The Future of AI: A Voice for the Global South or a Monopoly of Technological Power?

# Prem Sagar Poudel

Artificial intelligence has already entered mobile phones, education, healthcare, banking, agriculture, industry and public services. It is transforming not only how people work, but also the distribution of economic power and the competitive capacity of states. The decisive question today, therefore, is not simply how powerful AI will become. It is who will determine its future.

Will the rules governing AI be written primarily by a small number of technologically advanced countries and large corporations, or will developing nations also gain meaningful participation in its governance, opportunities and benefits?

In recent years, China has sought to place this question at the centre of the global AI debate.

Beginning with its Global AI Governance Initiative in 2023, China’s approach evolved toward capacity building for developing countries in 2024, a Global AI Governance Action Plan in 2025, and more institutionalized international cooperation in 2026. Its central argument is straightforward: if AI is to serve as a common instrument of human development, neither its benefits nor its governance should remain under the control of a limited number of powerful actors.

This argument is particularly significant for the Global South.

Developing advanced AI today requires enormous computing capacity, high-quality data, strong research institutions, highly skilled human resources and substantial capital. These resources remain heavily concentrated in a small number of advanced economies. If this imbalance persists, the existing digital divide could evolve into an even deeper AI divide.

Under such a scenario, some countries would build the technologies, write the rules and capture the economic gains, while a large number of developing nations risk remaining little more than consumers and markets.

China’s proposal challenges precisely this imbalance.

Beijing has placed particular emphasis on the role of the United Nations, sovereign equality, representation of developing countries, capacity building and access to technology in global AI governance. The agreement signed by 29 countries in Shanghai in July 2026 to establish a new World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization represents an institutional extension of this approach.

This effort is also connected to the wider United Nations process. The first Global Dialogue on AI Governance, held in Geneva in July, brought countries together to discuss the benefits and risks of AI, disparities in technological capacity, transparency, accountability and human oversight.

China’s proposal therefore does not necessarily need to be viewed as an alternative to the United Nations. If developed in the right direction, it could serve as a complementary mechanism that gives developing countries greater capacity and a stronger voice in AI governance.

The major global powers, however, do not approach AI in identical ways.

The United States has placed strong emphasis on rapid innovation, infrastructure expansion, global technological leadership and national security. The European Union has focused more heavily on risk-based regulation, transparency, safety and the protection of fundamental rights.

China has brought forward a third dimension: the right to development and broader global participation.

These approaches do not have to be mutually exclusive. Effective AI governance in the future will require innovation, security, rights protection and equitable access. China’s particular contribution has been to strengthen the fourth dimension within the global debate.

Representation alone, however, is not enough. Developing countries also need real capacity.

Capacity building means more than inviting countries to international conferences. It requires training AI researchers, strengthening cooperation between universities and research institutions, expanding access to computing and digital infrastructure, building expertise in policymaking, developing AI systems in local languages, and preparing skilled professionals capable of applying the technology in healthcare, education, agriculture and public services.

This is where China’s proposal will face its real test.

China possesses extensive digital infrastructure, strong research capabilities, a major industrial base and one of the world’s largest AI markets. If it can share these capacities with the Global South in practical and sustainable ways, its multilateral proposal could carry far greater significance than declarations alone.

Supporting China’s initiative, however, does not require accepting every aspect of it without question.

Questions of data privacy, access by governments and private companies, algorithmic transparency, human rights, freedom of expression, cybersecurity and meaningful human oversight are unavoidable in global AI governance. No national AI system can remain outside these debates.

It will therefore matter how open, transparent and participatory the new international structure proposed by China becomes. It will also be important to determine whether developing countries will merely hold formal membership or exercise genuine influence over policymaking.

Applying such critical standards does not weaken China’s proposal. On the contrary, it could strengthen its credibility.

If China can demonstrate in practice its principles of equality and shared benefit, it could open an important alternative pathway for the Global South: not merely access to technology, but participation in shaping the future of technology itself.

This debate is directly relevant to Nepal as well.

AI has significant potential in Nepali and other local-language systems, agricultural forecasting, healthcare access, digital governance, education, tourism and disaster management. But Nepal will not fully benefit from the AI era if it remains only a consumer of imported technologies.

Nepal needs a clear national vision on data policy, research capacity, skilled human resources, local-language technologies and AI governance. Cooperation with China, the United Nations and other international partners should be aligned with these national priorities.

The world has already moved beyond the stage at which the development of AI can simply be stopped. The central question is no longer whether AI will advance, but what kind of power structure its advancement will create.

If AI knowledge, infrastructure and rule-making remain concentrated in the hands of a few technological powers, the digital age could deepen existing global inequalities. But if developing nations are given meaningful capacity, access and participation in decision-making, the same technology could become a historic instrument of development.

China is currently advocating this second possibility.

Its success will be determined not by slogans, but by implementation. Yet China’s argument that the Global South should move from the periphery to the centre of AI governance cannot simply be dismissed.

Ultimately, the defining question of the AI era is not whether China, the United States or Europe will prevail. It is whether, when the rules governing a technology capable of reshaping humanity’s future are written, the voices of cities such as Kathmandu, Nairobi, Dhaka and Lima will carry as much meaning as those of Beijing, Washington and Brussels.

That will be the real test of a just global system of AI governance.

About the Author: Prem Sagar Poudel is a senior journalist and international relations analyst from Nepal. He has conducted in-depth studies on Nepal-China relations, the geopolitics of the Himalayan region, and Asian security issues.