S. delegation’s visit to Bhutan “routine” is to deliberately conceal its strategic significance. It is not accidental that U.S. lawmakers included India, the Tibetan separatist leadership, Bhutan and Nepal in one regional journey. This is a definite line that begins in India, passes through the Tibetan separatist centre, and extends to Bhutan and Nepal.<\/p>\n

What message might the United States be seeking to send to the international community through this journey? First, that the United States is not prepared to dismiss the Tibet issue simply as an internal matter for Beijing. Second, the American desire to expand direct contacts with governments and political leaders in the Himalayan region. Third, the message of bringing Nepal into the scope of dialogue as a country with its own decisions and interests, rather than as a geographical empty space between India and China. These are analyses that can be drawn from the itinerary; they are not the official purpose of the visit announced by the United States.<\/p>\n

This distinction matters in Nepal’s public debate. One cannot be reassured by the argument that a foreign delegation’s visit to Dharamshala does not prove that Nepal has been made a partner in U.S. policy on Tibet. In Nepal’s case, the question is not whether Nepal formally accepted U.S. policy. The question is this: when the U.S. delegation came to Nepal via Dharamshala and made Nepal the final destination of the same journey, what is Nepal’s place? Is Nepal the endpoint of the line where the United States concludes its Himalayan strategy? Nepal shares a border with China, has a Tibetan refugee community, and the government has pledged its commitment to the One China policy. Making Nepal the final destination of such an itinerary because of that sensitivity amounts to testing Nepal’s sensitivity. Nepal should therefore treat any high-level visit connected to Tibet with due sensitivity, but without leaping ahead of the facts.<\/p>\n

The question, “Why doesn’t the U.S. delegation come directly to Nepal?” must also be framed correctly. This time, the U.S. House delegation appears to have visited India and Bhutan before coming to Nepal. That does not mean the bilateral relationship with Nepal is weak. A parliamentary delegation can include meetings in several countries in a single regional trip. The claim that most U.S. delegations always come to Nepal via Dharamshala would require examining the sequence, records and purpose of every visit. In 2017, a delegation led by Nancy Pelosi reportedly met Nepal’s Tibetan community and then went to Dharamshala. This shows that the sequence of visits is not always the same.<\/p>\n

Even though the sequence is not always the same, the question raised by the current visit remains: given the longstanding relationship with Nepal, why did the U.S. delegation make Kathmandu the final destination of its regional journey? Perhaps the main programme was connected to India and Bhutan, with Nepal added as a subsequent destination. Perhaps the U.S. lawmakers sought to understand regional issues in one trip. These may be practical reasons. But when clear information is not provided about the purpose of the visit and meetings with the Nepali side, public suspicion grows. Silence does not dispel confusion; it spreads speculation further.<\/p>\n

The Government of Nepal should provide timely information about the U.S. delegation’s status, itinerary and meetings with Nepali officials. Information alone is not enough. Nepal must also make clear how it views a delegation arriving via Dharamshala, and whether such a visit is consistent with its One China policy. This is a time for Nepal to show confidence in its relationship with the United States: we want dialogue, but decisions on our policies are made in Kathmandu. Nepal need not treat meetings in India, cooperation with Bhutan or dialogue in Dharamshala as substitutes for its own Tibet policy. Nepal can maintain relations with every partner, but it must not allow any partner’s regional outlook to prevail over its independent policy. Nepal must not allow its territory or diplomatic platform to become a basis for supporting or promoting separatist activities against China.<\/p>\n

This visit has revealed American interests; now Nepal’s diplomatic capacity must be demonstrated. The relationship with the United States is longstanding, military and development cooperation have a long history, and people-to-people ties have also expanded. Nepal’s expectation should therefore be clear. Washington should engage with Kathmandu directly, clearly and on equal terms; Kathmandu should also inform the public about its policies and visits. Patriotism does not mean treating the United States as an enemy or supporting every one of its actions. Patriotism means proving through conduct that Nepal is not in anyone’s sphere of influence, but stands on its own interests and decisions. The first test of that is to prevent the shadow of Dharamshala from reaching Kathmandu.<\/p>\n

About the Author: Prem Sagar Poudel is a senior journalist and international relations analyst from Nepal. He has conducted in-depth studies on Nepal-China relations, the geopolitics of the Himalayan region, and Asian security issues.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

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