The American Current in Singha Durbar, the Indian Current in the Political Shadows

Nepal’s current power structure cannot be understood merely as the rise of a new generation, the arrival of technocratic competence or a popular revolt against the old political parties. A closer look at the composition of the government led by Balendra Shah, its policy priorities, international connections and sequence of decisions suggests that Singha Durbar is rapidly leaning towards the American political and development-policy current. Within the same power structure, Rabi Lamichhane has emerged as the principal political contact point for the Indian current.

This conclusion is not based merely on where individual ministers studied or how many years they spent abroad. The central issue is the government’s collective policy orientation. When the Council of Ministers, advisory groups and decision-making mechanisms contain a disproportionately strong presence of individuals connected in one way or another with Western development institutions, international non-governmental structures, American education and policy networks, it is natural for that influence to be reflected in national priorities.

To understand the direction of the government, one must examine the pace of projects rather than political speeches. A programme worth a total of 747 million US dollars is being implemented under the US Millennium Challenge Compact. Of this, the Government of Nepal is contributing 197 million dollars. Contracts for electricity transmission projects have moved forward, the American company Deloitte has been assigned technical assistance related to electricity regulation, and transmission infrastructure extending towards the Indian border is under construction.

By contrast, the Belt and Road Initiative cooperation framework agreed with China in 2024 lists 10 projects, including the Tokha–Chhahare Tunnel, the Hilsa–Simkot Road, the Kimathanka–Khandbari Road, the Kerung–Kathmandu Railway, the Rasuwagadhi–Chilime electricity transmission line and an industrial park. However, by May 2026, no significant progress had been publicly reported on these projects apart from the feasibility study for the Kerung–Kathmandu Railway.

This uneven pace lies at the centre of the political question. Legal, administrative and financial mechanisms become rapidly active for American projects, while projects formally agreed with China remain trapped in a cycle of studies, procedures and uncertainty. Such a situation cannot be dismissed merely as bureaucratic delay. It reveals where the government’s real priorities lie.

India has not been completely excluded. Rather, there are indications that political engagement with India is developing more through Rabi Lamichhane than through the head of government. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi formally met Lamichhane on June 3, 2026, and conveyed a message about taking Nepal–India relations in a new direction. The Indian Prime Minister’s Office publicly accorded particular importance to that meeting.

If Balendra Shah becomes the centre of the American policy current while Rabi Lamichhane serves as the channel for the Indian political current, Nepal’s elected power structure risks being driven not by a single national vision but by the parallel influence of two external power centres. A situation in which the government advances towards Washington’s policy and development structures while the party leadership builds political understandings with New Delhi is not healthy for the country’s national decision-making system.

The most serious consequences may emerge in Nepal’s relations with China. If Nepal signs the BRI but fails to implement it, reaffirms its commitment to the One-China policy while continuously delaying strategic projects, and simultaneously facilitates the entry of American security and political concepts, Beijing may begin to question the credibility of Nepal’s formal commitments.

India, too, may begin dealing with Nepal not through an independent and unified state policy but through separate individuals and competing power centres within political parties. This could produce separate understandings between the prime minister, party leaders, ministers and external powers. Such a condition would not constitute foreign policy. It would amount to the fragmentation of national institutions.

Maintaining relations with the United States, India or China is not the problem. The problem arises when the policies, projects and institutional networks of one country are automatically prioritised and national decisions are shaped in that direction. Nepal can benefit from the MCC, build infrastructure through the BRI and expand energy, trade and transit cooperation with India. However, proposals from all three sides must be tested against the same national standard.

The government should disclose the past and present connections of ministers, advisers and senior officials with foreign institutions, aid agencies and policy networks. It should also publish a white paper detailing the status, financial terms, strategic implications and implementation timelines of American, Chinese and Indian projects.

Nepal cannot be allowed to become Washington’s laboratory, Delhi’s sphere of influence or a forward post against Beijing. National power must remain under the control of the Nepali people, not under the grip of any foreign current. Friendship with all is necessary, but the direction of the state must be determined solely by Nepal’s national interest.