China’s Law-Based Administration and Protection of Maritime Rights in the Waters East of Taiwan Island
# Prem Sagar Poudel
China’s coast guard and maritime administrative activities in the waters east of Taiwan Island constitute an important dimension of its efforts to safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity and maritime rights in the western Pacific. These activities cannot be understood solely as routine patrols, as part of the Taiwan question, or as a response to the proposed maritime delimitation process between Japan and the Philippines. At their core lie the one-China principle, the law of the sea, effective administration, the role of external powers, and regional peace and security.
According to Jiang Lue, spokesperson for the China Coast Guard, the Xiushan formation replaced the Daishan formation on July 4 and continued regular law-enforcement patrols in the waters east of Taiwan Island. The Daishan-led formation had conducted patrols and inspections, fisheries protection and maritime rescue operations in the area since June. According to the Chinese side, these activities have helped ensure normal navigation and fishing operations while protecting the lawful rights, lives and property of Chinese fishing communities, including compatriots in Taiwan.
The replacement of one vessel formation by another is not unusual in itself. However, the continuation of patrols despite the change in formation indicates that China’s activities are evolving from a temporary response into a regular and institutionalised form of maritime administration. Beijing seeks to uphold its position on maritime rights not only through diplomatic statements, but also through the practical deployment of coast guard, maritime safety, fisheries protection and rescue capabilities.
The immediate background to these developments is the decision by Japan and the Philippines to advance talks on delimiting their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in the waters east of Taiwan Island. Tokyo and Manila have presented the proposed process as an effort to bring legal clarity to maritime boundaries in accordance with international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
China, however, has maintained that any such process conducted without its participation would be unacceptable. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the waters concerned lie east of Taiwan Island, where China possesses rights relating to the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. Beijing has stated that, because Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, the maritime rights arising from Taiwan’s coastline are represented by the People’s Republic of China. It therefore concludes that any attempt to exclude China from the delimitation process would be contrary to the law of the sea and China’s lawful rights.
Articles 74 and 83 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provide that the delimitation of exclusive economic zones and continental shelves between states with opposite or adjacent coasts should be achieved by agreement on the basis of international law in order to reach an equitable solution. China’s position is that Taiwan is not a separate sovereign state and that the People’s Republic of China is the lawful representative of maritime claims arising from Taiwan’s coastline. Beijing is therefore concerned that any permanent delimitation undertaken by Japan and the Philippines without Chinese participation could adversely affect China’s maritime rights.
It is important here to understand the legal distinction between an exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea. A coastal state does not exercise full sovereignty over an exclusive economic zone. Rather, it enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the exploration, use, conservation and management of natural resources, as well as over certain economic and administrative matters. Vessels of other countries retain freedom of navigation under international law. On the continental shelf, the coastal state possesses exclusive rights to explore and exploit the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil.
The mere presence of a Chinese coast guard vessel in a maritime area is therefore not, by itself, the final basis of a legal dispute. More important are the nature of the vessel’s activities, the orders it issues, and the legal authority under which it operates. China presents its activities as regular law enforcement and public maritime services within its jurisdiction. Other parties, however, may regard the same activities as an attempt to expand jurisdiction. This divergence in interpretation is the principal source of potential tension.
China presents its position not only as a geopolitical necessity, but also on institutional and legal grounds. In 1971, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 recognised the representatives of the People’s Republic of China as the only lawful representatives of China at the United Nations. Although the resolution primarily concerned China’s representation in the United Nations, China has consistently interpreted it as an international institutional foundation of the one-China principle.
Most countries, when establishing diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, have expressed commitments related to a one-China policy or the one-China principle. In international institutional practice, China is represented by Beijing. Any long-term maritime delimitation that entirely disregards China’s concerns regarding rights arising from the coastline of Taiwan Island would therefore be difficult to keep free of political, legal and practical disputes.
From June 6 to 10, China conducted a maritime law-enforcement and navigation inspection operation in the waters east of Taiwan Island with the participation of several maritime agencies. According to Chinese official accounts, the operation covered 1,030 nautical miles, inspected 198 vessels in transit and corrected violations involving three vessels. The involvement of the coast guard, maritime safety, transport services and rescue agencies indicates that Beijing is presenting the area not merely as a theatre of military presence, but also as a domain of civilian maritime administration.
This is an important feature of China’s strategic approach. The use of warships or military aircraft can immediately heighten security tensions. The deployment of coast guard, maritime safety, rescue and fisheries protection agencies, by contrast, allows sovereignty and rights-based claims to be established through routine administrative practice. From the Chinese perspective, this is not an attempt to create new rights, but a process of protecting rights that already exist.
The geographical importance of the waters east of Taiwan Island is also exceptional. To the west lie the Taiwan Strait and the Chinese mainland, while to the east are the Philippine Sea and the open western Pacific. Japan’s southwestern islands, the northern Philippines and major maritime and air routes across the Pacific are connected to this geography.
In a potential crisis, Taiwan’s eastern region has often been described as a comparatively secure route for external logistics, maritime access and military assistance. China’s regular coast guard and administrative presence is therefore not limited to fisheries management or maritime rescue. It also challenges the strategic assumption that eastern Taiwan would remain an unobstructed and secure area for external intervention.
For China, failing to respond could itself carry risks. If Beijing remained silent while Japan and the Philippines advanced maritime delimitation, that silence might later be interpreted as consent, passivity or weakness in its claims. In maritime disputes, sustained diplomatic objection, physical presence and administrative practice help preserve rights for future negotiations. In this sense, Chinese patrols are not merely demonstrations of power, but also a means of keeping China’s legal position active in practice.
China’s real challenge, however, is to strike an appropriate balance between firmly protecting its rights and maintaining regional peace and stability. If patrols remain transparent, regular, professional and centred on civilian safety, Beijing can credibly present its activities as responsible maritime administration. Clear operating procedures, safe distances, emergency communication and respect for the uninterrupted movement of commercial vessels can reduce the risks of misunderstanding and confrontation.
At the same time, the economic and administrative interests of Japan and the Philippines cannot be dismissed entirely. Clear maritime boundaries can facilitate the management of fisheries resources, natural-resource exploration, scientific research and environmental responsibility. However, such a process should not predetermine or extinguish the lawful claims of a third party arising from the relevant coastline.
Maritime delimitation is not simply a technical process in which two countries draw lines on a map. It involves the relevant coasts, territorial sovereignty, natural resources and the identification of parties asserting rights. A durable solution therefore appears to require China’s participation, or at the very least formal consideration of its concerns.
China’s long-term policy on the Taiwan question is also clear. Chinese white papers present peaceful national reunification as the preferred option. Beijing has repeatedly stated that it seeks peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and utmost effort. At the same time, it has made clear that it will not accept activities aimed at separating Taiwan from China or external interference.
Chinese activities in the waters east of Taiwan Island should therefore be understood within the combined context of the long-term objective of peaceful reunification, opposition to separatist activities and the strategic capacity to deter external intervention. Yet a long-term solution cannot depend solely on increasing the number of coast guard vessels. The protection of maritime rights, civilian safety, regional confidence and emergency crisis management must be integrated within a single framework.
While maintaining its position on sovereignty, China can provide greater clarity regarding the purpose of its patrols, operational methods and civilian maritime services. Japan and the Philippines, rather than dismissing China’s concerns, should ensure that any future delimitation does not prejudicially affect China’s rights-based claims. Emergency communication arrangements between coast guard agencies, technical dialogue on fisheries protection and cooperation in search and rescue could reduce the risks of accidents and miscalculation.
The situation developing in the waters east of Taiwan Island is not merely the result of one vessel formation, one delimitation negotiation or one diplomatic statement. It reflects a deeper interaction among the one-China principle, United Nations representation, the law of the sea, civilian administration and the changing security architecture of the western Pacific.
A durable regional order cannot be constructed by excluding China’s concerns regarding sovereignty and maritime rights. At the same time, an uncontrolled escalation of tensions in the course of protecting those rights would not serve the long-term interests of China or any other party. For Beijing, the most effective strategy is a combination of firmness and restraint.
A policy that clarifies the legal basis of China’s position, strengthens civilian maritime services, places the interests of people in Taiwan at its centre and avoids unnecessary militarisation can make China’s position more credible. For Japan, the Philippines and external powers, it would likewise be more practical to engage China in direct and responsible dialogue than to attempt to construct a regional order that excludes it.
Whether the waters east of Taiwan Island become a forward zone of future confrontation or an example of managing a complex sovereignty dispute through law, dialogue and restraint will depend on the political maturity of the parties concerned. It is natural for China to protect its territorial integrity and lawful maritime rights. Its long-term strategic success, however, will ultimately be measured by its ability to connect those rights with regional peace, safe navigation and shared maritime interests.
About the Author: Prem Sagar Poudel is a senior journalist and international relations analyst from Nepal. He has conducted in-depth studies on Nepal-China relations, the geopolitics of the Himalayan region, and Asian security issues.
