BRICS is at Nepal’s Doorstep, Why is Kathmandu Looking Away?
Prem Sagar Poudel
The global balance of power is undergoing a profound transformation. A vivid manifestation of this shift is unfolding in New Delhi on September 12 and 13, where the 18th BRICS Summit is being held under India’s chairmanship. The principal powers of the expanded BRICS grouping, including China, India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa, are convening to deliberate on trade, investment, development finance, and the future architecture of global governance. Nepal’s two colossal neighbors to its north and south are founding members of this very structure. Yet, wedged between them, Nepal conspicuously lacks a clear, institutionalized strategy to align BRICS with its own national interests.
Whether or not to pursue full membership is a secondary question. The primary question is this: How seriously has Kathmandu actually studied the economic, political, and financial significance of BRICS? The doors for high-level political engagement are wide open from both Beijing and New Delhi. In such a context, Nepal’s challenge is not about choosing sides. It is about leveraging available diplomatic opportunities to advance its own development, trade, and strategic autonomy.
The problem lies not in the rhetoric of foreign policy, but in the lack of continuity in its practice. Priorities shift with every change of government. The personal style of leadership dictates the tempo of foreign policy, and decisions on sensitive matters are often delayed. This has cultivated an environment of strategic ambiguity rather than strategic caution. Domestically, political accusations have poisoned the decision-making process. If Nepal grows closer to India, it is labeled “pro-India.” If it deepens cooperation with China, it is branded “pro-China.” If it works with the United States, it is interpreted as being “pro-West.” The fear of these domestic political labels has forced Kathmandu to view diplomatic distance as a safer alternative to proactive engagement. This is a fundamental misreading of a small state’s security dilemma.
In international relations theory, this is a question of strategic hedging. A small state does not need to fully align with one power or completely detach from another. It can cooperate with one partner in the economic sphere, another in security, and a third in development finance, provided that the center of decision-making remains firmly in Kathmandu. India itself exemplifies this strategic autonomy. It participates in the Quad with the United States while maintaining deep ties with Russia and China. Similarly, China adheres to the principle of peaceful coexistence and a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. Therefore, Nepal must discard its outdated interpretation of non-alignment. The old meaning was to maintain equal distance from everyone. The new, realistic meaning is to engage with all while reserving the final decision for one’s own national interest.
Nepal’s economic structure makes this proactive diplomacy not a luxury, but an absolute necessity. In Fiscal Year 2025/26, Nepal’s total foreign trade reached approximately NPR 24.12 trillion. While imports surged to NPR 20.96 trillion, exports remained a meager NPR 3.15 trillion, resulting in a staggering trade deficit of NPR 17.81 trillion. This structure reveals a hard truth. Nepal cannot advance economically by detaching itself from India. Nor can it build a long-term industrial and infrastructural strategy by ignoring China. Therefore, the issue is not about creating distance. The issue is about transforming dependency on both neighbors into mutual benefit and opportunity.
Viewing BRICS through an ideological lens would be a mistake. It is not a unified military alliance. Even though its members hold divergent interests, they convene under one roof to address economic cooperation, development finance, and the representation of the Global South. While Nepal need not rush to a conclusion on full membership, it is imperative to conduct a rigorous national study on the potential benefits of partner status, BRICS Plus, outreach participation, and development financing.
Herein lies the strategic importance of the New Development Bank. The bank provides critical financing for clean energy, transport, climate resilience, and digital infrastructure. Even without full BRICS membership, Nepal could potentially explore cooperation with the bank. However, this is not a magical solution. Securing funds requires bankable projects, debt sustainability, and strict environmental standards. Nepal must first prepare robust project pipelines, such as cross-border transmission lines, hydropower, glacial lake early warning systems, and digital infrastructure, before seeking finance. Similarly, while trading in local currencies like the Nepali Rupee and Chinese Yuan could mitigate some foreign exchange risks, the real solution to the trade deficit lies in enhancing domestic production and industrial capacity.
Nepal must also not overlook the potential risks. Due to its open border, Himalayan geography, and water resources, Nepal occupies a highly sensitive position in India’s security calculus. Consequently, New Delhi will naturally harbor concerns regarding telecommunications or strategic infrastructure connected to China. Accepting this reality is not submitting to Indian influence. It is accepting the reality of geography. Nepal’s diplomatic acumen will be tested precisely here. It must clearly communicate that its economic ties with China are not directed against India. Conversely, it must provide credible assurance that its cooperation with India does not threaten China’s legitimate economic interests. True balance is not about saying the same thing to everyone. It is about managing the distinct and legitimate concerns of each side separately.
Similarly, there is no strategic reason to sever ties with the West. BRICS nations themselves maintain extensive economic and political relationships with Western countries. Nepal’s actual risk lies not in engaging with BRICS. The risk lies in succumbing to opaque debt structures or allowing a single power’s political agenda to constrain its decision-making capacity. This principle must apply uniformly to all partners, whether they are American, Chinese, Indian, or European.
The historical roots of Nepal’s strategic ambiguity are deep. Since the 1950s, Nepal has attempted to diversify its external relations while maintaining its inevitable ties with India. During the Panchayat era, King Mahendra expanded relations with China through projects like the Kodari Highway, aiming to reduce excessive dependence on New Delhi. While this balancing act was not always successful, it embodied a clear strategic objective. That objective was to expand Nepal’s international alternatives. With the advent of multiparty democracy, this strategy was weakened by domestic political polarization. Foreign policy subsequently turned into a reactive exercise swayed by each successive government rather than a long-term national project.
To rectify this, the decision on BRICS must not be confined to personal whims. A permanent study mechanism comprising the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, Nepal Rastra Bank, the National Planning Commission, and the Investment Board is essential. The first phase should involve a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. The second phase should prepare a list of viable, bankable projects. This is what strategic hedging truly means. It means reducing over-dependence on any single power center while keeping multiple options open. For a small nation, options are strength.
Nepal does not have to abandon the West to embrace the East. Nor does it have to abandon India to embrace China. The core mantra of Nepal’s foreign policy must be unambiguous. Neither Delhi, nor Beijing, nor Washington should make decisions for Kathmandu. Kathmandu must always stand firmly for Nepal’s interests. However, standing for Nepal does not mean watching the world change from inside one’s home. It means traveling to Delhi, Beijing, Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo with a clear set of national interests. It also means being capable of voicing dissent where necessary.
BRICS is already at Nepal’s geographical doorstep. Yet, a truly strategic state is one that knows exactly which doors to open, why to open them, what to gain from them, and what the cost will be for national autonomy. Nepal’s real challenge today is not that it lacks BRICS membership. The real challenge is its inability to weave its geography, economy, and diplomatic potential into a cohesive, long-term national strategy. If this weakness is not corrected, the question in the future will not be why India or China drifted away from Nepal. It will be a harsher one. The question will be why Nepal sat as a mere spectator while the world’s new economic architecture was being built right on its doorstep. And that answer can never be supplied by simply blaming external powers.
About the Author: Prem Sagar Poudel is a senior journalist and international relations analyst from Nepal. He has conducted in-depth studies on Nepal-China relations, the geopolitics of the Himalayan region, and Asian security issues.
