Indian Army Chief’s Nepal Visit: Friendship Should Endure, Gorkha Recruitment Should Be Reconsidered
Muna Chand
The visit of Indian Army Chief General Dhiraj Seth to Nepal is a continuation of the military relationship that has developed between Nepal and India over several decades. The reciprocal tradition of conferring honorary generalship, military education and training, joint exercises, disaster management, peacekeeping, military medicine and engagement with former servicemen are important institutional links between the two countries. These relations should continue and become more professional, transparent and mutually beneficial. But the recruitment of Nepali citizens into the Indian Army, historically linked to this relationship, has now reached a point where serious national reconsideration is necessary. Military friendship between two countries and sending one country’s citizens into the regular armed forces of another are not the same thing.
The courage, discipline and professionalism demonstrated by Gorkha soldiers in the Indian Army deserve respect. The pensions, benefits, dignity and other rights of serving and retired personnel and their families must be fully protected. But respecting history and maintaining a policy under which future generations of Nepali youth continue indefinitely to join a foreign military are two different matters. The structure that evolved from the 1947 tripartite arrangement was created in a very different South Asian political environment. More than seven decades later, Nepal, India, China and the wider international security landscape have changed fundamentally. History, therefore, cannot by itself be a reason to avoid policy review.
One misconception must first be removed from this debate: the military is not an ordinary form of employment. Military service is fundamentally different from a job that provides salary, pension or overseas employment. A soldier accepts the military command of the state whose armed forces he serves, may be deployed to war and, when ordered, may have to risk his life or use lethal force against an adversary. The recruitment of Nepali citizens into another country’s military therefore directly concerns national loyalty, sovereignty, security policy and foreign policy. Unemployment is a serious challenge, but sending citizens into foreign armies cannot become a permanent national employment policy.
One difficult question arises in the unlikely event of a Nepal-India military confrontation. Nepal’s interest is that such a situation should never occur and that both countries should maintain relations in ways that prevent it. Yet national security policy cannot be built solely on the assumption of present friendship. If, under an extraordinary future circumstance, Nepal and India were militarily opposed, a structural contradiction would arise for Nepali citizens serving in the Indian Army. Under whose military command would they stand? This is not a question about the patriotism of individual Gorkha soldiers. The problem lies in a system that could place them between two conflicting national obligations.
An even more complex issue would arise in a future India-China military conflict. Both are Nepal’s immediate neighbours, while Nepal’s declared foreign policy is based on non-alignment, Panchsheel, peaceful coexistence and independent decision-making. If Nepali citizens serving in the Indian Army were deployed against China, that fact alone would not automatically make Nepal a belligerent under international law. The military service of an individual in a foreign armed force and the direct military participation of his country of origin are legally distinct matters. But international politics does not operate through legal definitions alone. Security perceptions, public sentiment, historical memory and political signalling also shape relations between neighbouring states.
Nepal therefore cannot ignore the political and public message that could emerge if large numbers of its citizens, as members of one neighbour’s military structure, were deployed against another neighbour. Nepal might remain legally neutral, yet the perception that “Nepali citizens are fighting China on India’s side” could still arise. In relations between neighbouring states, perception itself can become a security factor. It could generate diplomatic discomfort, political pressure, heightened security sensitivity along the border or demands that Nepal clarify its position. The issue therefore cannot be treated simply as a private service relationship between individual Gorkha soldiers and the Indian Army.
The 2020 Ladakh crisis demonstrated that this contradiction is not purely theoretical. After the deadly confrontation between Indian and Chinese forces in the Galwan Valley, India-China relations entered one of their most serious military crises in decades. At the time, the status of Nepali Gorkhas serving in the Indian Army became a matter of public debate in Nepal, and reports also emerged that some Gorkha soldiers on leave in Nepal had been asked to return to duty. Political voices in Nepal argued that Nepali citizens should not be used against China. The crisis therefore brought the relationship between Gorkha recruitment and a potential India-China conflict directly into Nepal’s public debate. However, public evidence remains insufficient to establish precisely which Gorkha units were deployed to which frontline positions and for what operational purpose, and conclusions beyond the available evidence should be avoided.
This issue also goes to the heart of Nepal’s non-aligned foreign policy. Non-alignment is not merely the absence of formal membership in a military alliance. It also concerns Nepal’s ability to preserve independent decision-making, credibility and strategic space amid competition between its two neighbours. If institutional recruitment of Nepali citizens into one neighbour’s regular armed forces continues and that neighbour later enters into conflict with the other, questions may arise not necessarily about Nepal’s legal neutrality, but about the political credibility of its non-aligned position. Gorkha recruitment and non-alignment therefore cannot be treated as entirely unrelated issues.
Another test is the principle of consistency. If the recruitment of Nepali citizens into the Indian Army is regarded as acceptable because of historical ties, what sovereign principle would Nepal apply if China or another country were one day to propose recruiting Nepali citizens into its regular armed forces? This is not a claim that China has made such a proposal. The question concerns the consistency of Nepal’s national policy. Nepal cannot maintain one standard for India on historical grounds and another for China or any other country on security grounds. National policy should be based not on the identity of a friendly state but on Nepal’s long-term interests.
For this reason, reconsidering Gorkha recruitment need not be anti-India. Nepal’s relationship with India should remain deep. High-level military dialogue, professional education, training, Exercise Surya Kiran, disaster rescue, mountain capabilities, military medicine, cyber security, United Nations peacekeeping and exchanges on emerging technologies can all be expanded. Nepal can also maintain professional military cooperation with China, India, the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries according to national need and transparent policy. That is a healthy expression of strategic autonomy. Friendship with one country does not require hostility toward another, and friendship should not need to be demonstrated by supplying Nepali manpower to another country’s wars.
India’s introduction of the Agnipath recruitment scheme in 2022 and the subsequent suspension of new Gorkha recruitment from Nepal have created a natural opportunity for policy review. The debate should no longer be confined to four-year service terms, pensions or employment conditions under the Agniveer system. The larger question is whether Nepal should continue institutional recruitment of its citizens into foreign militaries at all. A policy that gradually ends new recruitment while fully safeguarding the rights of serving and retired Gorkhas may better serve Nepal’s long-term national interest. Calls to resume recruitment should be heard respectfully, but the state must assess long-term national security and foreign-policy consequences above sectional economic interests or historical sentiment.
It is true that Gorkha recruitment has provided income and social security to thousands of Nepali families. That reality should not be dismissed. But this is precisely why the distinction must be made again: the military is not simply employment. Nepal must address youth unemployment through domestic employment, production, entrepreneurship, technical skills and dignified economic opportunities. If foreign military recruitment is to be phased out, the social and economic consequences must be managed through a realistic transition policy. Economic hardship, however, should not become a permanent exception to national security policy.
The history of Gorkha soldiers and the future of Gorkha recruitment are separate questions. Nepal can honour the courage and sacrifice of those who served in the Indian Army, protect their rights and preserve the human bonds that developed through that history without committing future generations to the same military structure. Respect for history is not an instruction that policy must remain unchanged forever.
General Dhiraj Seth’s visit to Nepal should therefore be viewed not only as an occasion for traditional military diplomacy, but also as an opportunity for Nepal to reflect on its long-term security doctrine. Friendship with India should deepen, mutual trust should grow and professional military cooperation should expand. Nepal should likewise preserve trust, peaceful coexistence and mutual respect with China. There is no reason for Nepal to maintain a structure that could expose it to strategic suspicion or hostility with one neighbour for the sake of another.
Nepal’s principle should be clear: friendship with all, hostility toward none; military cooperation according to national interest, but the military loyalty of Nepali citizens should remain tied to Nepal. Gorkha recruitment can be reconsidered without weakening the historic relationship with India. Indeed, transforming that relationship from dependence on recruitment into institutional cooperation between sovereign equals could make Nepal-India relations more mature and sustainable.
Nepal has no reason to incur hostility with China for India, or with India for China. That is the demand of Nepal’s geography, the essence of its non-aligned foreign policy and the foundation of its long-term national security.
