The Geopolitics of Mustang: History, Uranium, Cultural Diplomacy and Questions Raised by Balen’s Visit

Lucky Chand

Nepal’s northern border is not merely a geographical line. Historically, it has been a sensitive frontier linked to trade, security, Tibet, China, the South Asian balance of power and strategic competition among external powers. Any high-level political visit, foreign assistance programme, discussion of natural resources or cultural activity in a border region such as Mustang therefore cannot be viewed solely as a routine administrative matter.

The 1792 Treaty of Betravati introduced a new framework in the power relationship among Nepal, Tibet and Qing China. The 1856 Treaty of Thapathali subsequently took Nepal-Tibet relations into another phase. A significant chapter in the modern security architecture of the northern frontier emerged in 1960, when arrangements were made to keep regular armed forces out of a 20-kilometre zone on either side of the Nepal-China border. A border incident in the Mustang area that same year reminded both Kathmandu and Beijing of the sensitivity of the region.

This historical background cannot be separated from the Khampa activities of the Cold War era. Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison’s well-known book, The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet, provides extensive details of how Mustang became a base for CIA-supported Khampa insurgent activities directed toward Tibet. However, another important aspect must be kept in mind when interpreting this history. Available accounts do not indicate that the operation was conducted with the formal approval of the Government of Nepal. Rather, the activities appear to have expanded by exploiting weak state presence, Mustang’s difficult geography, social ties with Tibetan communities and the relatively autonomous conditions prevailing in the area at the time.

This is precisely why Mustang’s history serves as a warning for Nepal. A sensitive border region marked by weak state presence and unclear policy can become vulnerable to competition among external powers.

Another important chapter in Nepal-China relations was the 2016 Transit Transport Agreement and the protocol signed in 2019 to implement it. During then-President Bidya Devi Bhandari’s visit to China, the protocol opened a legal route for Nepal to use four Chinese seaports and three dry ports. Strategically, it created a long-term option for reducing Nepal’s complete dependence on India for third-country transit.

Similarly, the controversy surrounding China’s Global Security Initiative during the tenure of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli demonstrated the level of clarity Nepal requires when dealing with international security frameworks. Chinese official accounts stated that Nepal had expressed support for the GSI, while the Nepali side later clarified that no such agreement had been made. The episode offered an important lesson: Nepal’s non-alignment must be reflected not only in official rhetoric but also clearly in every bilateral document and public diplomatic message.

Global strategic competition today is no longer confined to conventional military power. Semiconductors, artificial intelligence, energy, data infrastructure and critical minerals have all become matters of national security. The U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative is one example of this changing economic-security architecture. It seeks to connect semiconductor supply chains, AI infrastructure, mineral processing, energy and related technologies among what it describes as trusted partners.

There is, however, no credible evidence that Nepal has become a member of Pax Silica or that any decision has been made to make uranium from Mustang available to the United States through such a framework. After such claims emerged publicly, the Government of Nepal also clarified that no agreement had been reached with any foreign country regarding uranium extraction in Mustang.

At the same time, the possibility of radioactive minerals in Mustang is not simply a rumor. Studies associated with Nepal’s Department of Mines and Geology have identified uranium-related radioactive bodies around the Lo Manthang area. But their commercially viable quantity, grade and extractability have not yet been established through sufficient drilling and scientific evaluation. It would therefore be inappropriate to present claims that “vast uranium deposits are about to be seized by foreign powers” as established facts.

Another clearly visible area of U.S. interest in Mustang is cultural heritage preservation. Through the U.S. Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation, significant financial assistance has been provided for the conservation of Lo Gekar, also known as Ghar Gompa, Jhong Gompa, Gonpa Gang and other Himalayan heritage sites. Around 285,000 U.S. dollars was provided for the restoration of Lo Gekar, while 100,000 dollars was allocated for the restoration of Jhong Gompa. In recent years, U.S. ambassadors and other senior embassy officials have also visited some of these projects.

Such engagement can reasonably be analyzed as one dimension of cultural diplomacy or soft power. Through heritage preservation, states can build long-term relationships with local communities, cultivate goodwill and strengthen their positive image. The United States is not alone in using cultural diplomacy in this way. China, India, Japan and other powers employ similar instruments across the world.

However, the existence of cultural assistance alone does not prove that there is a covert security operation, an effort to destabilize Tibet or a plan to control strategic minerals. Such conclusions would require separate and concrete evidence.

Against this background, Prime Minister Balendra Shah’s recent visit to Mustang has inevitably raised questions. Government sources have described the trip as a private and family visit. Publicly confirmed activities show the prime minister visiting Muktinath. So far, there has been no verified evidence of a strategic meeting at Lo Gekar, Damodar Kunda or with U.S. officials.

It would therefore go far beyond the available evidence to directly link the prime minister’s visit with the CIA, uranium or Tibet.

The more relevant question lies elsewhere. Why did the state apparatus appear unclear about the purpose, security coordination and itinerary of the prime minister’s visit to such a sensitive border region? Reports that local administrative and security agencies received insufficient advance information are a matter of concern from the perspective of state management. A prime minister has the right to undertake a personal visit, but wherever a prime minister travels, the office and presence of the head of government inevitably carry political and diplomatic significance.

In a region such as Mustang, that significance is even greater.

Nepal has already paid a price in the past for the use of Mustang in Khampa activities. Today’s environment is not the Cold War, but the nature of strategic competition has changed rather than disappeared. Military camps have increasingly been replaced by competition over digital infrastructure, minerals, cultural projects, research, development assistance and information influence.

Nepal must therefore avoid two extremes. The first is the tendency to interpret every foreign project as a conspiracy. The second is to dismiss every foreign activity in sensitive border regions as ordinary development assistance without asking legitimate questions about strategic influence.

Nepal’s proper course is transparency, national ownership and non-alignment.

There is currently no factual basis for claiming that Nepal is on the verge of losing Mustang or Manang. Such language creates fear more than it advances serious strategic debate. The real risk is not the immediate loss of territory, but rather unclear policy, weak border administration, opaque external influence, local dissatisfaction and the gradual weakening of Nepal’s ability to make independent decisions amid competition among major powers.

The government should therefore formulate a clear national policy for the northern border regions. It should specify which institutions oversee foreign assistance and cultural projects, how the movement of foreign officials in sensitive border areas is coordinated, how information relating to critical minerals is protected, and what security and diplomatic protocols apply even when the prime minister or ministers make private visits to strategically sensitive regions.

Nepal’s territory must not be allowed to be used against any friendly country. This principle must apply equally whether the country concerned is China, India, the United States or any other state.

Mustang will not be protected by slogans. It will be protected by an effective state presence. Stronger roads, communications, administration, security, local economies and public services along the frontier are the foundations of long-term national security.

It would be inappropriate to make unsubstantiated accusations regarding Prime Minister Balen Shah’s visit to Mustang. At the same time, the prime minister and his government have a responsibility not to create unnecessary secrecy around activities in such a sensitive region. Ambiguity creates a vacuum, and in geopolitics, vacuums are always filled by someone else’s narrative.

Nepal must not allow Mustang to become another chapter resembling the Khampa episode of the past. Achieving that requires not fear but facts, not accusations but transparency, and not policies shaped under the shadow of any great power, but a clear strategy rooted in Nepal’s own national interest.