Two Photographs, One Diplomatic Shift: Balendra Shah’s Changing Style, Neighbourhood Balance and the Power Equation Within the RSP
Dragon Media Correspondent
Prime Minister Balendra Shah’s separate meetings on Monday with Indian Ambassador to Nepal Naveen Srivastava and Chinese Ambassador Zhang Maoming produced two photographs that deserve to be viewed as more than routine images following courtesy calls. The same government office, the same national setting, an almost identical position for the Prime Minister and two ambassadors representing Nepal’s two major neighbours together offer a visual expression of diplomatic balance. Although the photographs differ somewhat in body posture, facial expressions and framing, their deeper political significance becomes clearer when examined alongside Shah’s diplomatic conduct since taking office, the change now visible in that approach, his direct engagement with India and China on the same day, mounting pressure from the opposition and the evolving power equation within the Rastriya Swatantra Party.
In the photograph with Chinese Ambassador Zhang Maoming, the Prime Minister and the ambassador appear to be standing comparatively close to each other. Zhang is visibly smiling, while Shah maintains a composed expression, with both men holding their arms naturally at their sides. The image therefore conveys a relatively relaxed and cordial atmosphere within an otherwise formal setting. In the photograph with Indian Ambassador Naveen Srivastava, both men hold their hands together in front of them. Srivastava appears more restrained, while Shah carries a slight smile. The wider framing also gives the image a more conventional official character. Yet it would be misleading to conclude from these differences alone that relations with China are warmer or that there is greater distance from India. Body language can offer clues, but personality, photographic direction and the precise moment at which an image is captured can significantly shape such impressions.
The more consequential feature of the two photographs is therefore not their difference but their similarity. In both, the Prime Minister occupies almost the same position. Nepal’s national flag, national emblem and the official portrait of the President appear in an equivalent manner in the background. Neither foreign country’s flag is given special prominence. The visual message is clear: the visitor may change, but Nepal remains the host state, the protocol is Nepal’s and the institutional centre of the engagement is the Office of the Prime Minister. This visual consistency can reasonably be interpreted as an effort to accord Nepal’s two principal neighbours broadly equal institutional treatment in the public presentation of the meetings.
India and China are unavoidable elements of Nepal’s geopolitical environment. Nepal has direct interests with both countries in security, trade, transit, energy, infrastructure, tourism, culture and border affairs. Against this background, meeting both ambassadors on the same day carries its own diplomatic significance. Had Shah met only the Indian ambassador while leaving engagement with the Chinese side pending for an extended period, political interpretations would inevitably have followed. The reverse would also have generated questions in New Delhi. By engaging both neighbours within the same day, the Prime Minister reduced the space for perceptions that one had been deliberately prioritised over the other. The planned engagement with the senior U.S. diplomatic representative immediately afterwards further suggests an attempt to maintain indispensable relations with the two neighbours while also expanding direct contact with other major international partners.
Such balancing behaviour is not unique to Nepal. Small and medium-sized states frequently seek to preserve strategic autonomy by maintaining working relations with competing major powers. Sri Lanka has sustained close historical, economic and security ties with India while simultaneously pursuing infrastructure, investment and commercial cooperation with China. Mongolia, situated between China and Russia, developed its “third neighbour” approach to diversify relations with the United States, Japan, Europe and other partners without abandoning its immediate neighbours. Singapore, meanwhile, has maintained deep economic and strategic relationships with both the United States and China despite intensifying rivalry between the two powers. The central principle in these cases is not choosing one power against another, but diversifying external relationships while retaining national decision-making autonomy.
Nepal’s own modern diplomatic history reflects a similar search for balance. From the era of King Mahendra onward, Nepal sought to broaden its international space by expanding relations with China and other countries while maintaining its traditional relationship with India. In more recent decades, successive prime ministers have continued high-level engagement with both New Delhi and Beijing. At some points, cooperation with India has advanced in areas such as energy, trade and transit, while at others Nepal has explored infrastructure, connectivity and alternative transit opportunities with China. Nepal’s enduring challenge is therefore not to choose between India and China, but to maintain productive relations with both while safeguarding its independent capacity to make national decisions. For this reason, Monday’s photographs are more meaningful when viewed through the question of how Nepal presented both neighbours institutionally, rather than through speculation over which meeting appeared warmer.
Another important dimension is Prime Minister Shah’s own earlier diplomatic behaviour. After assuming office, he did not immediately continue the conventional practice of holding frequent separate meetings with ambassadors based in Kathmandu. Instead, he initially favoured collective diplomatic engagement and appeared intent on keeping contact with foreign representatives within a more formal institutional framework. In a country where informal and frequent interactions between political leaders, ministers and foreign diplomats have often generated controversy, such an effort was not without rationale. Yet roughly four months later, Shah himself has begun holding separate bilateral engagements with key ambassadors.
This shift can be interpreted in two ways. One possibility is that the Prime Minister concluded that his initial approach was too rigid and adjusted it for practical reasons. The other is that, after initially emphasizing institutional discipline, he has now introduced greater flexibility for necessary bilateral communication. The second interpretation is diplomatically more plausible. Foreign policy cannot be managed through distance and principle alone. Direct engagement is necessary for confidence-building, crisis management, the exchange of sensitive messages and regular political communication. A prime minister meeting an ambassador is not in itself contrary to institutional diplomacy. The more important question is whether such meetings are coordinated through the foreign-policy machinery, guided by a clear agenda and properly recorded within the state system.
The earlier postponement of a proposed visit to Nepal by Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri had already generated discussion in political and diplomatic circles over whether a meeting with the Prime Minister could be assured. There was no official confirmation that this was the sole reason for the postponement, but the episode nonetheless raised questions about the Shah government’s approach to high-level engagement with India. By meeting the Indian ambassador directly on Monday, the Prime Minister has at least removed one layer of that uncertainty. Meeting the Chinese ambassador only hours later simultaneously ensured that renewed engagement with India would not be perceived as neglecting China. In this sense, the two meetings are more appropriately understood as parts of a single diplomatic balancing sequence rather than as isolated events.
Shah’s changing behaviour also cannot be viewed entirely separately from growing domestic political pressure. In recent days, lawmakers from the Nepali Congress, CPN-UML and the Nepal Communist Party have publicly questioned the Prime Minister’s communication style, accountability to Parliament and heavy reliance on personal social media channels. Nepali Congress lawmaker Renuka Kaucha told the Prime Minister to “take off the dark glasses” and said the opposition would support correct decisions taken in the national interest, while warning that it would not remain silent if democratic norms and parliamentary practices were weakened. UML Whip Nita Ghatani criticised the practice of delivering nationally significant messages through a personal Facebook account, arguing that a country must be governed through the Constitution and state institutions rather than through social-media reach or views. NCP coordinator Pushpa Kamal Dahal has gone further, comparing the government to “a ship that has lost its compass at sea” and urging Shah to expand dialogue and consultation.
These criticisms come from different political forces, yet they converge on one theme: the Prime Minister must strengthen institutional communication. There is insufficient basis to claim that Monday’s diplomatic meetings were a direct response to such criticism. Nevertheless, Shah’s gradual move toward greater direct engagement cannot be entirely separated from the broader political environment in which demands for consultation and institutional accountability are becoming more pronounced. A highly personalised and direct communication style that may have worked effectively in local government does not automatically translate into the requirements of national leadership.
The issue also intersects with the internal power structure of the Rastriya Swatantra Party. Ravi Lamichhane remains the party chairman, while Balendra Shah heads the government. One centre of authority therefore lies within the party organisation and another within the state executive. Such an arrangement is not unusual in democratic politics. Problems arise, however, when both figures possess distinct popular bases, political influence and independent decision-making authority and coordination between them begins to weaken. Lamichhane retains organisational networks, established party structures and his own political following, while Shah commands the premiership, the state apparatus and an independent popular constituency. If differences between the two were to deepen, the consequences could extend beyond routine organisational disagreement.
Dahal has claimed that friction appears to be growing between the government and the RSP leadership. As an opposition leader’s assessment, this should not be treated as independently established fact. Yet questions about relations between the government and the party leadership are clearly becoming part of the political debate. Dahal’s praise for Lamichhane’s dialogue with political parties during the sensitive tensions in Sunsari, contrasted with his criticism of Shah’s communication style, also illustrates how opposition forces are beginning to portray the two RSP leaders as distinct political personalities. That itself should be a matter of attention for the party.
The distinction becomes even more sensitive in foreign affairs. The Prime Minister is the principal political representative of the state’s foreign policy, while the party chairman represents a political organisation. If both develop parallel channels with foreign governments and political leadership without sufficient coordination, external actors may begin to perceive them as separate centres of influence. Shah’s recent direct diplomatic engagement can therefore also be interpreted as an effort to reinforce the institutional principle that the formal centre of Nepal’s foreign relations lies with the government, the Prime Minister’s Office and the foreign-policy apparatus. This need not weaken the party leadership; rather, it clarifies the boundary between party diplomacy and state diplomacy.
Social media remains another defining feature of Shah’s political trajectory. His rise from Kathmandu’s municipal politics to national leadership was built in significant part on direct digital communication, frustration with established parties and a highly personalised political appeal. Yet the communication style of a mayor and the institutional responsibilities of a prime minister are not identical. A prime minister’s words can influence foreign governments, diplomatic missions, Parliament, security institutions and economic expectations. A personal social-media post by the head of government therefore rarely remains entirely personal; it can be interpreted domestically and internationally as a signal from the state.
This is where Shah now appears to be entering a period of transition. His challenge is to transform a political style built around personal communication and direct public appeal into one compatible with the institutional demands of national leadership. Monday’s diplomatic meetings can be seen as one small but meaningful indication of that adjustment.
Ultimately, diplomatic relationships are not determined by smiles, hand positions or the physical distance between individuals in a photograph. Their real measure lies in subsequent policy and outcomes. Nepal’s relationship with India will be tested by how the government manages border questions, trade, energy, transit and infrastructure. Relations with China will depend on progress in development cooperation, connectivity, trade, tourism and long-term projects. Engagement with the United States and other international partners will similarly raise the broader question of how effectively Nepal can preserve strategic autonomy while expanding external partnerships.
The two photographs should therefore be read less as an emotional comparison between India and China and more as a visual marker of Nepal’s evolving diplomatic practice. The same wall, national emblem, national flag and Prime Minister standing beside the ambassadors of two major neighbours convey a basic message: Nepal seeks dialogue with both, but from the institutional centre of the Nepali state.
At a deeper level, the photographs also capture a moment in Balendra Shah’s own political evolution. A Prime Minister who initially maintained distance from separate diplomatic engagements is now entering direct bilateral dialogue with key foreign representatives. The opposition is pressing him toward greater institutional communication and parliamentary accountability, while the RSP faces the challenge of coordinating two powerful centres of authority within the party and government. The story behind these two photographs, therefore, is not merely about India and China. It is also about Shah’s governing style, the internal balance of power within the RSP, Nepal’s neighbourhood diplomacy and the broader transition from personalised political popularity to institutional statecraft.
