BRI’s Himalayan Journey: Ten Projects, Ten Possibilities

# Prem Sagar Poudel

Some time has passed since Foreign Minister Shishir Khanal completed his visit to Beijing. During the visit, Nepal and China reaffirmed their commitment to expanding cooperation in infrastructure, connectivity, energy, trade, technology and people-to-people relations. The Chinese side also pledged to support the accelerated implementation of programmes and projects agreed earlier.

Some portrayed the visit as producing a new and historic agreement on ten Belt and Road Initiative projects. But those projects were not identified for the first time during the visit. They had already been preliminarily listed for possible joint implementation under the Nepal–China BRI Cooperation Framework signed in December 2024.

The latest talks were a continuation of that framework. They renewed the political commitment to move the previously listed projects towards implementation. This is not merely a matter of wording. It helps clarify the distance between a declaration, a concept, a feasibility study, a financing agreement and actual construction.

Ten Projects at Different Stages

The BRI Cooperation Framework includes the Tokha–Chhahare Tunnel, the Hilsa–Simkot Road, the Kimathanka–Khandbari Road and border infrastructure, the Kerung–Kathmandu Cross-Border Railway, the Amargadhi City Hall, the Rasuwagadhi–Chilime 220 kV Transmission Line, the Madan Bhandari University of Science and Technology, the Kathmandu Scientific Centre and Science Museum, the China–Nepal Friendship Industrial Park in Damak, and the Jhapa Sports and Athletics Complex.

However, inclusion on the list does not amount to a construction contract. The official framework describes the projects as having been preliminarily identified for possible joint implementation. Their priority, feasibility, financing arrangements, procurement methods and implementation mechanisms will be determined through separate negotiations.

The projects are not all at the same stage. The Kerung–Kathmandu Railway has reached the detailed feasibility-study phase. Letters concerning feasibility studies for the Tokha–Chhahare Tunnel and the Hilsa–Simkot Road have already been exchanged. Concept papers for several other projects are under consideration by the Chinese side.

It is therefore incorrect to assume that ten projects mean ten construction agreements. The real issue is not the preparation of concept papers. The principal challenge is the absence of a clear and publicly available timetable for moving from the conceptual stage to feasibility assessment, financing decisions and construction.

High-Quality BRI: Prudence and Timelines

In recent years, China has placed “high-quality BRI cooperation” at the centre of its policy. This does not simply mean making major announcements and immediately beginning construction. It also requires an assessment of economic justification, technical feasibility, environmental impact, debt-carrying capacity and long-term operational sustainability.

The Nepal–China BRI Cooperation Framework calls for an objective evaluation of technical, financial, commercial and economic feasibility and for returns proportionate to investment. The projects have not been tied to a single debt structure. The appropriate model—grant assistance, concessional lending, commercial investment, public-private partnership or blended financing—will be determined separately for each project.

The framework does not prevent Nepal from cooperating simultaneously with other countries or institutions. It preserves Nepal’s policy space to select projects, negotiate financing and diversify its development partners.

Every delay should therefore not be interpreted as Chinese unwillingness, political punishment or a geopolitical signal directed at a third country. At the same time, indefinite waiting in the name of feasibility and quality cannot be accepted. The credibility of caution must be demonstrated through conclusions, deadlines and transparency.

Kerung–Kathmandu Railway: A Himalayan Test

The Kerung–Kathmandu Cross-Border Railway is the most ambitious and symbolic project under the BRI. A Chinese technical team began its feasibility study in December 2022, with a scheduled duration of 42 months. The study covers approximately 72 kilometres on the Nepali side and includes geological surveys, aerial mapping, tunnels, bridges, stations, projected costs, seismic risks and construction conditions.

A pre-feasibility study indicated that approximately 98.5 percent of the proposed Nepali section would have to be built through tunnels or over bridges. The extreme differences in elevation, active geology, landslides, earthquake risks, harsh climate and limited access make this far from an ordinary railway project. If constructed, it could become one of the world’s most difficult pieces of railway infrastructure.

China’s construction of a 414-kilometre railway in Laos within five years and the completion of the Jakarta–Bandung High-Speed Railway in seven years are frequently cited. Those projects demonstrate China’s technical and construction capacity. The China–Laos Railway was itself built across difficult terrain marked by mountains, valleys, tunnels and bridges. The Jakarta–Bandung project also faced tunnels, complex geology, land acquisition and cost-related challenges.

Yet neither can be directly compared with the Kerung–Kathmandu Railway. In Laos and Indonesia, political approval, financing structures, corporate arrangements and institutional implementation mechanisms had been established before construction began. In the case of the Kerung–Kathmandu line, the feasibility study must still determine the route, cost, economic justification and technical design.

The Himalayas’ extreme elevation differences, active geological structure, earthquake risks and limited accessibility make this project fundamentally different. The time required for the study should therefore be understood not as evidence of Chinese technical incapacity, but as necessary preparation for a project involving exceptional risks.

It is also unreasonable to describe a project as a “debt trap” when it is advanced quickly, yet call it a “strategic delay” when detailed studies are undertaken.

However, the lack of clear information about the feasibility report, even after its expected handover period, has created unnecessary uncertainty. Nepal and China should clarify whether the report has been completed, is being revised or is awaiting formal diplomatic transfer.

Technically sensitive sections may remain confidential. But there is no need to conceal from the Nepali public a summary of the proposed route, estimated cost, expected economic return, environmental implications and the next stage of the decision-making process.

Tokha–Chhahare Tunnel: Environment and Preparedness

The Tokha–Chhahare Tunnel is a strategic project intended to shorten the road connection from Kathmandu through Nuwakot, Bidur and Rasuwagadhi to China. Nepal and China have exchanged letters concerning its feasibility study. Publicly available information indicates that the Chinese side has emphasised completing an environmental impact assessment before beginning the pre-feasibility study.

There is insufficient evidence to portray this as a Chinese strategy to test the speed of Nepal’s bureaucracy. Establishing baseline environmental conditions is a normal technical requirement for a large tunnel project in mountainous, watershed-sensitive and environmentally fragile terrain. China has also prioritised green, sustainable and risk-controlled projects under its more recent BRI policy.

The problem is not the requirement for an environmental study. Nepal’s failure to complete the necessary assessment on time is the weakness. Environmental procedures should not become tools for obstructing development, but possible risks cannot be ignored in the name of development either.

Nepal should complete the environmental study with a clear scope of work, qualified consultants, public hearings and a fixed deadline. The Chinese side should then provide a definite timetable for beginning the feasibility study. The situation in which both sides wait for the other’s preparation without disclosing responsibilities and deadlines must end.

University and Industrial Park: Implementation over Speculation

Claims that the Madan Bhandari University of Science and Technology is being relocated from Chitlang to Panchkhal have not been publicly confirmed. Available official information indicates that its campus remains in Chitlang, Makwanpur.

It would therefore go beyond the facts to connect the alleged relocation with Chinese displeasure or the creation of a new strategic corridor. Chinese cooperation could help expand the university’s physical and research capacity. Like international educational assistance from other countries, such cooperation may also carry diplomatic and cultural dimensions.

The central question is not which country provides the assistance. It is whether academic autonomy, research priorities, curricula, intellectual freedom and public accountability remain under the control of Nepali institutions.

Nepal should welcome Chinese cooperation in laboratories, research infrastructure, scholarships, technology transfer and scientific partnerships. But it remains Nepal’s responsibility to ensure that the university develops not as a promotional centre for any foreign power, but as an independent research institution of international standard.

A memorandum of understanding for the China–Nepal Friendship Industrial Park in Damak was signed in 2019, and its foundation stone was laid in 2021. Although the detailed project report has been approved, issues concerning the project development agreement, investment structure, land, external infrastructure and implementation remain unresolved.

There is no solid basis for claiming that China has deliberately blocked the project or is waiting until Nepal has no alternative. In a large public-private partnership project, complicated questions concerning investment security, land transfer, taxation, returns, operational rights, supporting infrastructure and dispute settlement naturally arise.

Chinese investors, like others, are unlikely to commit substantial capital to a project that is economically unclear and legally incomplete. A foundation-laying ceremony cannot guarantee construction until Nepal turns a political announcement into an investment-ready project.

The Nepal–China joint statements and the BRI framework have committed both sides to concluding the project development agreement promptly. They should now disclose which issues remain unresolved, which agencies must make the necessary decisions and by when the agreement is expected to be completed.

The Debt Debate and Nepal’s Strategic Options

A concept paper is not a complete construction agreement. It generally presents the need for a project, its objectives, preliminary cost, expected benefits, implementing agencies and the justification for further study. Detailed financial terms, interest rates, repayment periods, procurement arrangements, land acquisition, allocation of risks and legal obligations are usually decided through feasibility studies and subsequent project-specific agreements.

It may therefore be inaccurate to conclude that all financial or security conditions are hidden inside concept papers. But this does not grant the government an unlimited right to secrecy. A non-confidential summary of each project’s concept, anticipated benefits, preliminary cost, possible financing options, implementation stage and responsible agencies can be made public. Sensitive negotiating positions can be protected while maintaining public accountability.

Automatically describing the BRI as a “debt trap” is not fact-based. It is equally unjustified to assume that every project proposed under the BRI will automatically benefit Nepal.

World Bank studies have indicated that BRI transport corridors could reduce trade costs, expand commerce and contribute to poverty reduction. They have also warned that such benefits require transparency, debt sustainability, environmental safeguards, corruption control and complementary policy reforms.

The risk does not depend only on the country from which a loan or investment originates. Poor project selection, weak negotiations, exaggerated demand projections, opaque procurement and political interference can make investment from any source hazardous.

Responsibility for avoiding debt risks rests not only with the lender but also with the borrowing government. Nepal must strengthen its capacity to reject loans for projects that cannot produce economic returns, identify the foreign-currency income needed for repayment and independently assess financial risks.

The supply disruption of 2015 demonstrated that excessive dependence on a single transit direction and market can become a national vulnerability. Northern connectivity, access to Chinese ports and alternative trade routes represent strategic insurance for Nepal.

In this sense, the BRI is important for Nepal’s long-term diversification of connectivity. But it need not become the country’s only option or a geopolitical inevitability.

Nepal can expand northern connectivity with China, strengthen southern trade and energy networks with India, and simultaneously cooperate with multilateral development banks on infrastructure. This is the practical expression of balanced diplomacy.

Using China as an alternative to India, or India as a means of containing China, would be damaging for Nepal. The value of the BRI should not be measured against a third country, but by whether it expands Nepal’s trade access, productive capacity, regional connectivity and economic autonomy.

Project Preparation, Transparency and People-to-People Diplomacy

Delays in BRI projects cannot be resolved merely by pointing a finger at Beijing. Nepal must improve its own project-preparation capacity. Instead of submitting concept papers and waiting for years for a response, it needs dedicated teams with technical, financial, environmental and legal expertise for each project.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs can provide diplomatic coordination. But the geology of a road, the economic returns of a railway, the academic structure of a university and the commercial model of an industrial park must be developed by the relevant technical agencies. Moving files between ministries cannot be regarded as project management.

The government should publish regular progress reports on all ten projects. It should explain which stage each project has reached, what Nepal has completed, what response is expected from China, which decisions remain pending and what the next deadlines are.

The Chinese side should also provide timely responses to concept papers, updates on feasibility studies and schedules for forthcoming negotiations. The credibility of high-quality BRI cooperation depends not only on construction standards, but also on the transparency and predictability of the process.

My long experience in Nepal–China people-to-people diplomacy has taught me one thing: a lack of transparency can damage public trust. When the real status of projects, the causes of delay and the responsibilities of both sides remain unclear, even trust built at the state level can weaken among the public.

Track II institutions such as the Nepal–China Mutual Cooperation Society should not merely repeat government statements. They should conduct honest dialogue about the actual stages of projects, the nature of Chinese procedures, Nepal’s responsibilities and public concerns.

People-to-people diplomacy should help China understand that not every criticism raised in Nepal is an anti-China activity. It should also help Nepal recognise that Chinese caution is not always a conspiracy, insult or political punishment.

Policies centred on development, connectivity and shared prosperity must be established through facts, results, transparency and mutual respect—not through publicity alone.

Ten projects are not ten construction agreements. They are ten possibilities. Transforming them into concrete infrastructure requires studies, financing arrangements, environmental approval, land, legal agreements and political continuity.

China’s caution is one factor behind the Himalayan delays in BRI projects, but Nepal’s lack of preparation appears to be an even greater cause. In some cases, Chinese responses may be slow. In many others, the proposals submitted by Nepal may not yet have reached a decision-ready standard.

China possesses world-class construction capacity, capital, technology and experience in mountain infrastructure. Nepal holds project ownership, legal authority and the power to determine national priorities. The BRI can succeed only when these two sets of capabilities come together.

Nepal is not China’s pawn, and China is not Nepal’s automatic donor. They are two sovereign partners. The true test of their partnership lies not in declarations, but in the sharing of responsibilities, transparency and results.

The BRI is neither a predetermined debt trap nor a risk-free development gift. Its outcome will be determined by project selection, negotiating capacity, financial discipline and the quality of implementation.

China has advanced a policy of “high-quality BRI cooperation.” Nepal must respond with high-quality proposals, adequate preparation and clearly defined national priorities.

Caution in friendship is acceptable, but uncertainty cannot be endless. Concept papers will turn into concrete projects only when Chinese capacity, Nepali preparedness and public confidence come together in the same undertaking.

About the Author: Prem Sagar Poudel is a senior journalist and international relations analyst from Nepal. He has conducted in-depth studies on Nepal-China relations, the geopolitics of the Himalayan region, and Asian security issues.