The Dilemma in Nepal–China Relations: Growing Distrust Between Rhetoric and Reality of Friendship

# Sanket Kirati

When Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Nepal in 2019, there were high expectations that Nepal–China relations would reach new heights. The declaration of a strategic partnership between the two countries, along with multiple agreements on infrastructure, connectivity, and economic cooperation, generated optimism among the Nepali public. However, during the same visit, the Chinese President, standing on Nepali soil, issued a strong warning against activities that undermine China’s sovereignty and the One-China policy. On one hand, this signaled China’s sensitivity toward its national interests; on the other, it delivered a clear message to Nepal—that anti-China activities from Nepali territory would not be tolerated.

Ironically, within a week of the visit, anti-China and pro–Free Tibet activities were publicly witnessed in Kathmandu. Some local media outlets reported on these incidents. Surprisingly, there was no formal reaction from China. Subsequently, individuals directly or indirectly involved in anti-China activities in Nepal were invited on official visits to China. This sequence of events raised further curiosity and suspicion. It led to a serious question within Nepal: what is China’s real policy?

There are two camps in Nepal. One is a clear supporter of the one-China policy; the other is an anti-China or China-sceptical group. There is no shortage of those who hold critical views towards China in political parties, government machinery, and non-governmental organizations. For them, anti-China discourse has become a means of sometimes ideological, sometimes economic, and sometimes geopolitical gain.

The irony, however, is that those who are critical of China often rise to power with the backing of international power groups, become ministers or high-ranking officials, and eventually receive formal recognition from China itself. This has strengthened a perception within Nepal that China is unable to identify its genuine friends and is instead merely managing power balances according to circumstances.

Realism dominates diplomacy. From China’s perspective, Nepal is a small but strategically significant country—a geopolitical bridge between India and China. Therefore, China’s priority may be stability and peace rather than Nepal’s internal political leanings. Yet this very approach appears to have created frustration among supporters and encouragement among critics within Nepal.

Recently, a new Chinese ambassador was appointed to Nepal. The day after his arrival, he met with Prime Minister Sushila Karki. On the same day, the Commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, Paparo, held meetings in Kathmandu with representatives of political parties from border regions. While the Chinese ambassador was presenting his credentials to President Ramchandra Paudel, anti-China slogans were raised in Kathmandu, and demonstrators circled the Ring Road.

It is difficult to regard these developments as mere coincidence. Nepal currently stands at a sensitive point in the geopolitical competition between the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In such a context, every diplomatic meeting, every public protest, and every silent reaction carries symbolic significance.

It is worth recalling that during the tenure of Home Minister Shakti Basnet, pro–Free Tibet activists staged demonstrations against China in Kathmandu. When a senior journalist inquired about the issue, the Home Minister’s wife, Satya Pahadi, reportedly stated: “We instructed the police to arrest the pro–Free Tibet activists. They were detained. Shortly afterward, a message came from the Chinese embassy asking that they be released. Now you tell me—what should we do?” The claim that the Chinese embassy requested the release of detained pro–Free Tibet demonstrators has further deepened the questions. If true, why does China’s behavior appear so contradictory? On one hand, it takes a hard stance on sovereignty; on the other, it shows flexibility in practice. This inconsistency sends mixed signals.

From a diplomatic perspective, China may prefer behind-the-scenes dialogue over direct confrontation. Publicly pressuring a small country might prove counterproductive. However, what the public sees is surface-level behavior. When individuals involved in anti-China activities travel to China, receive respect, or benefit from economic cooperation, the common citizen draws a simple conclusion: “If China itself is not concerned, why should we be?”

Nepali society has long nurtured emotional ties with its neighbors. Many Nepalis regard China with respect akin to that shown to a guardian. Historically, China has supported Nepal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. But when inconsistencies appear in practice, that respect gradually transforms into doubt.

Today, through social media and alternative platforms, the perception that “being anti-China is advantageous” seems to be spreading. This perception is not merely ideological; it is shaped by opportunism, power politics, and international competition. If China cannot clearly explain how, to whom, and why it provides assistance, this confusion may evolve into long-term distrust.

China has provided significant assistance to Nepal in infrastructure, energy, health, and education. Yet questions arise: are these projects selected on the basis of genuine friendship, or are they simply pragmatic engagements with whoever happens to be in power?

If China fails to ensure strict transparency and effective utilization of its assistance, that aid may ultimately fall into the hands of groups critical of China. As a result, anti-China discourse gains additional momentum: “We criticized China, yet we are the ones benefiting.”

Nepal has always sought to balance between two major powers—India and China; now, American engagement has intensified as well. In such circumstances, adopting a multi-vector foreign policy to safeguard sovereignty is natural. However, if that balance turns into opportunism, trust weakens.

Nepal’s responsibility is to prevent its territory from being used for activities against any neighboring country. Nepal is officially committed to the One-China policy; therefore, its actions must align with that commitment. If state institutions themselves appear ambivalent, the international message becomes distorted.

The growth of anti-China sentiment in Nepal cannot be attributed solely to external powers or local actors. China’s diplomatic style, selective silence, and behavioral ambiguity have also played a role. In a friendly nation, economic assistance alone is not sufficient to maintain a positive image; trust, consistency, and coherent messaging are equally essential.

If China fails to identify its genuine friends, formulate a long-term cooperation strategy, and ensure transparency in aid distribution, its support base may weaken. In an open and emotionally responsive society like Nepal, public perception can change rapidly.

Historically, Nepal–China relations have been friendly. In this era of geopolitical competition, that friendship needs to become more mature and clearer. When rhetoric is firm but practice appears flexible, the message becomes contradictory.

What is needed today is not accusation but clarity. China must bring coherence between its policies and actions. Nepal must demonstrate its commitments through practice. Otherwise, once the seeds of distrust are sown, it may take decades to remove them.

For Nepal, China is not merely a neighbor but also a development partner. For China, Nepal should not be merely a strategic buffer but a trusted friend. Only when mutual trust is strengthened can the rhetoric of friendship truly translate into reality—and this chapter of ambiguity become history.