Beyond the Thucydides Trap: The Difficult Path to Peace in China–U.S. Relations
Muna Chand
The meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House in Washington on September 24 has brought an old geopolitical question back into focus. How does the risk of war rise when an established power sees the progress of a rising power as a threat? And if that risk is recognized, can a path be found to prevent war? The “Thucydides Trap” offers one way to examine these questions. It is more useful as a warning about dangers that leaders must identify in time than as a prediction of war between China and the United States.
Revisiting the Trap
The ancient Greek historian Thucydides regarded the growth of Athenian power and the fear it generated in Sparta as the underlying cause of war between them. American scholar Graham Allison used this interpretation in his book Destined for War as a framework for understanding competition between rising and established powers. Of the 16 historical cases he studied, 12 resulted in war. That number deserves attention, but it is not the probability of war between two countries today. The selection of cases, their different historical circumstances and other causes of war must also be considered.
The other four cases are especially important to this discussion. In Allison’s study, competition between Portugal and Spain was managed through an agreement. Britain chose to accommodate the rise of the United States rather than fight it. The United States and the Soviet Union remained deeply hostile but did not go to war directly. Britain and France eventually managed the growing influence of a unified Germany within a framework of European cooperation. The causes and outcomes differed in each case. Together, they show that a shift in power creates pressure but does not itself decide whether war occurs.
Why Today’s World Is Different
China–U.S. competition is not a replay of the conflict in ancient Greece. Both countries are deeply connected to the global economy, trade, technology and supply chains. A serious crisis between them would affect industries, jobs and development plans in third countries. Nuclear weapons have also made the potential cost of direct war extraordinarily high. These factors make war more difficult and costly, but they do not make it impossible. It would be equally dangerous to treat economic interdependence as an automatic guarantee of peace.
Alternative scholarly perspectives help clarify this distinction. American scholar Joseph Nye warned that belief in the inevitability of war can itself become an idea that fuels confrontation. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has proposed “managed strategic competition,” emphasizing clear boundaries, rules for dialogue and cooperation where possible. Taken together, Allison’s historical warning, Nye’s caution about perceptions and Rudd’s practical proposal sharpen the central question: if competition cannot be stopped, how can it be conducted safely?
The Trap in Trade and Technology
Today, fear between major powers is visible beyond warships and borders. It also appears in trade restrictions, market access, advanced technology and supplies of critical goods. When the United States seeks to protect its economic and security interests, China may view some measures as attempts to obstruct its development. As China expands its capabilities, concerns may grow in the United States about losing its technological or strategic position. If those concerns are not addressed, and every move by the other side is treated as evidence of hostility, mistrust can become the basis of policy itself.
In this context, the vision of “constructive strategic stability” advanced by Xi and Trump in Beijing in May matters. At their September meeting, they again emphasized putting it into practice. Its stated aim is to give priority to cooperation, keep competition within limits, manage differences and build a relationship in which peace can be expected. A new joint arrangement was reported following the latest trade consultations, but its detailed terms have not been made public. Implementation, rather than the announcement, will therefore be the measure of progress.
The same tension is sharper in artificial intelligence. Both countries want to lead in this technology. Competition can accelerate research, but it can also increase the risks of unsafe use and harmful outcomes. That is why the two leaders’ view that dialogue is possible on keeping AI under human control and preventing its misuse is significant. They do not have to agree to share every technological capability. Agreement on identifying common risks and reducing potential harm could be a first step.
Three Tests of Stability
The first test is regular, reliable communication. A good understanding between leaders is useful. But personal rapport will not be enough if the relevant agencies cannot speak promptly when a crisis occurs. Diplomatic, economic and security contacts need to be maintained, with clear procedures for who should contact whom in an emergency.
The second test is restrained management of sensitive differences. China’s position on Taiwan is clear, and the issue is among those capable of generating tension in China–U.S. relations. Stability cannot be built by concealing the fact that the two sides hold different views. Dialogue is needed to reduce the chance that either will respond on the basis of assumptions about the other’s actions. Even when a disagreement cannot be resolved immediately, both sides can act to prevent it from becoming a crisis.
The third test is whether citizens see results. If trade rules become clearer, businesses can plan with greater confidence and useful cooperation on technological risks moves forward, strategic stability will become more than a diplomatic phrase. The important question will be how much uncertainty has been reduced, not how often an understanding has been announced.
Nepal and the Role of Smaller Countries
For Nepal, China–U.S. competition is not a distant debate. Nepal’s cooperation with China under the Belt and Road Initiative and its agreement with the United States under the Millennium Challenge Corporation show that it works with different partners on development. Viewing these projects only through a geopolitical lens can obscure the necessary examination of their value, costs, terms, implementation and public accountability. Each decision should be assessed against Nepal’s needs and through its own institutional processes.
That is what independent decision-making means for a smaller country. It does not mean Nepal can remain entirely unaffected by competition between major powers. It means Nepal can set its own priorities, assess partnership proposals against clear standards and avoid turning cooperation with one side into a declaration against another. An independent foreign policy also requires consistency in project selection, contractual terms and public communication.
History’s Warning, Today’s Responsibility
The first step towards escaping the Thucydides Trap is to refuse to treat it as fate. The practical agenda for China and the United States is clear: maintain regular contact between leaders and officials, strengthen procedures for communication during emergencies, clarify and honour trade arrangements, and advance expert-level work on shared risks from artificial intelligence. Nepal, for its part, should keep its development priorities and standards for assessing projects clear.
History reminds us how difficult shifts in power can be. It does not compel today’s leaders to go to war. The Washington meeting has shown a political possibility for peaceful competition. Sustained dialogue, restraint and honoured commitments will determine whether that possibility becomes credible. If the two major powers do this difficult work, the Thucydides Trap will remain a warning learned from history, rather than become the destiny of the present.
Sources and references: Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War; Graham Allison, Destined for War, and the Belfer Center’s historical case study; Joseph Nye’s writings on China–U.S. relations; Kevin Rudd, The Avoidable War, and his remarks on strategic competition; Chinese Foreign Ministry accounts of the Xi–Trump meetings in May and September; and Nepal government documents on foreign policy and development cooperation.
