Politics of Accusation Against Deuba, a Test of the Congress Charter
Rajendra Sharma
The current dispute in the Nepali Congress cannot be dismissed as a contest for office between two leaders. It is a test of whether the party will abide by its charter or allow power to shape the rules to suit its purposes. It also raises questions about how delegates’ signatures should be interpreted, how fairly leadership changes must be conducted, and how decisions made before a court resolves a pending dispute should be viewed.
The Election Commission has recognised the committee led by Gagan Thapa, and the Supreme Court has upheld that decision. The Deuba faction cannot disregard this and declare its own structure the official one. But neither can the ruling be treated as the final resolution of the dispute while the Deuba faction’s questions are ignored. The Supreme Court has accepted a review petition, returning the case for further consideration. The current legal record and a final judicial determination are not the same thing.
Supporting Deuba does not mean that he must remain party president indefinitely. It means that any decision to remove him or restrict his political rights must comply with the party charter, follow a fair process and be free from the shadow of violence. Challenging the tendency to treat allegations as proof, investigations as convictions and political pressure as a substitute for popular consent is a defence of democracy.
The history of allegations against Deuba shows why these distinctions matter. In 2005, after King Gyanendra assumed direct rule, the Royal Commission for Corruption Control accused Deuba in connection with the Melamchi project and sentenced him to two years in prison. He was released after the Supreme Court later ruled that the commission was unconstitutional. That sentence cannot be described as a final conviction by a constitutionally competent court. It would also be inaccurate to claim that the court’s ruling resolved every factual allegation concerning Melamchi. The lesson is clear: an accusation by a body established under political rule is not the same as a crime proven through lawful judicial proceedings.
Deuba and his wife, Arzu Rana Deuba, are currently under investigation in a money-laundering case. The Supreme Court intervened in the arrest-warrant process and ordered that they not be arrested on the basis of those warrants. This did not end the investigation or amount to a final exoneration. But the issuance of an arrest warrant cannot itself be presented as proof of guilt. The law maintains a distinction between an ongoing investigation and a proven crime; political rhetoric cannot erase it. Guilt is determined by a court, not by a political indictment.
The violent attack on Deuba and his wife at their residence on September 9, 2025, cannot be dismissed as an ordinary incident. Until evidence is made public, it would be wrong to claim that a particular group planned the attack. But it is equally unfair to portray subsequent events as the product of normal, unrestrained consent while ignoring the impact of the violence on Deuba’s security, presence and political activity. An attack on a leader’s home is not merely a breach of personal security; it also raises questions about political rights and freedom of decision-making. Condemning violence and calling for scrutiny of its impact on the political process are not contradictory positions.
Article 17(2) of the Nepali Congress charter is central to the debate over the special general convention. It requires the party to convene one when at least 40 percent of general convention delegates make a written demand. In Ashoj 2082, 2,488 delegates—54.58 percent of the total—were reported to have made such a request. The leadership had a duty to hear a demand supported by so many delegates; ignoring it would not be consistent with the charter. But signatures calling for a special convention cannot be treated as unlimited advance approval of every decision, leadership change and election procedure that follows. The basis for convening a convention and the validity of the decisions it makes are separate questions that must be examined independently.
After the special convention, the Election Commission recognised the committee led by Gagan Thapa on January 16, 2026. On April 17, the Supreme Court upheld the Commission’s decision. The Deuba faction then sought a review, which the Supreme Court accepted for hearing on August 6. Accepting a review petition does not automatically overturn the earlier ruling. By the same token, the fact that an earlier ruling exists does not make a fresh hearing meaningless. The Commission’s decision remains in effect unless and until it is changed; nevertheless, the questions raised must be heard now that the case is again before the court.
The Supreme Court has declined to issue an interim order halting the convention process, allowing the Thapa-led leadership to proceed. But the absence of an interim order does not mean that the court has finally resolved the review questions or endorsed every step in the process. The verification of signatures, attendance at the closed session, delegates’ rights and election procedures must be assessed against the evidence and the party charter. It would be unjust to dismiss the Deuba faction’s questions as nothing more than the resentment of a defeated leadership.
It is fair to criticise the Deuba faction’s preparations for a parallel convention as divisive and risky. But organising a separate gathering or process does not, by itself, constitute contempt of court; that requires a violation of a clear court order. Nor can the other faction’s process automatically change the official leadership recorded by the Election Commission. The Deuba faction must prove its case in court, while the Thapa faction should not present the Commission’s recognition as the final answer to every political and procedural question.
International examples also show why rules matter in the internal democracy of political parties. Germany’s Constitution requires parties to organise themselves according to democratic principles. In 1981, the US Supreme Court recognised a political party’s authority to apply its rules for selecting delegates to its convention. These cases are not identical to the Nepali Congress dispute. They do, however, reflect a common democratic principle: a party’s charter and delegate-selection procedures should not be changed to suit a leader’s convenience.
The claim that an unseen force secured legal recognition for the Thapa faction cannot be presented as fact without evidence. No publicly available evidence has established that conclusion. But the questions raised by the attack on Deuba, the extraordinary circumstances that followed and the rapid pace of the leadership change cannot simply be silenced. The answer to suspicion is not to repeat it; it is to make the signatures, delegate attendance, closed-session records and decision-making process public and open to scrutiny.
Allegations have repeatedly been made against Deuba during his political career. Some arose amid political power struggles; other matters remain under investigation. It is unjust to turn allegations that have not been proven in court into a final verdict on his political character. The case for supporting him is not blind loyalty to an individual; it is the demand that the same judicial standards apply to everyone.
The Election Commission should issue a clear written explanation of its current records and the implications of the review proceedings before the court. The court should resolve the case promptly. Both Congress factions must respect delegates’ rights, the party’s procedures and political competition free from violence.
The question of who should lead the Congress must be answered through the party charter and a fair process, not through power, haste or accusation. Deuba must not be declared guilty unless guilt is proven; nor should the questions surrounding the process to remove him be ignored. That is the rule of law—and the minimum path to preventing the Congress from splitting further.
