BRICS in the New Geography of Digital Power
Prem Sagar Poudel
The next phase of global economic competition will not be defined by oil, ports and manufacturing capacity alone. Access to and control over data, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, digital skills and cross-border technology markets will increasingly shape the new geography of economic power. It is in this context that China’s proposal for deeper digital industry cooperation, presented at the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi, should be understood. China has proposed advancing a “BRICS Digital Ecosystem Cloud Platform” while expanding digital skills training, technology exchange and coordination among industries. It is important, however, to distinguish the proposal from an already operational BRICS-wide system with a fully agreed governance structure and implementation mechanism.
The importance of the proposal lies less in the name of the cloud platform than in the economic architecture it could create. The digital divide is no longer simply a question of who has internet access and who does not. It now concerns who possesses advanced computing power, where skilled artificial intelligence talent is concentrated, who provides secure cloud services, who controls data and whether digital businesses can enter markets across national borders. If infrastructure, skills, technology, industry and markets can be connected within a coherent framework, digital cooperation could become genuine economic cooperation. If not, an ambitious technological concept may remain little more than an attractive summit declaration.
BRICS members do not possess equal capabilities, but that very diversity can become the basis for complementary cooperation. China has a vast industrial and technological base. India has a powerful information technology and digital services sector. Brazil offers a large market and considerable potential in agricultural technology, while other members bring strengths in energy, capital, natural resources, industrial capacity and regional connectivity. A common digital framework could connect these capabilities rather than leave them operating as separate islands. If small and medium-sized enterprises can gain easier access to customers, partners, payment systems, legal requirements and technical standards, the cost of entering cross-border markets could fall significantly.
Digital skills are another essential pillar. Shared training and recognised qualifications in artificial intelligence, data science, cloud computing and cybersecurity could gradually create a broader digital labour market across BRICS. If skills acquired in one member country are recognised by employers in another, opportunities for young people could extend beyond national borders. But the number of training programmes alone should not be treated as success. The real test will be how many people find employment, how many new enterprises are established, how much investment is generated and whether incomes actually rise.
This is also where the initiative becomes strategically sensitive. Cloud infrastructure is not simply a storage facility. Questions about where data is stored, who secures it, which technical standards are adopted, how service providers are selected and how easily data can be transferred from one system to another are directly connected to national sovereignty. Given China’s enormous digital and industrial capacity, it is reasonable to ask whether such a system could also expand Chinese technological influence. But the origin of the proposal alone should not determine the conclusion. The more important questions are whether decision-making authority is genuinely shared, whether standards remain open, whether competition among providers is possible and whether each member retains control over sensitive national data.
The challenge for BRICS is not to replace the dominance of Western digital corporations with a different form of concentrated dominance. A meaningful alternative would require an open, secure, competitive and interoperable digital environment. If a country or company cannot change providers without losing access to its data, markets or operational capacity, that cannot be described as digital autonomy. The credibility of the system will therefore depend not on its size, but on the freedom of choice available to users, the level of competition and the protection of data rights.
The risks are equally clear. Excessive dependence on a single system or provider creates technological vulnerability. Large corporations could dominate a shared market and marginalise smaller enterprises, creating economic imbalance. Data and technical standards could become instruments of political influence. A vast network connecting governments, universities and businesses across several countries could also become an attractive target for cyberattacks. Cybersecurity must therefore be built into the architecture from the beginning, not added later as an afterthought.
The success of the initiative should ultimately be judged by measurable results rather than summit language. How much does cross-border digital trade increase? How many small businesses gain access to new markets? How many jobs are created after training programmes? How much new investment is generated, and how far do digital service costs fall? Equally important will be transparent reporting on data breaches, cyber incidents, service disruptions and the cost of switching between providers. Without measurable accountability, even a large digital structure risks becoming a political symbol rather than a genuine economic achievement.
Nepal is not a BRICS member, but it cannot remain outside the consequences of this transformation. With deep economic ties to both India and China, Nepal should treat emerging digital standards, cloud infrastructure, artificial intelligence and cross-border digital trade in its neighbourhood as strategic issues. An economy that fails to prepare may become merely a consumer in the new digital order. An economy that prepares can enter new value chains through skilled professionals, software, data services and digital enterprises.
For Nepal, therefore, the central question is not BRICS membership but digital readiness. The country needs clear policies on data ownership, privacy and cross-border data flows. Universities and industry must develop internationally competitive human resources in artificial intelligence, cloud computing, data science and cybersecurity. Critical digital infrastructure must be protected, and national capacity to respond to cyber incidents must be strengthened. Smaller technology firms need better access to finance, computing resources and international markets. Above all, Nepal should avoid becoming locked into a single technological ecosystem and instead prioritise systems capable of working securely across different platforms.
The proposed BRICS digital architecture carries substantial potential, but its true value will be measured by outcomes, not scale. If it helps developing countries move from being consumers of technology to producers, creates opportunities for young people, opens markets for smaller businesses and protects national rights over data, it could become an important structural shift for the Global South. If governance remains opaque and technological power becomes concentrated in only a few centres, old forms of dependence may simply return under a new name. The decisive question of the digital future, therefore, is not whose cloud is the largest, but how widely and fairly the power, opportunity and economic value created by that cloud are shared.
About the Author: Prem Sagar Poudel is a senior journalist and international relations analyst from Nepal. He has conducted in-depth studies on Nepal-China relations, the geopolitics of the Himalayan region, and Asian security issues.
