Pressure on Oli, Power Struggle Inside UML, and the Crisis of Leadership Structure
# Muna Chand
Nepal’s politics is passing through an extraordinary phase of transition. The political atmosphere after the Gen-Z movement, the investigation process linked to it, recommendations from the National Human Rights Commission, the debate over leadership transfer within the UML, and questions surrounding the role of KP Sharma Oli have pushed the country’s power equation into a new phase.
This is not merely an internal dispute within one political party. It is a wider political crisis connected to Nepal’s state structure, the institutional character of political parties, the possibility of external influence, the legitimacy of leadership, and the style of power management.
In recent days, the debate over leadership change, generational transfer, and future leadership has become more open inside the CPN-UML. During the reorganisation and election review campaign in Lumbini Province, leaders from different levels of the party expressed their views on leadership continuity, the future of the party, and organisational restructuring. The presence of vice chairpersons, the general secretary, secretaries, and other senior leaders in the discussion has been viewed as a sign of growing dissatisfaction and a new power equation within the UML.
However, when Chairman KP Sharma Oli warned party leaders not to play the “out-of-season tune” of leadership change, it created further ripples inside the party. Oli’s statement clearly exposed two currents within the UML. On one side are those who still see Oli as the central leader of the party, a symbol of nationalist commitment and political continuity. On the other side are those who argue that the party must move toward new leadership, a new style, and a new generation.
Such a debate is not unnatural in itself. In a democratic party, leadership change, succession planning, and organisational review should be regular processes. But the problem becomes serious when such debates move forward not through political principles, organisational procedures, and transparent processes, but under the shadow of factionalism, opportunism, suspicion of external influence, and personal ambition.
Oli’s political life has been full of ups and downs. Due to his positions on nationalism, Lipulekh, Kalapani and Limpiyadhura, constitutional implementation, relations with China, diplomatic tensions with India, and caution toward Western influence, Oli has established himself as a leader with a clear political line in Nepal. For his supporters, he is a leader who stands for national interest. For his critics, however, he is also a symbol of power centralisation, harsh rhetoric, and intolerant political conduct.
The current crisis stands between these two images.
Questions have been raised against Oli in connection with the Gen-Z movement, state violence, administrative decisions, and political accountability. These questions require constitutional, legal, and political answers. In any democratic society, impartial investigation is necessary when there are deaths, repression, damage, or state failure during a public movement. But if the same process is used for revenge, political elimination, or the adjustment of power equations, it becomes a misuse of democratic procedure.
The suspicion of the Oli camp begins from this point. According to them, the campaign to weaken Oli is not merely a legal process, but a planned political effort by some forces inside and outside the UML. In their view, Oli’s nationalist stance, closeness with China, discomfort with Western strategic influence, and effort to keep Nepal on an independent foreign policy path had become inconvenient for certain external forces.
This is a serious claim. Therefore, it must be evaluated only on the basis of evidence, facts, diplomatic activity, and political behaviour. At the same time, the question of external influence in Nepali politics cannot be completely dismissed. MCC, SPP, the Indo-Pacific Strategy, China-US competition, India-China tensions, and increasing external contacts within Nepali parties have not kept Nepal’s politics separate from regional and global power competition.
In this context, the tendency to accuse some UML leaders of having a “pro-American” inclination has also emerged. Such accusations should not be presented as proven facts, but as political claims and expressions of internal mistrust. However, the reason why such allegations are being raised is itself a serious question. If a party fails to conduct institutional debate on foreign policy, nationalism, power balance, and leadership succession, the language of conspiracy fills the vacuum.
The UML currently appears to be facing that very risk.
Is the debate over removing Oli part of the party’s natural renewal, or is it a campaign to weaken the leadership during a crisis? The UML must answer this question institutionally. If leadership change is necessary, it must take place through procedure, a party convention, political documents, and open debate. But if the process turns toward factional capture by taking advantage of Oli’s legal and political crisis, the organisational unity of the UML will become even weaker.
Another important issue is Oli’s secretariat and style of governance. While reviewing Oli’s second term, it is necessary to examine not only his personal style but also the advisory structure built around him. The role of Bishnu Rimal has long been a subject of criticism inside and outside the party. According to critics, Oli’s secretariat became excessively centralised, opaque, and unwilling to listen to criticism. This pushed the prime minister away from public sentiment, internal party feeling, and political reality.
Around any powerful leader, the advisory structure must be even more open, analytical, and connected with the public mood. But when advisers start filtering information, blocking criticism, controlling access, and presenting only favourable opinions to the leader, leadership gradually becomes detached from reality. In such a situation, the leader may appear strong, but governance becomes weak.
This is one of the major accusations against the Oli government. From ministerial selection to communication strategy, from internal party dialogue to the management of public anger, many believe the secretariat failed to show the required sensitivity. If elected representatives, party workers, critics, and responsible party leaders cannot easily communicate with Baluwatar, the government becomes separated from the party. The party becomes separated from the people. And when a leadership crisis arrives, the structure of defence becomes weak.
The Gen-Z movement exposed this weakness openly. The inability to understand the dissatisfaction of the new generation, anger spreading through digital platforms, distrust toward the state, and frustration with political parties was not only a failure of the security agencies. It was a failure of political communication, the ability to read social signals, and the leadership’s public-contact system.
Therefore, Oli’s crisis cannot be explained only through external conspiracy or factional betrayal. Oli’s own style of governance, the conduct of his secretariat, lack of dialogue within the party, intolerance toward criticism, and failure to prepare a clear succession plan are also internal causes of this crisis.
But this does not mean that every pressure against Oli is automatically legitimate. In a democracy, a leader can be questioned, investigated, and subjected to debate over leadership change. However, all these processes must be impartial, transparent, constitutional, and free from political revenge. If the legal process becomes a political weapon, today it may target Oli, and tomorrow any other leader may become a victim of the same tendency.
For Nepal’s democracy, the central question today is this: Are we trying to institutionalise political accountability, or are we establishing a practice of weakening political rivals through legal procedures?
For the UML as well, this is a decisive moment. The party must openly review Oli’s contribution, weaknesses, leadership style, and future role. At the same time, the Oli camp must not dismiss every criticism merely as a foreign conspiracy or factional betrayal. If the party is to be revived, serious reforms are necessary in leadership, ideology, organisation, communication, and public engagement.
The current UML crisis has offered a major lesson. Having a powerful leader is not enough. A strong institution, open dialogue, responsible secretariat, capable advisers, a fact-based decision-making system, and a political culture that listens to criticism are essential. A power-centred structure may look effective for some time, but in times of crisis, that very structure can become the weakest link.
Oli gave Nepali politics the language of nationalism, stability, and firm political stance. But if the UML wants to preserve his legacy, it must choose institutional reconstruction over personality worship. The accusations against Oli must be tested through an impartial legal process. The debate over leadership inside the party must move forward according to procedure. If there are suspicions of external influence, they must be discussed publicly with evidence. And all political parties must learn from the failure of the secretariat culture.
Nepal’s present crisis is not only Oli’s crisis. It is a test of the leadership structure of Nepali political parties, their capacity to face external pressure, their internal democracy, and the maturity of state management. If revenge, conspiracy, and factionalism capture this test, democracy will be weakened. But if this crisis can be transformed into self-review, institutional reform, and a clear debate on national interest, it can become an opportunity for future political reconstruction.
Ultimately, Oli’s political future will be determined not only by the UML, but also by Nepal’s democratic process. The question is not only whether Oli remains or leaves. The question is whether leadership change in Nepal happens through procedure or through design. Whether the justice process remains impartial or becomes a political weapon. Whether parties are guided by ideology or by factions and external influence. And most importantly, whether Nepali politics is directed by the interests of the Nepali people or by the equation of external forces and internal opportunism.
Finding honest answers to these questions is the national need of the present moment.
