Election Review Should Be About Saving the Party, Not Protecting the Leadership

The CPN-UML’s “Election Review and Party Restructuring Task Force” has examined the causes of the party’s electoral defeat. But the significance of its findings goes beyond the internal affairs of a single political party. The debate raises broader questions about how Nepal’s major political parties are run, how leadership is developed and transferred, whether the voices of grassroots cadres reach decision-making levels, and whether parties genuinely engage in self-criticism after defeat or simply blame external forces.

The UML task force has identified public dissatisfaction, weak government performance, the growing distance between the party and the people, internal factionalism, problems in candidate selection, changing social attitudes and weaknesses in digital political competition as factors behind the defeat. The report also refers to geopolitical maneuvering and the influence of digital algorithms. What is important, however, is that it does not appear to place the entire failure in the category of an external conspiracy while concealing the party’s internal weaknesses. Genuine political reform can begin from this point.

Nepal’s political parties suffer from a longstanding problem. Leadership tends to claim credit for victory, while responsibility for defeat is shifted to circumstances, party workers, coalition partners, the media, foreign powers or even voters. In a democratic party, authority must come with accountability. If a leader receives praise for repeatedly delivering electoral victories, it is equally natural for questions to be raised about that leadership when the party experiences sustained political decline. Treating such questions merely as indiscipline or rebellion weakens internal democracy.

For this reason, the debate over leadership transition should not be understood as an insult to, or rejection of, any individual. No matter how experienced, popular or historically significant a leader may be, a political institution must remain larger than any one person. Leadership transition is not defeat. The ability to transfer responsibility to a new generation at the right time is a sign of political maturity. An organization that fails to prepare successors in time eventually falls into a leadership crisis.

The debate within the UML over restoring a 70-year age limit and a maximum of two terms in executive positions should also be viewed from this perspective. Age or term limits alone cannot solve every problem. A capable person does not become incapable simply because of age, nor does a younger person become capable merely because of youth. But clear and predetermined rules prevent leadership change from becoming a matter of personal confrontation. If the same rules apply equally to everyone, space opens for the development of future leadership.

This lesson is not for the UML alone. The Nepali Congress, Maoist parties, Madhes-based parties and newer political forces must also establish clear democratic procedures for leadership selection, succession, candidate nomination and internal dissent. Democracy is not merely a system of asking citizens for votes every five years. If parties that practice democracy in the state fail to remain democratic within themselves, the democratic character of the state itself will weaken.

For the UML, the current report can become an opportunity. If it is reduced to a document used in a power struggle between supporters and opponents of the leadership, its value will quickly disappear. But if it becomes the basis for openly discussing criticism from cadres, acknowledging weaknesses, pursuing organizational reform and creating a credible mechanism for leadership transition, electoral defeat itself could become the starting point for long-term renewal.

A political party is strengthened not simply by a powerful leader, but by institutions that continue to function even when leaders change. Nepal’s democracy now needs parties built on that principle.