७ मंसिर २०८३, आईतवार

Balendra Shah’s Test in Delhi

Nepal should seek a date for boundary talks, clear timelines for customs clearance and a basis for sharing the benefits of common rivers. Decisions on these issues can strengthen a friendship built on sovereign equality.

Prem Sagar Poudel

Nepal has seen plenty of politics around disputes with India. Few have taken responsibility for resolving them. Public pressure over boundary and transit issues brought matters successive governments had sidestepped onto the negotiating agenda. Yet once the leaders who spoke most forcefully about these issues came to power, the public rarely got answers to three questions. What did Nepal propose? How did India respond? What did Nepal do next? Prime Minister Balendra Shah’s visit to Delhi offers an opportunity to change that practice.

At the invitation of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Shah is making a state visit to India on 22 and 23 November 2026. Two days of talks cannot settle every issue that has remained unresolved for decades. The two leaders can, however, agree on a date for the next formal boundary talks, a process for removing a specific obstacle to Nepali exports and a basis for calculating the benefits and costs of the Pancheshwar project. Decisions at the highest level would give the relevant agencies a mandate to act. Neither country can change its neighbours. Both can make more dependable a relationship that family ties, pilgrimage, work and trade have sustained for generations.

Evidence and procedure in the boundary talks

The Treaty of Sugauli was signed in 1815, and the ratified copies were exchanged in 1816. Article III lists the territories Nepal was to cede to the East India Company. Under Article V, the King of Nepal renounced claims to territories west of the Kali River. The article does not identify the river’s source. Which watercourse the treaty refers to as the Kali lies at the heart of the disagreement over Limpiyadhura, Kalapani and Lipulekh. Susta has a distinct history involving shifts in the course of the Narayani River, historical demarcation and administrative records. Article I of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship commits both countries to respecting each other’s full sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. Nepal should present its treaties, maps and records in the talks on that footing of sovereign equality.

On 3 May 2026, Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated its position that Limpiyadhura, Kalapani and Lipulekh are Nepali territory. Nepal sent India a diplomatic note concerning the proposed Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage through Lipulekh. India’s Ministry of External Affairs rejected Nepal’s claim, saying the route had long been used for pilgrimage and that India remained open to constructive dialogue on outstanding boundary issues. The history of the route’s use and the legal status of the territory should each be examined on the relevant evidence. Any interim arrangement for the pilgrimage should proceed with the necessary consent and include a written provision safeguarding each side’s formal position on the territory.

The 2014 Nepal–India joint statement welcomed the decision to task the two foreign secretaries with addressing outstanding boundary issues, including Kalapani and Susta. It also said they could draw on technical input from the Boundary Working Group as needed. India pressed for formal signature of the boundary strip maps that had already been initialled. Nepal sought resolution of the outstanding boundary issues as well. The two sides can now set a date to exchange evidence, define the technical team’s mandate and agree on how to refer matters the secretaries cannot settle to the ministerial level. That would allow both sides to proceed with a joint examination of the evidence while maintaining their respective positions.

The trade deficit debate should begin at the border

According to Nepal Rastra Bank’s annual report on the country’s macroeconomic and financial situation, Nepal’s total merchandise trade deficit with all its trading partners rose by 16.6 percent in fiscal year 2025/26 to about Rs 1.781 trillion. In the same year, exports to India grew by 15.1 percent and imports from India by 13 percent. Given the larger import base, faster export growth alone does not establish that the bilateral deficit narrowed. Increasing production capacity, improving quality and lowering costs are Nepal’s responsibility. Reducing unnecessary clearance delays for Nepali goods entering the Indian market requires decisions by both countries.

In May 2026, after India tightened laboratory testing requirements for imported tea, trucks carrying Nepali tea were held at the border in Jhapa awaiting clearance, Nepal News reported. Nepal could propose starting with tea. Regulators in both countries could agree on recognised laboratories and testing methods, define when retesting is required and set a maximum time for clearance. That would allow India to enforce its food safety standards while giving Nepali exporters a predictable timeline for the release of their consignments. If the two sides cannot immediately agree on recognising test certificates, they could still provide written notice identifying which samples are being held, why they are being held and when testing is expected to end. Records of clearance times at each crossing, published fees and receipts for digital payments would make it possible to assess whether the changes are working.

The trade and transit crisis of 1989 and the cross-border supply disruption of 2015 showed the price citizens pay when essential shipments are interrupted. Kathmandu and Delhi differed over who was responsible for the 2015 disruption. Both countries should now agree in advance on which crossings will handle fuel, medicines and food when regular routes are blocked, which agencies will coordinate shipments and how cargo insurance will remain in force. While making routes through India more dependable, Nepal should assess the routes available under its transit protocol with China and the feasibility of reaching Bangladeshi ports through India. The assessment should consider costs, seasonal reliability and the permissions required.

Accounting for the benefits, costs and risks of shared rivers

For the Pancheshwar project under the 1996 Mahakali Treaty, Shah should seek written agreement on how benefits and costs will be calculated and on a timetable for completing the detailed project report. A political decision is needed on how to value the benefits each country would receive from electricity generation, irrigation and flood control. Technical teams can then use that framework to assess estimates of river flows, power generation and construction costs. The experience of the Koshi and Gandak agreements shows why cooperation on shared rivers must account for losses borne by local communities. Before implementation begins, it should be clear who bears the risks of inundation, erosion or displacement and what protection or compensation affected families will receive.

Even if agreement on the Pancheshwar report takes time, the two countries can act now on cross-border flood warnings. Before the monsoon, their agencies should agree on which monitoring stations will issue alerts, what risk thresholds will trigger them and which local authorities will receive them. Recording how long warnings take to reach communities at risk would show how much time residents actually have to prepare.

Electricity cooperation among Nepal, India and Bangladesh has shown how the regional market can expand. Under an agreement signed on 3 October 2024 by the Nepal Electricity Authority, the Bangladesh Power Development Board and India’s NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam, Nepal began exporting 40 megawatts of electricity to Bangladesh through the Indian grid on 15 November 2024. Expanding that trade requires terms that producers can rely on when making investment decisions and buyers can use to plan their supply. The duration of export approvals, the criteria for renewal, available transmission capacity and advance notice of regulatory changes should all be clear.

The state’s responsibility in border communities

On 26 September 2024, President Ram Chandra Paudel inaugurated a suspension bridge over the Narayani River connecting Susta village in Nawalparasi West. Before the bridge opened, residents had to risk crossing by boat. Susta’s experience also points to Kathmandu’s own responsibilities. A map records a position on territory. Roads, bridges and everyday public services build citizens’ trust in the state.

Major crossings should publish the documents required, the procedures that apply, authorised fees and details of the offices that handle complaints. People should be able to report improper charges or mistreatment at a help desk at the crossing or at the district administration office. A proposed standard would give complainants a reference number immediately, an initial response within three working days and a decision or written explanation for any delay within 15 working days. Local governments should document recurring complaints and forward them to the responsible agencies. Border management should be judged by how easily and respectfully people can cross for medical care, education, work and family visits.

The prime minister’s initiative and continuity of state policy

Talks at the prime ministerial level set the political direction. To sustain the work through changes of government, a committee on boundary negotiations and records could be established under the coordination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It should maintain a central record of treaties, maps, diplomatic correspondence and decisions, prepare negotiating proposals and hand over outstanding work to each incoming government in writing. Specialists in surveying, history, hydrology and law could review the evidence, and local governments in border areas could provide records from the ground. All-party consultations would help build agreement on national priorities. The relevant committee of the House of Representatives should assess whether commitments are being fulfilled.

If India’s response does not arrive by the agreed deadline, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should send a written reminder and propose another meeting. It should report the delay to the parliamentary committee. While protecting sensitive negotiating material, the government could publish a white paper setting out Nepal’s proposals, the portions of India’s formal response that can be disclosed and the status of outstanding issues. For each agreed action, it should publish the responsible agency, the implementation deadline and the date of the progress review.

Shah should make both Nepal’s friendship and its position clear to Modi. Nepal should be firm about its sovereign rights and flexible about how evidence is examined and how the talks are sequenced. On his return from Delhi, Shah should tell the country what Nepal proposed, how India responded and who will do what by when. Defending Nepal’s rights, making daily life easier for its citizens and taking responsibility for seeing issues raised with its neighbour through to resolution are concrete expressions of patriotism.

The author is a senior journalist and an international relations and policy analyst. He is Deputy Executive Director and Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for South Asian Studies at the World and China Institute (WCI), President of the Nepal–China Mutual Cooperation Society and a columnist for Asia Review. His research focuses on geopolitics, Nepal’s foreign trade policy and multilateral governance.

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