Can the Cockroach Movement Change the Modi Government? – 5

# Prem Sagar Poudel

As India’s student movement intensifies, one central question has emerged: can it bring down the government led by Narendra Modi?

The answer must be found not in emotional slogans, but in parliamentary arithmetic, coalition politics, social expansion and the duration of the movement.

In the immediate term, it is unlikely that street protests alone will remove the Modi government.

India is a parliamentary democracy. The government remains in office as long as the prime minister retains the confidence of a majority in the Lok Sabha.

The size of a street protest does not in itself constitute a constitutional process for changing the government.

Modi’s third term, however, differs from his previous two.

In the 2024 general election, the BJP failed to secure an outright majority on its own and had to rely on regional partners in the National Democratic Alliance.

This increased the political importance of coalition allies.

So far, however, no major coalition partner has publicly indicated that it will withdraw support because of the CJP movement.

Unless an ally leaves the coalition, a major internal rebellion occurs or the government loses a confidence vote, an immediate transfer of power remains difficult.

Yet bringing down a government and changing the character of governance are not the same thing.

The movement could force the removal of the education minister, trigger a Cabinet reshuffle, restructure the National Testing Agency, secure an inquiry into police action and change the parliamentary agenda.

Such results would amount to a major victory for public pressure even if formal power did not change hands.

In the medium term, the political impact could become far more serious.

Young voters may play a decisive role in forthcoming state elections, including in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. Examination preparation, government recruitment and the coaching industry affect millions of families across northern India.

If the movement carries this dissatisfaction into electoral constituencies, the BJP’s support among urban and lower-middle-class voters could weaken.

The movement would need to fulfil three conditions.

First, it must build a programme that is broader than NEET but still clear and practical. Employment, examination reform, education expenditure, public recruitment and mental health must be brought together within a coherent policy platform.

Second, the organisation must expand beyond Delhi and social media into districts, universities and rural communities. Digital supporters do not automatically become an electoral organisation.

Third, the movement must clarify its relationship with political parties. Complete separation could limit parliamentary influence, while subordination to a single party could destroy its independent credibility.

The Modi government still possesses a strong party organisation, a vast communications network, state governments, coalition partners and the personal political influence of the prime minister.

It could reduce the movement’s momentum through credible reforms, limited political accountability and effective communication.

The government would also benefit if the movement suffered internal divisions, violence, financial opacity or leadership disputes.

Similarly, if opposition parties attempted to take control of the movement, independent young supporters might withdraw.

The most dangerous situation for the government would arise if the student movement became connected with unemployed youth, farmers, lower-middle-class families, parents and applicants for public-sector jobs.

If these different grievances merged into a single moral narrative, the political climate before future elections could change dramatically.

The conclusion is therefore clear.

The CJP is unlikely to bring down the Modi government within days or weeks. But it could weaken the government’s moral authority, force changes within the Cabinet, pressure coalition partners and create the social foundations for a future transfer of power.

The movement is not an immediate mechanism for regime change. It could, however, become the beginning of a political consciousness that eventually makes such change possible.

About the Author: Prem Sagar Poudel is a senior journalist and international relations analyst from Nepal. He has conducted in-depth studies on Nepal-China relations, the geopolitics of the Himalayan region, and Asian security issues.