Aid Was Not Rejected, It Was Prioritized: A Blueprint for Nepal’s New Disaster Policy

Prem Sagar Poudel

When devastating floods, landslides and debris flows in the Bhotekoshi region damaged settlements, roads, bridges and hydropower projects, the Nepal Army, Armed Police Force, Nepal Police and other state agencies were immediately mobilized with the resources available to them. But as the crisis deepened, it became clear that additional expertise was needed to rescue people trapped inside hydropower tunnels, deploy specialized detection equipment, identify human remains through DNA testing and restore damaged transport and communications infrastructure. India subsequently deployed an 11-member specialized tunnel technical team. China’s emergency management authorities also sent an initial group of five tunnel experts, followed by four more specialists. This sequence makes one point clear: Nepal did not reject international assistance; it selected assistance according to the nature of its needs.

What the government failed to do effectively was communicate that distinction from the beginning. Statements suggesting that “foreign search-and-rescue assistance is not required at present” were interpreted internationally as Nepal rejecting foreign help altogether. A clearer message would have been: Nepal is conducting national search-and-rescue operations under its own leadership, while specialized capabilities that are not sufficiently available domestically will be mobilized immediately from friendly countries.

This distinction should now become fundamental to Nepal’s disaster policy. Relief, rescue and recovery are not the same thing. A country may have enough food, tents and medicines but still lack bore-scope cameras, heavy drilling systems, underground communications equipment or forensic DNA capacity. Search-and-rescue manpower may be sufficient while expertise in tunnel engineering, geotechnical assessment or specialized aviation remains inadequate. Even after rescue operations end, restoring bridges, electricity, roads and telecommunications may require entirely different capabilities. The key question, therefore, should no longer be whether Nepal “needs foreign aid,” but what kind of assistance is required, at what stage, in what quantity and from whom.

The Lessons of 2015

The 2015 Gorkha earthquake remains an important reference point. Seventy-six international urban search-and-rescue teams from 31 countries came to Nepal, comprising 1,872 rescuers and 118 search dogs. Eighteen of those teams were internationally classified under INSARAG standards. International rescuers pulled 16 people alive from collapsed structures.

That number alone, however, cannot be used to judge the total value of their contribution. Foreign teams also conducted structural assessments, technical searches, body recovery, coordination and other humanitarian tasks. Equally important, two days after the earthquake, once sufficient international search-and-rescue capacity had arrived, Nepal asked additional teams that had not yet departed not to come.

This is a crucial lesson for the current debate. Accepting international assistance and later limiting unnecessary additional deployments are not contradictory decisions. Both are part of responsible disaster management.

The international response in 2015 brought immense value. India, China, the United States, Japan and many other countries helped save lives, deliver supplies to inaccessible communities and reinforce Nepal’s limited aviation and technical capacities. But the same experience also exposed weaknesses. Tribhuvan International Airport faced extraordinary congestion from aircraft and incoming relief cargo. Some supplies did not match immediate local needs. Housing, security, transport and coordination for large numbers of foreign teams also placed additional demands on Nepal’s own institutions.

India’s rapid and extensive assistance was highly significant, yet excessive self-promotional coverage by some Indian media outlets generated unnecessary resentment in Nepal. American military aviation provided vital access to remote areas, but the experience also highlighted the need to assess terrain, fragile structures and landing zones carefully when deploying powerful military aircraft and helicopters.

None of these lessons mean that Indian, American or other foreign assistance was harmful to Nepal. The real lesson is that international assistance works best when its type, scale and deployment are aligned with national priorities and command structures.

Sovereignty and the Sensitivity of the Northern Border

Foreign military or specialized technical personnel operating in northern districts such as Rasuwa or Mustang, directly bordering China, naturally raise additional security considerations. This should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of pressure or influence from any particular country. Determining who enters sensitive territory, what equipment they carry, where they operate and for how long is a normal responsibility of any sovereign state.

But the answer to security sensitivity is not to reject expert assistance. The answer is a clear protocol.

When foreign military aircraft are required, Nepal can mandate prior coordination with the Nepal Army, approved flight corridors, designated landing zones and the presence of Nepali liaison officers. Foreign specialists deployed on the ground can have clearly defined mandates, geographic limits, timeframes and equipment declarations. In this way, humanitarian urgency and national sovereignty can be protected simultaneously.

A National Quick Response Matrix

Nepal now needs a permanent national “Quick Response Matrix” for international disaster assistance.

For major earthquakes and collapsed buildings, internationally classified medium or heavy urban search-and-rescue teams may be required. Tunnel emergencies demand a different set of capabilities: mining and tunnel engineers, underground structural specialists, heavy drilling, ventilation systems, robotic cameras and life-detection technologies. Glacial lake outburst floods and avalanches require satellite imagery, radar, hydrology, glaciology and geotechnical expertise. Mass-casualty incidents require forensic DNA testing, dental identification, cold-storage capacity and Disaster Victim Identification procedures consistent with international standards.

No single country needs to be Nepal’s first choice for every kind of disaster.

India offers geographic proximity, Himalayan rescue experience, military helicopters, engineering expertise and forensic capacity. China has extensive experience in tunnels, mountain infrastructure, high-altitude engineering and the rapid movement of heavy equipment across Nepal’s northern frontier. The United States possesses strategic airlift, satellite monitoring and advanced emergency communications capabilities. Japan is a global leader in earthquake response and structural rescue. European countries possess strong capacities in civil protection, forensic science and specialized medical response.

Nepal’s decisions should therefore be driven not by political proximity, but by the best available capability for each specific emergency.

Airports, Emergency Funds and Institutional Reform

Nepal also remains excessively dependent on Tribhuvan International Airport for international disaster relief. Gautam Buddha International Airport and Pokhara International Airport should be formally designated and prepared as alternative disaster-response hubs. Procedures covering aircraft types, relief storage, emergency customs clearance, fuel, parking, helicopter transfers and onward ground distribution should be rehearsed in peacetime rather than improvised after a catastrophe.

The same applies to disaster financing. Nepal already has legal provisions for central disaster-management funds. The question after a major emergency should therefore not simply be whether money exists. Authorities should review how much funding was available in the first six, 12 and 24 hours, who had authority to release it, what procedures delayed disbursement and how quickly resources reached provincial and local levels. If regulations prevent rapid emergency spending, those rules should be amended. If existing powers were simply not used, administrative accountability should follow.

The private sector must also become part of Nepal’s national disaster capability. Hydropower companies possess tunnel engineers and underground construction specialists. Construction firms own excavators, cranes and drilling equipment. Telecommunications companies operate portable base stations, satellite terminals and backup power systems. Private helicopter operators and hospitals possess critical emergency capacities.

These assets should be registered in a national disaster-resource inventory during normal times. Nepal should know in advance what equipment exists in each district, who controls it and how quickly it can be mobilized. Disaster response should not begin with frantic telephone calls to locate machinery that could have been mapped beforehand.

Three Immediate Priorities

Nepal should now move quickly on three institutional reforms. First, it should prepare a national assistance-mobilization guideline that identifies both domestic and international capacities for specific types of disasters. Second, it should include explicit emergency provisions in bilateral mechanisms with India, China and other major partners covering specialist deployment, equipment movement, air access and cross-border logistics. Third, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and security agencies should establish a permanent joint mechanism for international disaster assistance.

Such coordination should not begin only after a catastrophe. It should operate, train and conduct simulations during peacetime.

India has provided relief materials and specialized technical support during the present emergency. China has deployed tunnel experts. Japan, Australia and other friendly countries have also supported Nepal. Nepal should express the highest respect and gratitude for such assistance. At the same time, every foreign contribution should operate within Nepal’s identified needs, laws and national leadership.

Respect for friendly countries and protection of national sovereignty are not competing principles.

The central question for Nepal’s foreign and disaster-management policy is therefore clear: should political sensitivities and technical requirements continue to be treated as opposing forces, or can both be managed within a single coherent national framework?

Nepal must move beyond the mindset of being merely a country that “requests aid” and develop the institutional capacity to assess its needs and mobilize the right domestic and international capabilities at the right moment. Self-reliance does not mean confronting every crisis alone. A capable state is one that knows where its own capacity is sufficient, where it ends and when the expertise of trusted partners should be activated.

In the hour of disaster, the value of human life is greater than any political calculation. Nepal’s disaster policy must therefore speak the language of technical necessity, not political hesitation: the right assistance, at the right moment, in the right place, under Nepal’s leadership.

About the Author: Prem Sagar Poudel is a senior journalist and international relations analyst from Nepal. He has conducted in-depth studies on Nepal-China relations, the geopolitics of the Himalayan region, and Asian security issues.