The Nepalese Shadow of “Zelenskyization”: Balen, Concentration of Power and External Influence
Sanket Kiranti
Volodymyr Zelensky and Balendra Shah are not products of the same political project. Ukraine is at war; Nepal is not. Their histories, state structures and security environments are different. Yet when their political rise, visual identity, social media-based power building, tendency to elevate personality above institutions, the growing political importance of security structures and developments linked to external power networks are examined together, several uncomfortable similarities emerge. The comparison therefore goes far beyond a coincidence in clothing.
Zelensky rose from the entertainment industry to become president. Balendra moved from rap music, engineering and leadership of Kathmandu Metropolitan City to national power. Both built political strength from public dissatisfaction with the old establishment. Both distinguished themselves from traditional politicians in language, clothing and behavior. Zelensky’s military-influenced attire became a symbol of wartime Ukraine, while Balendra’s black clothing, dark glasses and restrained speaking style have become part of his political identity. In modern personality-centered politics, such visual identity is not merely fashion; it can also become the psychological language of power.
The similarity is even clearer in their communication styles. Zelensky used direct video addresses and social media to keep the political narrative of the war largely under his control. Balendra has likewise prioritized social media and limited direct messaging over regular press conferences, extensive public debate and traditional political communication. This creates a direct relationship with the public, but it also carries the risk of weakening parliamentary scrutiny, media questioning and institutional accountability. When the leader becomes the source of information, the interpreter of events and the center of public opinion, popularity may rise while accountability declines.
In Ukraine, the expansion of the power of the presidential office, military and intelligence structures is understandable because of the war. In Nepal, however, even without war, the power and activism of the military and intelligence structures appear to be increasing. There is a growing sense that military structures are gradually gaining more influence relative to civilian institutions. During the latest political transition, the Nepal Army played an influential role not only in security management but also in facilitating political dialogue. The prime minister’s decision to retain the Defence Ministry and maintain close coordination with military leadership is not constitutionally abnormal. But if Parliament appears weak, decision-making becomes concentrated within a narrow circle and the public influence of security institutions rises simultaneously, serious questions emerge about the democratic balance of power.
The Constitution is clear on this matter. Sovereignty and state authority are vested in the Nepali people. Executive power rests with the Council of Ministers. The legitimacy of the prime minister and the Council of Ministers derives from the parliamentary structure. The National Security Council and the Nepal Army remain under civilian control as defined by the Constitution. Ordinances are constitutional instruments available for exceptional circumstances, not permanent substitutes for Parliament. The meaning is simple: a popular prime minister may be powerful, but cannot stand above the Constitution. The military is an instrument of the state, not the political foundation of an individual.
The most sensitive dimension in comparing Zelensky and Balendra is the United States. In Ukraine, American influence is not speculation but a structural reality. Washington plays a decisive role in weapons supply, economic assistance, intelligence coordination, sanctions policy and even peace negotiations. A major reduction in US support would immediately affect Kyiv’s military and economic capacity. Zelensky’s government therefore cannot be fully understood in isolation from the American strategic framework.
In Balendra’s case, there is no publicly established document proving that the United States directly created him as a political leader or gives him instructions. But using that fact to ignore the American influence infrastructure built in Nepal over many years would also amount to an incomplete presentation of reality.
Public American records show long-term investment in Nepal through the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute and programmes associated with the US State Department in areas including youth leadership, political training, civil society, journalism, policy debate, public opinion and research related to China. Emerging political leaders have received training in strategic planning, political communication, voter engagement and policy development. Programmes have also been conducted to increase youth participation in civic and political processes, expand networks and connect them with decision-making structures. These are not secret allegations; they are activities publicly disclosed by the institutions concerned.
This raises a fundamental question. When a foreign institution builds a road, it is called development assistance. When it builds a school, it is called educational assistance. But when foreign money enters political leadership training, youth mobilization, public opinion, media and policy debate, can it still be accepted simply as politically neutral development assistance?
This is the sensitive boundary where soft power moves toward structural influence. Influence does not always require direct orders. Leaders can be trained, networks can be built, political vocabulary can be shaped, research and media can be funded, and the mobilizing capacity of social groups can be strengthened. When a crisis arrives, structures prepared over time may emerge as seemingly organic political forces. Modern influence politics often operates precisely through such mechanisms.
Some relationships that became visible after the Gen-Z movement deserve investigation for this reason. Reports emerged that Students for a Free Tibet appeared on the public partnership list of Hami Nepal, which became influential during the movement. The organization is active in Tibet-related political advocacy, and public records also show that it has received support from the US National Endowment for Democracy. This does not prove direct financial transfers between the two organizations, nor does it prove American direction. Nepal’s One-China policy is the official foreign policy of the state, and the independent relationships of a non-governmental organization do not automatically represent the official position of the Government of Nepal. But when such relationships intersect with Nepal’s laws, national interest, political transparency or sensitive foreign policy, they cannot remain outside state scrutiny and public accountability. It is therefore a normal national security responsibility for the state to have clear information about their actual nature, financial connections and potential influence.
There have also been public reports of significant financial support for Balendra’s national campaign from Nepalis living abroad, particularly diaspora communities in the United States. This is not US government money. But the source, legal route and potential influence of political funding must be transparent. Similarly, repeated visits to Kathmandu by senior American officials after the formation of the new government do not prove direct control, but they certainly indicate Washington’s high strategic interest in Nepal’s emerging power structure.
This criticism, however, should not be confined to the United States. India’s influence in Nepal is older, deeper and more multidimensional. The open border, trade, energy, transit, political contacts and security relations give New Delhi exceptional access. China, meanwhile, has been expanding its influence through infrastructure, trade, loans and grants, political contacts and development partnerships. The methods of all three powers differ, but Nepal’s standard must remain the same. The United States, India or China should not be allowed to exercise opaque influence over Nepal’s political decision-making.
Balendra’s own political capabilities should not be ignored either. Public dissatisfaction with traditional parties, his experience in Kathmandu Metropolitan City, appeal among young people, effective use of social media, personal image and electoral strategy are his own political assets. External influence and domestic political capacity are not mutually exclusive. Modern political leadership often develops through the interaction between domestic discontent and an external structural environment.
The weak question, therefore, is not whether “Balen is an American leader.” The serious questions are different. How influential are foreign money and foreign institutions in the environment that produces new political leadership in Nepal? Who is training emerging political actors? What are the objectives behind external assistance to media and research? Does the state have sufficient information about the foreign relationships of political movements? Are parliamentary and national security mechanisms capable of monitoring foreign influence effectively?
This is where the true meaning of “Zelenskyization” becomes visible. It is not military-style clothing. Its dangerous form lies in elevating the individual above institutions, turning social media into a substitute for accountability, increasing the political weight of security structures and allowing external influence to escape scrutiny under the language of normal partnership.
Ukraine is at war. Nepal is not.
Nepal therefore should not treat wartime concentration of power, personality cults, the political expansion of security structures or external strategic dependence as models of new governance. The sources, objectives and partners behind foreign assistance received by political parties, election campaigns, civil society, media and politically active youth organizations should be publicly disclosed. Sensitive foreign political programmes should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and the role of security institutions must remain within constitutional limits.
This is not anti-Americanism. Nor is it support for India or China. It is a single standard of sovereignty. Nepal should not become Washington’s strategic outpost, New Delhi’s sphere of influence or Beijing’s political extension. Relations and cooperation with all three are necessary, but national decision-making authority cannot be surrendered.
Sovereignty is not merely about flying the national flag at the border. It also means that the Nepali people must retain control over how their leaders are produced, where political money comes from, who shapes public opinion, where the influence of security institutions ends and where the final decision on national policy is made.
The most serious similarity between Zelensky and Balendra is not their clothing. It is the possible rise of the individual above institutions. Nepal’s answer must therefore be clear. The center of Nepal’s decision-making must be Kathmandu. Not Washington, Beijing or New Delhi.
